740.00/655: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

388. As reported in my 360, March 18, 2 p.m.,59 the British Government following the démarche of the Rumanian Minister with his information of an “ultimatum” having been served on Rumania by Germany, communicated with the Governments of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland, Russia, France and Rumania to inquire what would be the position of those Governments in the face of a German attack on Rumania.60 According to information given by the Foreign Office replies to these inquiries have been received and may be summarized as follows:

  • “(1) Turkey said that she had received no communication from Rumania. The reply was otherwise noncommittal, Turkey stating merely that she would abide by the obligation imposed on her by the Balkan Pact.61
  • (2) Greece would fulfill the obligations of the Balkan Pact. As regards any attack on the Rumanian frontiers beyond the limits of the Balkan Pact, Greece would examine the situation sympathetically with Turkey and Yugoslavia, taking into account the attitude of the [Page 91] British and French Governments. The Greek Prime Minister remarked to the British Minister that everything would depend in that situation upon Yugoslavia as, without the concurrence and cooperation of Yugoslavia, Greece would not be in a position to bring any effective aid to Rumania.
  • (3) Yugoslavia. The Prince Regent’s reply was to make a similar inquiry of the British Government. He likewise expressed surprise that Rumania had not approached him. The British Minister at Belgrade, Sir Ronald Campbell, thinks that Yugoslavia would make every effort to remain neutral, as in a conflict with Germany unless Italy were neutral or on her side she would be almost completely immobilized.
  • (4) Poland. Beck frankly said that he did not believe the Rumanian statement was correct. He said that his Government would examine the situation with the Rumanian Government before expressing any view on the British Government’s inquiry. In a conversation yesterday afternoon between Lord Halifax and the French Foreign Minister now in London, M. Bonnet said that he had spoken to the Polish Ambassador in Paris on March 19 and inquired what assistance Poland was prepared to give to balk a German attack on Rumania. The Polish Ambassador replied that the Polish-Rumanian treaty covered aggression by Russia only. He further told M. Bonnet that he had been authorized by Colonel Beck to inform the French Government (a) that the Polish Government attached all importance to the Franco-Polish alliance but that it was only valid in the case of a German attack on France; (b) that the most useful assistance to Rumania would be not to bring in Russia but to support the present Polish representations at Budapest and Bucharest undertaken with a view to persuading Hungary and Rumania not to mobilize against each other on account of Hungarian occupations of Ruthenia. M. Bonnet further told Lord Halifax that since he left Paris the final Polish reply had been received, that he had not seen it but that he was informed it was unsatisfactory and full of reservations.
  • (5) Russia. M. Litvinoff in his reply proposed the now much publicized conference and inquired what the British Government would do in the circumstances. He expressed surprise that Rumania had not consulted with him.
  • (6) The French replied that they were prepared to collaborate in examination of possibilities of concerted action and that they felt it extremely important for the Western powers to take a stand on the line of Rumania.
  • (7) Rumania replied that she wished to avoid provoking Germany and therefore does not want to join any pact of mutual assistance. She thinks the Western powers should declare that they will not allow any further changes of frontiers in Europe and that they would support any state that defended itself with all its military forces. [”]

The Foreign Office now realizes that the story brought by the Rumanian Minister of a German “ultimatum” to Rumania, which was the immediate cause of the inquiries to these Governments, cannot be substantiated. They feel, however, that even though the case had been over-stated by the Rumanians, the danger of further German [Page 92] advance in Eastern Europe is nevertheless existent and that the Rumanian démarche had at least served the useful purpose of galvanizing the Western democratic powers into immediate examination of the new situation and the dangers it presented. It is perhaps needless to add that Foreign Office officials do not regard these vague and generalized replies as a serious contribution toward a solution of the immediate problems.

There has been some confusion among newspaper correspondents between the British inquiries at the capitals mentioned in this telegram and the draft declaration sent to France, Russia and Poland and reported in my 370, March 20, 5 p.m.62 The two moves were separate undertakings.

Kennedy
  1. Not printed.
  2. For texts of telegrams of March 17, 1939, see Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, Third Series, vol. iv, doc. Nos. 388–390, pp. 360–361.
  3. Signed at Athens, February 9, 1934, by Greece, Rumania, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cliii, p. 153.
  4. Telegram No. 370 not printed.