741.61/901: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State

1293. The British Ambassador called on me this morning to acquaint me with the subject of a conversation which he had with Molotov. He had called on Molotov to inform him of the decision of the British Government to reopen the Burma Road on October 17. The Ambassador read me his telegrams to the British Foreign Office reporting his conversations with Molotov, the substance of which may be briefly summarized as follows:

At the Ambassador’s request Molotov had reaffirmed that the Soviet Union had a common interest with Great Britain in continued Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression although at first Molotov endeavored to minimize the effect of the reopening of the Burma Road [Page 618] and in so doing had displayed to the Ambassador’s astonishment the fact that he [thought] the Burma Road was a railroad; but upon being enlightened by the Ambassador that it was not a railroad but a well constructed motor highway capable of transporting 600 tons per day, had recognized that the Burma Road as a medium of furnishing supplies to China was superior in every respect to the route via Sinkiang. In reply to a request from the Ambassador, however, for additional Soviet supplies to China to be sent via Rangoon, Molotov was noncommittal. The Ambassador then dwelt at great length on the desire of the British Government to adopt a strong position vis-à-vis Japan in the Far East as the result of the German-Italian-Japanese alliance but only provided the British Government was assured of the wholehearted support of the United States in the Far East which in turn to some extent would be affected by the position of the Soviet Union. The Ambassador expressed to Molotov the view that the present southward course of Japanese aggression would not remove a future threat to the Soviet Union and Soviet interests on the continent of Asia which a powerful Japan would present and added that in the event the Soviet Union were to conclude a pact with Japan designed to direct Japanese activities to the south and away from the Soviet Union any such agreement would unquestionably affect the United States to the extent that should Japanese aggression at some time in the future be directed toward the Soviet Union it was not likely that the United States would feel called upon to take a strong position against Japan.

The Ambassador, on the basis of his exposition of the situation in the Far East, expressed the opinion to Molotov that the Soviet Union should consult and cooperate with Great Britain and the United States at the present time in respect of Far Eastern matters. Molotov replied that inasmuch as Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other have been unable to agree on minor and relatively unimportant matters he did not see how they could find any basis of agreement on questions of major policy in the Far East. Despite the noncommittal nature of his reply, Molotov gave the Ambassador the impression that the Soviet Government would welcome an opportunity to eliminate minor controversies existing between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Great Britain on the other if we could clear the way for the policies in the Far East. The Ambassador added orally to me that Molotov had appeared quite nervous when he referred to the subject of consultation with the British Government and had appeared obviously relieved when the Ambassador had said that he referred primarily to the question of increased assistance to China.

The Ambassador then reverted to his previous argument (see my telegram No. 1262, October 2, 10 a.m.) that since the Soviet Union, [Page 619] in his opinion, would shortly be under extreme German pressure to reach an agreement with Japan it was important that Great Britain and the United States take steps to counteract this pressure.

From the Ambassador’s detailed account of his conversation with Molotov I received the distinct impression that he had throughout spoken of a joint move on the part of Great Britain and the United States and while I appreciated his frankness I was somewhat surprised by the facile convictions which he had expressed to Molotov in respect of the present and future policy of the United States in the Far East. The Ambassador in conclusion informed me that a full account of his conversation with Molotov had been sent to the British Ambassador in Washington who will presumably discuss the matter with the Department.

Steinhardt