793.94/15333: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 1—3:20 p.m.]
1702. For the President. The Chinese Ambassador called on me this morning and said that he had an official communication of the [Page 222] importance to make to me and through me to the Government of the United States.
He had received two extremely long telegrams from General Chiang Kai Shek. The General had instructed him to see me at once to present to me his personal regards and best wishes and to make the following official communication which he hoped I would transmit at once to you.
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I asked the Chinese Ambassador if he had any indication in the telegrams he had just received with regard to the terms of settlement which General Chiang Kai Shek would be willing to accept.
He replied that the General had not stated any terms in these telegrams; but from previous instructions to him he believed that the General’s terms would be the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China and the reestablishment of Chinese sovereignty as it had existed before the Tientsin incident.93 I asked the Chinese Ambassador if General Chiang would really insist on the withdrawal of Japanese troops from all North China. He replied that he believed that General Chiang would be glad to agree to have Japanese troops stationed on the Tientsin–Peiping Railroad as they had been before the Tientsin incident. He indicated that he was not at all sure that General Chiang’s terms would be so stiff as this.
He stated to me that he believed General Chiang recently, in conversation with the American Ambassador in Chungking, had gone into detail as to the terms on which he was ready to make peace. He was in no position in Paris to be specific on this point.
The Chinese Ambassador concluded by stating that he hoped I would communicate the message he had given to me to you as an official message of the Chinese Government. He hoped I would urge you to act quickly and that I would emphasize General Chiang’s belief that the course of action should be (1) conversations with the French and British Governments with a view to preventing them from throwing themselves into the arms of Japan at the expense of China, (2) an approach to the Japanese Government which would include advice not to set up a so-called Chinese Government under Wang Ching Wei and (3) a conference for the settlement of the Chinese-Japanese war.
As I said in my telegram No. 1645, August 29, 2 p.m.94 I shall avoid any conversations that I can avoid on the subject of the Far East but once again yesterday the Polish Ambassador obviously acting under instructions from his Government urged me once more to urge my Government to take advantage of the present disposition of the Japanese Government to reestablish good relations with France, England and the United States and to end the war in China.
[Page 223]Bonnet95 also referred to the same matter.
As he left me the Chinese Ambassador stated that he hoped I would be able to communicate to him in the near future your opinion as to the message he had communicated to you.
I venture to suggest that you should merely inform me that you are studying the question and that you will use more direct channels of communication with the Chinese Government in case you should decide to take any action.