893.102 Tientsin/501
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 13.]
Sir: …
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The British Embassy has been particularly helpful in enabling us to follow closely these developments and has kept us currently informed of the situation. In a rather long interview which a member of my staff had with Mr. Henderson, first secretary of the British Embassy, on the day instructions virtually ending the conversations arrived, the probable considerations motivating the British Government’s decision were discussed at some length by Mr. Henderson. The British Government, he said, had some time ago approached the American Government concerning the economic questions at Tientsin. The Government of the United States had then expressed to Japan its interest in the proposition to prohibit circulation of the fapi in the British Concession, but had not shown much concern over the problem of the silver reserves. Consultations were then held between the French Government, which had indicated its direct concern in both [Page 239] problems, and the British Government as to whether to approach the United States again on the ground that if the silver were allowed to be taken over by the Provisional Government at Peiping, this would, in effect, seriously damage the legitimate currency of the National Government of China and constitute a “leg up” for the Federal Reserve Bank currency. The United States, therefore, should be, if not directly, certainly indirectly interested in the silver problem. Agreement was reached that further approaches should be made to the United States. After this, Mr. Henderson went on to say, the public reaction in Great Britain to the handing over of the four alleged terrorists had been distinctly unfavorable and his Government had felt it necessary to take a decisive step to offset that reaction. At the same time, the British Government came to the conclusion that the United States is of the frame of mind that it will “help only those who help themselves.” He pointed out that the reactions in China and the United States had been unfavorable to the British decision regarding the four men. He made a few side remarks to the effect that the British stand in regard to these men had been taken “on bad ground” and his Government wished to relieve itself of that position and take a stand on a firmer and more clearly defined issue. Therefore, the British Government had come to the decision that the political factors involved far outweighed all other considerations and the decision had, in his estimation, been taken for its political effect in Great Britain, China, and the United States.
The Japanese by publicly announcing their objectives were thereby precluded from modifying their stand on questions which Great Britain was unable to accede to for political reasons, and thus at the very first prejudiced the success of the conversations.
Recent international events have completely overshadowed the local issues at Tientsin. The former positions of Great Britain and Japan were so far separated that any future conversations will undoubtedly have to be openly of political significance and far-reaching in their scope. Certainly nothing in this connection can be expected to materialize until the policies of the Japanese Government with regard to the European situation have been clarified and the position of the present Cabinet made apparent or a new Cabinet established.
Respectfully yours,