867N.01/1609
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 13.]
Sir: The fortnight since publication of the British Government’s White Paper of May 17, 1939, on its future policy in this country, I have the honor to report, has seen a crystallization of the various and sometimes complex reactions foreshadowed in my despatch No. 934 of May 1686 and immediately preceding political despatches. As observed respectively among Palestinian Jews and Arabs and British Government officials they may be summarized as follows:
Among the Jews there is an intense country-wide bitterness at the repudiation (sic) of the promises of the Balfour Declaration and Palestine Mandate and at the resulting denial of their national aspirations, [Page 770] a bitterness which has given rise to and is today closely combined with a sullen determination to continue in the face of all opposition the building of their National Home and to prevent effective application of the new policy through unremitting campaigns of protest both here and abroad and of non-cooperation in Palestine;
Among the Arabs the major reaction—while modified by a considerable measure of continuing distrust in British bona fides and keen resentment against the declared British intention indefinitely to prohibit the return of their paramount leader, the Mufti of Jerusalem—is one of very obvious relief that the White Paper actually contains the long-heralded provisions curtailing Jewish immigration and land purchases, definitely limiting to one-third the permissible maximum Jewish proportion of the total population and opening the way to a reestablishment of peace and orderly government in town and countryside;
Among British officials, also, while on another score, I find a dominant feeling of relief—though tinged by some scepticism as to the future—that a policy, at least moderately clear in objective and in definition of what is meant by a Jewish National Home, has at long last been set before them as a basic guide for future civil administration of the country.
To all, the two outstanding provisions of the White Paper—copies of which have been forwarded to the Department by the Embassy in London—are:
- First, the definite statement that “His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that, when the immigration over the five years which is now contemplated has taken place (i. e. a maximum of 75,000) they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they be under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population”; and
- Second, the equally definite declaration that “it is not their policy that Palestine should become a Jewish State”, but, rather, “a State in which the two peoples in Palestine, Arabs and Jews, share authority in government in such a way that the essential interests of each are secured.” The Arab contention that “the McMahon correspondence forms a just basis for the claim that Palestine should be converted into an Arab State” was, at the same time, specifically rejected.
The latter of these major provisions (first in order of presentation in the White Paper) is clearly designed—and in the opinion of objective observers here—should, while dashing Zionist hopes of political sovereignty in Palestine, remove Jewish fear of Arab domination. Together with the first and its corollary that the Jewish proportion of the population shall not exceed one-third, it removes the fundamental Arab fear of continuing Jewish penetration and eventual domination.
[Page 771]The declared “objective” of the new policy arising out of these major considerations—i. e. “the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine State in such treaty relations with the United Kingdom as will provide satisfactorily for the commercial and strategic requirements of both countries in the future”—is, therefore, generally acceptable to the Arabs but flatly repugnant to Zionist aspirations.
Consequently, Jewish opposition to the new policy is based on a fundamental denial of its premises, whereas that of the Arabs—in addition to the factors, already mentioned, of distrust of British good faith and resentment against exclusion of the Mufti—centers primarily on the details of the transitional regime which the White Paper outlines as necessarily precedent to establishment of an independent state.…
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Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩