893.102 Tientsin/278: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 20–—3 a.m.]
399. Department’s 201, June 6, 5 p.m.
1. I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th and on General Chiang on the 17th. Both were engrossed in the British-Japanese controversy at Tientsin59 almost to the exclusion of other subjects. The Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasized his view which he asserted was supported by the Japanese military spokesman’s statement at Tientsin on the 13th (Tientsin’s 95, June 15, 6 p.m.60) that the dispute had been extended beyond the treatment of a few alleged terrorists to include a demand for a complete reversal of the pro-Chinese policy of Great Britain. General Chiang expressed the conviction that capitulation by Great Britain to Japan at Tientsin would mean the nullification of the Nine Power Treaty and the substitution of Japanese interests, prestige and influence in China for those of Great Britain and the United States.
2. In my call on General Chiang I was accompanied by Peck and McHugh. Madame Chiang interpreted. At Chiang’s desire I first gave him a somewhat detailed account of my observations on the Burma and the Chungking–Yunnanfu Highways. Then he inquired what views my Government held toward Japanese actions at [Page 187] Tientsin. I replied that the position of the American Government with respect to the present hostilities had been fully and publicly announced and that it had not changed. He wanted to know what my Government anticipated would be the outcome of the dispute, particularly whether it thought the Japanese would occupy the British Concession with troops. When I expressed doubt whether the Department had formed any opinion he pressed me for my personal view. I disclaimed any ability to foresee the outcome but observed that Japanese military strength was dominant at Tientsin and that if the concession were isolated long enough it might have to yield through sheer starvation. I said that the dispute was between the Japanese and British Governments and only they could say how it could be ended.
3. After conversation on other subjects, Chiang reverted to the earlier one and asked permission to express his opinion which he said was different from mine. He said that one of Japan’s main objectives was to persuade the United States that the quarrel was with Great Britain alone. If Great Britain’s defense of treaty rights could be crushed at Tientsin, Japan could repeat the process elsewhere in China and a complete transformation in the Orient would result. The rights of other treaty powers including the United States would be swept away and China’s position would be even more seriously damaged. Yet the remedy, he insisted, was simple. Japan was bold at this juncture because of a belief that it had isolated Great Britain and convinced the United States and other powers that they were not involved. He asked me to inform the Secretary of State that it was his own absolute conviction that if the United States should let it be known that the American Government regarded its interests as involved the Japanese “front” would collapse.
He inquired whether our Government had any intention of mediating to settle the dispute. I replied that such mediation would obviously be impossible unless both sides invited it and I saw no likelihood of that; the American Government would never lend its assistance to any matter contravening its announced policies. Chiang made the startling suggestion that I proceed to Tientsin to offer my services as mediator. With all politeness I rejected this idea but he urged that I submit it to the Secretary as coming from him and I assented.
4. Chiang went on to say that all that was really necessary to turn what was potentially catastrophe into a minor incident was for the American Government to let it be known publicly that it was prepared to send some of the American Marines now at Tientsin into the British Concession at the slightest threat that the rights of American citizens were to be invaded. He could guarantee that no Marines would have to be sent and that the Japanese attack against the British Concession [Page 188] would cease. Since the sanctity of the Nine Power Treaty and the whole position of American nationals in the British Concession at Tientsin and elsewhere were involved in this question it was the right and even the duty of the United States to come to the assistance of Great Britain at this juncture; if this were not done he felt that Great Britain would almost inevitably capitulate to Japan with results as already described.
In view of Chiang’s direct request that I transmit his views to the Secretary of State I told him I would do so, but I said that I should feel less than honest if I did not point out to Chiang frankly that no step so grave as an implied use of force against Japan could be taken by the American Government without consulting Congress and that in any event it was inconceivable that the United States should employ force or the threat of force to protect administrative rights of a British Concession. His reply to this was that the action he proposed would be in defense of the rights of American nationals.
6. During this interview Chiang mentioned but did not dwell on the subject of general mediation as the British Ambassador anticipated he would do. He may intend to do this at a second visit I have agreed to pay him in a few days.
7. Chiang urged, as a means of bringing to the fore the principles involved in the controversy at Tientsin, that the American Government request from the Japanese Government in positive terms a reply to our note of December 30, 1938.61
8. While General Chiang’s proffer of advice on the implementation of American Government [policy] was a step unusual in diplomatic practice, I was not inclined to take offense in view of his earnestness, our long established personal relationship, and the deferential Chinese terms in which his opinions were couched. I was carefully noncommittal in regard to his contention that compromise by Great Britain with the Japanese at Tientsin would weaken the whole treaty structure in China and adversely affect American interests but this has seemed to me self-evident from the beginning. The United States has no Concession in China but it is interested in two international settlements62 and its citizens for decades have been identified with the Concessions of other nations. Moreover, if as seems to be the case Japanese measures at Tientsin are in reality designed to compel Great Britain to desist from support of the National Government, similar retaliatory measures sooner or later against the United States appear inevitable if the campaign against Great Britain succeeds. I [Page 189] am convinced that the ultimate aim of Japanese policy is to oust all Western interests and influence from Asia irrespective of nationalities. Furthermore we have made no secret of our condemnation of Japanese policy and sympathy with China’s cause.
Repeated to Peiping. Peiping air mail code text to Tokyo.
- See Vol. iv, pp. 163 ff.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Note No. 1153, from the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, Vol. i, p. 820.↩
- At Shanghai and Amoy (Kulangsu); see Vol. iv, pp. 1 ff. and 108 ff.↩