893.102 Tientsin/496
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Mr. Mallet handed me the attached aide-mémoire29 this morning. He called special attention to paragraph A, subheadings 3 and 4. I said that I would call these to the special attention of our economic officers.
Mr. Mallet then made mention of the remainder of the aide-mémoire, beginning with paragraph B. He said that this of course involved a program which it would take a considerable period of time to work out. He said that, in offering this, his Government was offering something in the nature of “thinking out loud”, something intended tentatively. I called attention to an ambiguity in a sentence which I have marked on page 3.30 Mr. Mallet said that according to his reading of the sentence the illustration offered was meant to be an illustration of a type of procedure to which his Government would not “give sympathetic consideration”. (Note: If that is what the sentence means, I see no reason why the illustration should have been offered at all.)
I made a number of observations to Mr. Mallet, stating that they were my personal views, to the effect that pursuit of a policy of “appeasement” (I did not use that word) involving signing away of rights, etc., in Japan’s favor, if followed, in the Far East, would be likely to be no more effective toward producing peace, stability and conditions of justice than has been pursuit of such a policy in Europe. Mr. Mallet remarked that the British are very hard pressed at Tientsin. I replied that it is one thing to give way under force majeure and it is another thing to sign and seal a deed of surrender.
[Page 243]Later, Lord Lothian31 being present, I expressed the personal opinion that signing away of rights and deeding of property to bandits will no more ensure peaceful enjoyment of remainders in the Far East than has or will (would) the same process in Europe.