740.00/651: Telegram
The Minister in Hungary (Montgomery) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 22—7:49 a.m.]
59. The Regent47 received me most affably today but he was more restrained in speech than in any previous conversations and particularly guarded with respect to Hungarian activities.
He felt that Hitler would take no action anywhere producing resistance because this might provoke a war which would be disastrous for Germany. It was noticeable in Budapest that Germany was frightened by the reaction to its last coup which had been made because of Germany’s economic need and Hitler felt he could make one last stroke before France and Great Britain were prepared to resist him. He felt that Hitler had finished his territorial expansion in Europe although he still would demand colonies and make demands upon Poland concerning Danzig but he would attempt a solution of the latter by adjustment because of the fear of war and of removing Poland as a buffer state against Russia. Through diplomacy, intrigue, economic penetration and other means Germany would attempt more [Page 86] assiduously to obtain advantages other than territorial by gaining control over other countries.
Hitler’s success, he said, was due entirely to the credulity of France and Great Britain who had become so accustomed since the war to having their will obeyed internationally that they were unable to cope with Hitler who disobeyed this rule.
The Regent said Hungary was not committed to Germany in any way and under any circumstance it would play a strictly Hungarian political game refraining from rushing headlong into situations which in the past had cost it so much. In war it would remain neutral if possible and await the turn of the tide to join the side which ultimately would win. He and the majority of Hungarians detested the Germans and sympathized with Great Britain but the democratic powers since the war had remained inattentive to the pleas of Hungary who had achieved something only with the aid of Germany and Italy. Consequently Hungary would continue to accept what it could providing this did not call for extreme commitments but the Regent had told Hitler personally that Hungary would meet German military aggression with resistance to the last shepherd. Consequently he felt Germany would make no antagonistic move, and Hungary would afford no opportunity for peaceful penetration.
Transylvania he asserted like Croatia was a political danger spot because its people had suffered unfair treatment for 17 years and their discontent produced a fertile field for trouble. This problem demanded solution. In response to my question he said the present Hungarian military preparations were for any eventuality.
From the Regent’s guarded remarks I inferred that there at least is entertained the possibility of some Hungarian collusion with Germany with a view to retrieving Transylvania or, more immediately probable, to effecting its autonomy. Germany for whatever ends it may wish to gain from Hungary also has to offer the enticement of returning Slovakia. Without defining a purely Hungarian policy to which he referred repeatedly I concluded that the Regent meant a policy of expediency to be developed by any possible means to retrieve lost territory and to maintain Hungarian independence. In this situation I do not think Germany as yet presents the predominant permanent coloring and that the democratic powers could exert a large influence if they were to offer some tangible and practical positive solution of Hungary’s problems. He dismissed discussion of Italy’s possible future course by professing ignorance thereof. In any event I feel that the conduct of Hungary’s affairs in future will be held firmly and singularly in the hands of the Regent and of his Prime Minister.
Since my audience was had without the knowledge of the Foreign Office I should appreciate the maintenance of its secrecy.
- Admiral Horthy.↩