741.61/903: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 24—9:05 a.m.]
1393. For the President, the Secretary and the Under Secretary. My 1390, October 22, 5 p.m.31 The British Ambassador told me last night that having been unable to obtain an appointment with Molotov he had seen Vishinski yesterday afternoon who had offered no explanation of the failure of Molotov to receive the Ambassador. The Ambassador said that he had prefaced the submission of the proposals contained in his instructions by informing Vishinski that Great Britain was now confident of ultimate victory particularly as the most powerful industrial country in the world, the United States, was coming more and more to the aid of Great Britain. Vishinski brought out comments on this statement by inquiring of the Ambassador what the Diplomatic Corps in Moscow was saying with reference to recent diplomatic “maneuvers,” to which Cripps replied that it was the consensus of opinion in diplomatic circles that a Soviet-Japanese pact would be signed shortly after the arrival of the new Japanese Ambassador,32 to which Vishinski replied “reports of such a pact are perhaps greatly exaggerated.” Cripps told me that from Vishinski’s reply he had deduced that some form of Soviet-Japanese pact would be signed but that it might well be more limited in scope than had previously been expected.33 Cripps then outlined to Vishinski the [Page 620] proposals which he had been authorized by his Government to make as follows:
That the British Government would bind itself in writing (1) to conclude no peace without consulting the Soviet Union; (2) to conclude no anti-Soviet agreement with any third nation; (3) to give definite assurances that no attack would be made by Great Britain against Baku or Batum; and (4) to conclude a commercial agreement with the Soviet Union for the delivery by Great Britain of rubber, tin and other commodities required by the Soviet Union.
In reply to my inquiry Cripps stated that the British Government would not require guarantees from the Soviet Union that the commodities referred to in number (4) above or their equivalents would not be reexported to Germany since in conformity with the recent declarations of avoiding any appearance of suspicion in its relations with the Soviet Union, his Government has informed him that the acceptance of the proposals of the British Government as a whole would eliminate the probability of reexport.
In return for the foregoing proposals the British Government would require (1) that the Soviet Union observe genuine neutrality in the present war between Germany and Great Britain; (2) that in the event of the involvement of Turkey or Iran or both in war with the Axis Powers the Soviet Union would adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality toward these countries; (3) that there should be no cessation of aid to and support of China; and (4) that subsequent to the conclusion of the commercial agreement referred to above and at a propitious time in the future a nonaggression pact should be concluded between Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
The Ambassador informed me that after he had set forth the foregoing proposals to Vishinski, the latter had asked him whether these proposals and terms had been communicated by the British Government to the Government of the United States, to which Cripps had replied in the affirmative.34
With further reference to Soviet-Japanese relations, Cripps took occasion to tell Vishinski that a Soviet-Japanese pact which contained the implication of cessation of Soviet aid to China would probably result in the collapse of China’s resistance, in which event the Japanese armies on the continent of Asia would be “free for other purposes”.
The Ambassador told me that he had given Vishinski renewed assurances that there would be no publicity emanating from Great Britain concerning the proposals which he had just submitted on behalf of his Government or any negotiations resulting therefrom. [Page 621] In conclusion the Ambassador said that Vishinski on the whole, except for his question as to whether the Government of the United States had been informed of the British proposals, had been entirely noncommittal and had merely promised to submit the proposals to his Government.
- Post, p. 667.↩
- Lt. Gen. (retired) Yoshitsugu Tatekawa.↩
- A neutrality pact between Japan and the Soviet Union was signed at Moscow on April 13, 1941; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 29, 1945, p. 812.↩
- Information about these proposals and terms was given to the United States by the British Chargé N. M. Butler, in a conversation on October 18, 1940, with Under Secretary of State Welles.↩