893.102 Tientsin/335: Telegram
The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 3—11 a.m.]
309. Department’s 182, July 1, 11 p.m. If Far Eastern problems and situations were self-contained there would be no great difficulty in forming our opinion on the question whether the time is now opportune for sending the Department’s draft note to the Japanese Government, but never before have they been so closely inter-related with problems and situations in Europe, with regard to which we do not have the information necessary to form views in accurate perspective. I feel that I am in position only to present my estimate as to the probable far-reaching effects of the note if sent at this time and this I do as follows:
1. After 2 years of the China conflict the Japanese are anxious to avoid trouble with the United States. Whatever may be the value of Japanese good will in terms of safeguarding American rights and interests in China, the United States is the only nation which enjoys the good will of both Japan and China and is the only nation which could exercise good offices toward peace when the opportunity arrives.
[Page 216]It is easy for uninformed American journalists and others not in positions of public responsibility to attribute the anxiety of Japan to avoid involvement with the United States to American military and naval strength, but as we anticipated when the conflict began that the course which our Government has followed would bring precisely those results, we cannot but believe that it has been American attitude which is primarily responsible for the profound respect for the United States and appreciation of the justice of its position and which are general among the population in Japan at least.
2. The draft note, so far as I can judge from the extended outline so kindly furnished us and from the comment contained in paragraph 3 of the Department’s telegram under reference would be regarded here, as I assume that the Department intends that it should, as a challenge of Japanese policies and actions in China and as indication of intention to bring American attitude into line with British attitude. There would be in my opinion an immediate reversal of Japanese attitude and feeling toward the United States. What would be in effect a demand that Japan make her policies and actions in China conform to her treaty obligations would I believe result in the loss of the preferential position which we now have and, if there followed further American demand or action to enforce such demand, would lead eventually to difficulties so grave that force alone could resolve them. To present the note to coincide with the Anglo-Japanese conversations about to be held in Tokyo would be construed here as an act of special significance, and would only hasten those difficulties.
3. In our 304, June 29, 6 p.m. and 306, June 30, 4 p.m. which are not mentioned in the telegram under reference, I outlined difficulties with which the British are now confronted. I am now able to present these difficulties more clearly. The British, I am reliably informed, will propose to the Japanese a settlement on the following basis:
- (a)
- Elimination or modification of all measures, policies and actions in the British Concession which render the Concession an enclave of opposition to the Japanese;
- (b)
- The Concession no longer to be permitted to be an outpost of the Chinese Government;
- (c)
- Maintenance in the Concession and in North China by the British of an attitude of complete neutrality including treatment of both designated national and subserves [sic] currency on a position of equality.
The British Ambassador told me privately and confidentially that the British had tried to obstruct the Japanese. He felt that this could not go on, as he feared a seizure of the Concession. From his remarks I am reasonably certain of the accuracy of the reported contemplated proposal. If the draft note is now sent to the Japanese Government, [Page 217] the British would not only regard it as indication of American support in the Far East but probably would not enter into a settlement embracing points falling outside the compass of Concession administration for fear of alienating American moral support of British policy in Europe.
Whatever might be the consequences of a break down of the conversations because of an American démarche at this point, we shall have created a responsibility toward the British which we could not lightly shirk.
4. So far as our attitude toward Japan is concerned, we have a choice of only two alternatives in the by no means certain event of the Japanese and British present difficulty extending beyond the limited scope of the administration of the British Concession: (a) lay down a complete reservation of American rights against all consequences and implications of Japanese policy and action in China, and await an opportunity for adjustment of issues and problems by friendly discussion; or (b) make it clear to Japan that the United States will brook no further interference with her right as a sovereign state to maintain and develop its relations with China and that any further interference will meet with force. In either case it would seem that the draft note would require more time. In view of the many considerations both in Europe and in the Far East upon which high policy must rest, I do not conceive it to be within my province to indicate which course our Government should follow.