740.00/718
The Minister in the Netherlands (Gordon) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 31.]
Sir:
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I have naturally been desirous during the past week of sending a telegram to the Department which would indicate with some authoritativeness the reactions of Dutch public opinion, both private and official, to this most recent demonstration of German unprovoked and [Page 94] ruthless aggression, as well as contain references to official reports from Dutch representatives abroad as to definite indications of repercussions of this German move upon the position of the Netherlands—for such help as it might be in fitting into the Department’s general mosaic—but so far there has been a dearth of information of sufficiently positive quality to warrant cabling it.
Universal indignation and dismay has been manifest, but of course that was only to be expected. Various conversations which I and other members of the Legation have had with officials and well-informed private individuals reveal a marked diversity of views, running the gamut from resigned certainty that this country will be crushed by Germany and that whatever resistance may be offered on land it cannot escape destruction from German bombers, to a feeling that there is little less ground to hope that the Netherlands may remain neutral in a forthcoming European war than there was in 1914.
Between these two rather unreasoning extremes there is still a considerable variety of opinion. Even among members of the armed forces with whom we have talked there are those who feel that in a general European war Holland is so directly on Germany’s necessary path to attack England that she cannot escape, and on the other hand those who hold that even if Belgium were able to maintain her neutrality vis-à-vis both France and Germany so that the road for a German attack upon England would necessarily point to going through Holland—both for that reason and for the submarine threat against England, which is greater than that afforded by the Belgian coast line—Germany would nevertheless be reluctant to force this country into the ranks of her active enemies. This latter view is based on the thought that even the present Spanish war has shown that a military decision cannot be won in the air only, and that the Dutch army, plus the Dutch scheme of land defense based on inundation, could oppose a stiff resistance to German invaders and inflict serious damage upon them; it is a view, however, which I fear is not very widely held by others than zealous and energetic military officers—by which I do not mean that faith in the efficacy of inundation to stop an advancing army has vanished from the face of the Netherlands, but rather that the dread of massed aerial bombing expeditions has captured first place in the popular imagination.
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As regards high official opinion, I understand that Dr. Colijn63 is still disposed to take the view that Germany will not be inclined to look for any unnecessary trouble by a wanton invasion of the Netherlands (see despatch No. 678,64 page 3), but rather is only likely to [Page 95] attack this country if Germany feels herself in such a position that she, to use the Prime Minister’s words, “might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb”. Dr. Patijn65 and other officials of the Foreign Office state that there is nothing in their reports to indicate that in pursuance of the policy which dictated the Czechoslovak coup Germany has adversely changed her designs or intentions vis-à-vis the Netherlands. But even in official circles it is felt that not only the embodiment in this latest coup of a new German policy completely devoid of even any pretext of racial protection principles, but also the circumstances of its execution, are impressive of the stark fact that there is no longer the possibility of forming any reasonable estimate of what Hitler will do next. Moreover, when it considers the hypothesis of Hitler going to such extremes as to force England and France into a war, I doubt whether officialdom in general entirely shares the robust optimism of the Prime Minister.
All in all, therefore, it is my impression that the best informed opinion in this country, both official and private, is even more nervous than last September—save perhaps for the two or three days immediately preceding the meeting at Munich.
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One thing, in any event, emerges from the recent events in Czechoslovakia more strongly than ever, and that is that in any future general European war Dutch sentiment will be far more anti-German than it was from 1914 to 1918; the Department is aware of this but it does no harm to state it concretely. …
Respectfully yours,