893.102 Tientsin/337½: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, July 5, 1939—5
p.m.
[Received July 5—8 a.m.]
[Received July 5—8 a.m.]
312. Our 309, July 3, 7 p.m.
- 1.
- I have had conversations during the past few days with the British Ambassador, members of his staff and Major Herbert5 from Tientsin and the impression formed of British thoughts and plans for dealing with the Japanese at the forthcoming conference is that they are compounded of confusion and irresolution. Craigie, when explaining his views to me, oscillates between compromise and non-compromise, thus reflecting diversion of opinion among members of his staff. I said to him smilingly that I assumed that he would not agree to the conference opening in view of the continued mistreatment of British nationals at Tientsin and he replied that he could not go so far as to say that to the Japanese but that he is insisting on “moderation” (see our 296, June 26, 5 p.m., third paragraph). Herbert whose views are presumably those of the British community at Tientsin seems to favor coming to terms with the Japanese and to fear that if the negotiations break down the Japanese would cause the local Chinese regime to take over the Concession.
- 2.
- I have been giving continued thought to the Department’s 182, July 1, and our 309, July 3, 7 p.m. The views expressed in the latter telegram are my own but they are substantially indorsed by all the other members of the staff including the Naval and Commercial Attachés, the Military Attaché being absent on inspection. However, in view of the obscurity of the British position in Tokyo and of the obvious efforts of the Japanese to intimidate the British (see our 310, July 4, 11 a.m.6), I desire to review my suggestion that the American Government await the conclusion of the Tokyo conversations before taking a definite position vis-à-vis the Japanese Government. I respectfully submit for the Department’s consideration the desirability of our Government taking interim action prior to opening of the conversations,7 which would carry implication of American concern if issues exceeding the limited field of the administration of the British Concession were discussed at Tokyo is now to take the form, for example, of an oral statement by the Secretary at a press conference.
Dooman