Office of the Historian

760d.61/499: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Thurston) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 29, 1939.
[Received November 29—10:50 a.m.]

959. Today’s Moscow papers publish the text of the Finnish reply to the Soviet note of November 26 and the text of the Soviet counter reply of November 28. A translation of the latter follows:

“Mr. Minister: The answer of the Government of Finland to the note of the Soviet Government of November 26 represents a document reflecting the profound hostility of the Government of Finland to the Soviet Union and is destined to lead the crisis in the relations between both countries to an extreme.

1.
The denial on the part of the Government of Finland of the fact of the outrageous artillery shelling of Soviet troops by Finnish [Page 1002] troops which resulted in casualties cannot be explained otherwise than as a desire to mislead public opinion and to mock the victims of the shelling. Only an absence of a feeling of responsibility and a disdainful regard of public opinion could have motivated the attempt to explain the outrageous incident of the shelling as artillery training exercises by Soviet troops at the very frontier line and in sight of Finnish troops.
2.
The refusal of the Government of Finland to withdraw the troops which committed the villainous shelling of Soviet troops and the formal demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of Finnish and Soviet troops on the basis of the principle of equality reveal the hostile desire of the Government of Finland to keep Leningrad under threat. In fact we have here not equality in respect of the position of Finnish and Soviet troops but on the contrary an advantageous position of Finnish troops. The Soviet troops do not threaten the vital centers of Finland since they are situated hundreds of kilometers therefrom, whereas the Finnish troops situated at a distance of 32 kilometers from a vital center of the USSR—Leningrad, with a population of 3½ millions—creates for the latter a direct menace. It is hardly necessary to state that there is actually no place for the Soviet troops to withdraw to since the withdrawal of Soviet troops to a distance of 25 kilometers would place them in the outskirts of Leningrad which clearly would be absorbed [absurd] from the point of view of the security of Leningrad. The proposal of the Soviet Government for the withdrawal of Finnish troops to a distance of 20 or 25 kilometers is a minimum one since its aim is not the elimination of the inequality in respect of the positions of the Finnish and Soviet troops but merely a certain amelioration thereof. If the Government of Finland rejects even this minimum proposal then this means that it intends to keep Leningrad under the direct menance of its troops.
3.
Having concentrated above Leningrad a large number of regular troops and having placed thereby a most vital center of the USSR under direct threat the Government of Finland has committed a hostile act in regard to the USSR which is incompatible with the pact of nonaggression concluded between the two countries. Having refused to withdraw its troops even 20 or 25 kilometers after the villainous artillery shelling of Soviet troops on the part of the Finnish troops the Government of Finland has shown that it continues to retain hostile positions in relation to the USSR, does not intend to take into consideration the requirements of the pact of nonaggression and has determined to continue to hold Leningrad under threat. But the Government of the USSR cannot reconcile itself to the fact that one side should violate the nonaggression pact while the other side should be bound to fulfill it. Consequently the Soviet Government considers itself obliged to declare that it considers itself as of today free from the obligations which it has undertaken under the nonaggression pact concluded between the USSR and Finland and which is being systematically violated by the Government of Finland.”

Thurston