781.003/180
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
The French Ambassador called on me this morning, by appointment, to receive the Secretary’s note of January 21, 193919 and the draft instruments which we have prepared for purposes of negotiations looking to the termination of American capitulatory rights in the French Zone of the Shereefian Empire and to the establishment [Page 648] of appropriate safeguards for our trade with Morocco after such termination.
In handing the Secretary’s note and the draft instruments to the French Ambassador, I made the following observations:
The position of this Government upon entering the present negotiations differs in certain material respects from that of the British Government when entering into treaty relations with the French on the same subject in 1937. It was recalled that the British Government had obligated itself, under the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904,20 to examine any suggestions that might be made by the French Government respecting reforms “tending to assimilate Moroccan legislation with that of other civilized countries,” in return for similar cooperation on the part of the French Government in respect of any suggestions of the same kind made by Great Britain in the case of Egypt. Since France had fulfilled her part of the bargain in connection with the Montreux Convention of 1937 terminating the capitulations in Egypt, the British Government was, of course, under the necessity of giving effect to the promises made in the above-mentioned declaration of 1904.
Furthermore, there figured in the Anglo-French negotiations of 1937 the quid pro quo of the French Government’s renunciation of its capitulatory rights in Zanzibar in deference to British wishes and, finally, it had been noted that the British obtained also, during the negotiations with the French, definite commitments regarding insurance legislation favorable to British interests.
The Ambassador interrupted me at this point to observe that, since this Government had shown such a liberal and helpful attitude to the Egyptians during the Montreux conference,21 it was hoped that our position would be equally favorable to the French in the matter of the termination of our capitulatory rights in Morocco. In reply to this observation, I pointed out to the Ambassador what we believe to be the very considerable difference between the two situations. In the case of Egypt we were cooperating in the termination of our capitulatory rights solely in the interest of the Egyptians themselves, whereas in the case of Morocco the termination of our rights there is rather in the interest of the French than of the Moroccans. A further and more important point of difference was that, in the matter of our trade with Egypt, there had never been any cause for complaint on the score of discrimination, whereas our records show that, despite our capitulatory rights in Morocco, there have been almost constant complaints that the French authorities there have endeavored to discriminate against American trade in favor of their own.
[Page 649]The Ambassador appeared rather annoyed at the above remark and said that he would like to know in what particular cases there had been charges of discrimination on the part of the French authorities. I replied that I did not, of course, have the particular cases at hand but could easily furnish material on this subject at his convenience. The Ambassador then went on to say that the situation was an impossible one in Morocco and that the French must naturally make every endeavor to “regularize” it. I thereupon mentioned the basic principle enunciated in the Algeciras Act, namely “economic liberty without any inequality”, and observed that our present treaty drafts quite naturally took that principle fully into account.
Returning to the exposition of our general attitude in this matter, I mentioned the introduction of quotas in the new Franco-British Commercial Treaty regarding Morocco. As the Ambassador must doubtless be aware, this Government had been requested in 1935 to give its consent to the introduction of quotas in Morocco but was unwilling to do so at that time. As evidence, however, of our present spirit of accommodation and in view of the desire of both the French and the British Governments to introduce the principle of quotas in French Morocco, we had reluctantly, in the present instruments, agreed to the introduction of quotas with proper safeguards for certain items of American imports into Morocco in which we are principally interested. Our approach to the matter was, however, in my opinion, far more liberal than that of the British. The latter had actually insisted upon the introduction of quotas in French Morocco in order to regain their lost textile market. We, on the other hand, were perfectly willing to take our chances in the free competitive market of French Morocco which we desired to see continued. If we had followed the British example with the present commanding position of our automotive products in the French Zone, we would have requested that those products be placed under quotas guaranteeing them in the future against any reduction in the volume of our exports to the Zone and against any outside competition. The Ambassador was also reminded in passing that, while other powers appear to have granted the French Government a certain degree of latitude in certain particulars in French Morocco by the provisions of Article IV of the Franco-German Accord of November 4, 1911,22 the United States has never adhered to that accord.
In view of the above circumstances, I wished to make it clear that in presenting the present draft instruments we were firmly attached to the provisions therein regarding (1) customs valuation and (2) the Annex to our Commercial Treaty containing assurances against the [Page 650] imposition of quantitative restrictions on articles of special interest to this country.
The Ambassador was anything but pleased at the above oral exposition of our views on this subject and inquired whether they were incorporated in the covering note. I replied that, while they were not specifically mentioned, they were clearly implied and would be obvious after he had examined the draft texts. The Ambassador then expressed the wish that I not regard his remarks as an official reply to the oral statements I had made; that, in view of his long familiarity with Morocco, he would be in a position to reply in detail to the points I had raised and in writing if I desired. I informed him that there would appear to be no necessity for written correspondence on these points since they would undoubtedly come out during the course of our future negotiations on the basis of the treaty drafts.
- Supra.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. ci, p. 1053.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. ii, pp. 615 ff.↩
- British and Foreign State Papers, vol. civ, p. 948.↩