741.61/718: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Wilson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:30 p.m.]
1174.…
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Leger79 said that at no time had the Soviet Government proposed that the mutual assistance accord should cover the Far East. If the Soviet Government had desired to obstruct the conclusion of an agreement they might well have made such a proposal.
Leger said that the situation in the Far East was extremely disquieting. He had just received information that there was now little if any possibility of the British reaching a local solution of the Tientsin incident with the Japanese.
The central Government in Tokyo doubtless desired a local solution but the army was in the saddle and determined to force a settlement of far wider issues. The Japanese Army had been unable for some time to make further headway in central and southern China and in order to gain decisive military decisions in majority of areas it would be necessary to send there Japanese troops from northern China. This the Japanese did not dare do for fear of the Soviet Union. The aim of the Japanese Army therefore was to break down the British policy of support for Chiang Kai Shek, to make British policy subservient to Japanese policy in China and thereby destroy the spirit of resistance of the Chinese.
Leger said that measures of economic reprisal by the British alone or even in cooperation with the French would not force the Japanese Army to modify its policy. The British would either have to resist the Japanese which would mean war in the Far East or they would have to submit to the Japanese demands which would mean not only the destruction of the rights of the Western Powers in China but would also so encourage Hitler and Mussolini with the evidence of British weakness that they would at once precipitate a situation in Europe which would develop into war.
Leger said that there was just one factor which could prevent the worst from happening. He did not wish what he was going to say to be considered as a special plea or as an attempt to influence the United States Government. The French Government believed it understood the position of the United States Government and was [Page 192] trying to be discreet and not make any suggestion which might prove embarrassing to the United States. But his personal view was that the only factor which could influence the Japanese to accept a local solution of the Tientsin incident would be the attitude of the United States Government. The Japanese Army asserted that the United States Government regarded the Tientsin affair as of no interest to it and that nothing was to be feared on that score from the United States. If, however, the United States Government informed the Japanese Government that it was in fact interested in these developments in China this would strengthen the hands of those members of the Japanese Government who have been arguing with the army that if they persisted in their policy they would eventually run foul of the United States.
I inquired of Leger in this connection what he thought of Secretary Hull’s statement of June 19.81 Leger said that it was excellent but it was a statement made only to the press in Washington. Whether a statement of this character would produce an effect upon the Japanese Government was uncertain but a similar statement communicated through diplomatic channels to the Japanese Government would be a different matter. Leger repeated that he was not asking anything or assuming to suggest anything. He was convinced that if war should come in the Far East the United States would be drawn into it in defense of principles and rights which the United States has always defended. His hope is that the tremendous influence of the United States may be exerted as a preventive force to avert war.
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