793.94/15174
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 7.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Embassy’s telegrams Nos. 129, February 23, 1 [3] p.m., 144, March 1, 10 a.m. and 268, April 17, 10 a.m., all dealing with war conditions in China’s northwest, and to enclose in this relation a copy of an article63 on the subject “The Northwest Fights”, which relates some of the observations, impressions and experiences of Mr. Andrew T. Roy, an American citizen affiliated with the University of Nanking, who together with two other Americans, Dr. Robert Brown and Miss Joy Homer, toured various areas in southwestern Shansi and southeastern Shensi during the month of May 1939. The group interviewed General Yen Hsi-shan at his headquarters at Ichuan, Shensi, and Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese communist leaders at Yenan, as well as the Shensi provincial authorities at Sian.
Mr. Roy’s account, like the observations contained in the telegrams under reference, reflects an atmosphere of optimism, confidence and hope for the Chinese cause in the northwest. It portrays the birth among the Chinese of a new spirit of self-reliance and resolution born of adversity; it once more evidences an amazing ability on the part of the Chinese to adapt themselves to kaleidoscopic changes on conditions and circumstances and to overcome the numerous difficulties confronting them; it indicates that they have devised plans for meeting Japanese aggression and that creditable if unspectacular results are being obtained through pursuance of these measures; and lastly it fortifies the conviction that the Japanese have a very formidable if not insuperable task before them in attempting to eradicate the spark of resistance in Shansi. The evident failure of Japanese military operations in Shansi thus far in 1939, notably the attacks on the Chinese bases at Wutai and in the Chungtiao mountain range of south Shansi, and their repeated failures to cross the Yellow River into Shensi, are eloquent testimony of the magnitude of the difficulties with which they are beset in that area.
[Page 190]Mr. Roy’s comment concerning the status of relations between the National Government and Chinese communist authorities (see pages 27–29) is of particular interest and is added evidence of the seeming genuine desire of the Chinese communists to cooperate with the Kuomintang both during and after the present war in the building of new China under a democratic form of government. The sole desiderata of the Chinese communists appear to be that they be ensured of the right to maintain their party organization and carry on political activities without restrictions; in other words, they desire to be placed on a basis of unrestricted equality with the Kuomintang as an internal political organization. The feeling here at Chungking among informed observers is that General Chiang Kai-shek, who has at various times since the outbreak of hostilities voiced his scorn of certain sections of the Kuomintang for their ineptness and reactionary conservatism, is likely to work for some such peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-communist dilemma. But it is only natural to think that certain influential elements in the Kuomintang will exert every effort to sabotage cooperation between the two organizations and will bend their power to ensuring the continuance of the Kuomintang as the sole ruling organ and, of course, of their own positions of influence. It is not at all unlikely that the Generalissimo may find it necessary to liquidate these latter elements in the Kuomintang if he is to proceed unhindered with the work of national reconstruction.
Respectfully yours,
- Not reprinted.↩