740.0011 European War 1939/35523/14: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:02 p.m.]
1057. For the President and the Secretary. Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Ambassador who just lunched with me alone, stated that the reason for the British refusal to send their remaining pursuit planes to France is that they are convinced that at the rate of destruction [Page 242] in the present battle there would be no British pursuit planes left at the end of 2 weeks.
He went on to say that his opinion, which he asserted was based on statements of General Weygand,93 was that while the French would fight with the utmost bravery there was no hope of preventing the Germans from occupying Paris and destroying the French Army. The British Government therefore felt that it must keep what planes it still had in Great Britain.
I replied that I hoped he realized that in taking such an attitude the British Government was running an enormous risk that the people of France realizing that the British had withdrawn their pursuit planes [and?] that King Leopold had withdrawn his army, would feel betrayed and would feel disposed to make peace with Germany and even perhaps in a rage turn against Great Britain.
The British Ambassador said that he was fully aware of this danger but so far as he was concerned he had little or no hope that the French might be able to resist the present German assault. He felt that Churchill was prepared to go much further than any of his advisers in supporting the French and that if no planes should be sent now it would be because there were not sufficient planes available and that there was no hope of stopping the German attack.
I replied that the French had every hope of stopping the German advance now. The French were prepared to shed every drop of French blood available. From the purely selfish point of view of the British Government the decision to be made involved an extremely careful calculation.
If it should be decided that there was no hope of stopping the Germans now by sending every available British soldier and British plane, in that case the British, from their own selfish point of view, might decide not to send either soldiers or planes. On the other hand the British Government might decide that the present battle was the decisive battle of the war and that every available British soldier and plane should be put into it.
I expressed the personal opinion that if the Germans should succeed in destroying the French Army and occupying the entire north coast of France it would be possible for the Germans to establish a line of mines and submarines at Calais and another such line to the west of Southampton, and that an invasion of Great Britain in force would become a definite possibility. I felt, therefore, that even from the most selfish point of view it would be to the interest of Great Britain to bring all planes and troops available into the present battle.
- Gen. Maxime Weygand, Commander in Chief of the French Army replacing General Gamelin.↩