Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, The Far East; The Near East and Africa, Volume IV

893.102 Kulangsu/244: Telegram

The Chargé in Japan (Dooman) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, August 23, 1939—8 p.m.
[Received August 24—12:24 p.m.]

429. Department’s 264, August 21, 6 p.m.

1. I reviewed the Kulangsu situation at length this morning with Yoshizawa and an officer of the East Asia Bureau of the Foreign Office who is in immediate charge of the present case. During my review I read aloud the first paragraph of the Department’s telegram under reference amplifying it as I went along. I stressed that the American Government had already indicated its willingness that there be found some measure for affording the Japanese in Amoy a greater measure of police security provided that search be made through friendly discussions and not in response to menacing demands or under pressure of coercive measures. I stressed also that we had gone more than halfway and that we now looked for a responsive attitude on the part of the Japanese.

2. The Foreign Office then gave me a copy of the instructions which were sent to Uchida on August 2 when it was expected by the Foreign Office that the arrival in Amoy of Benninghoff would facilitate the finding of a reasonable solution. The instructions are substantially as follows:

“You will approach your consular colleagues preferably through the American Consul and you are authorized to endeavor to effect a solution along the following lines:

(a) One Japanese inspector of police to be appointed, his position to be immediately after that of the chief of police and equal with that of the Russian Inspector, it being understood that the functions of the two inspectors are to be so arranged that there shall be no confusion;

(b) although the Japanese would appreciate the appointment of three Japanese constables, the reduction of the number to two or even one would be considered;

(c) assurance to be given to the municipality that the appointments proposed will not be any financial burden on the ratepayers;

(d) the so-called ‘coercive measures’ are to be lifted.”

3. The question was put to me whether the American Government would agree to the appointment of the Japanese inspector and constables. I replied that I was not in any position to make any responsible reply, but that the instructions given to our Consul at Amoy did not seem to preclude his entering into friendly discussions looking toward the acceptance of such proposals; but that I would assume responsibility for saying that there could be held no such discussions so long as the coercive measures were continued. I was then asked whether the lifting of these coercive measures would be a condition precedent to the discussions being opened. My reply was that the Japanese were perfectly aware of the fact that the blockade had resulted in limiting supplies of food, raising prices, and creating economic and social difficulties of various kinds in the International Settlement; that whereas the blockade might be put forward as being merely a police measure to guard against the intrusion of Chinese disturbing elements, it was in fact known to be operating as a form of pressure against the foreign community. There was, I added, the additional consideration that the Japanese Consul General had been emitting threatening statements.

4. I was informed that the Japanese Government had indicated disapproval of the public statements made by Uchida and that Uchida had taken steps to retract them; that the authorities in Tokyo are extremely anxious to have a solution of the situation brought about as soon as possible and that they would be glad to have the American Consul at Amoy instructed to enter into negotiations for a settlement with the Japanese Consul on the basis of the proposition which has been authorized and is summarized in paragraph 2 above.

5. The Foreign Office without inquiry on my part expressed their appreciation of the constructive efforts of Benninghoff and expressed the hope that the anticipated settlement of the case would occur before his temporary assignment in Amoy comes to an end.

6. If the Department feels that it can authorize Amoy to enter into discussions with the Japanese Consul General along the lines of the proposition above described, I recommend that Benninghoff remain at Amoy for a further short period; if not, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by his further stay there.

Shanghai please repeat to Chungking, Peiping and Amoy.

Dooman