762.00/276
The Chargé in Germany (Geist) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 17.]
Sir: I have the honor to continue the comments on apparent trends in German foreign policy which have from time to time been supplied by this Mission.
The immense vitality of the German nation has given the development of National Socialist Germany something of the elemental quality of a natural force. As such, the energies aroused in this country seem liable to expand in a fashion not wholly predictable by logic or reason, but rather as forces determined to develop through seeking an outlet of least resistance. Accordingly, German political activity sometimes gives the impression of testing resistances on all sides with a view to discovering, by actual trial, the point or points where expansion may most readily be undertaken. This elemental force of expansion, coupled with the elusive character of the people’s leader, renders political forecasting a hazardous undertaking.
However, the events of the latter half of March indicate the direction in which Germany’s powers are being turned today. The armed absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, with the reduction of Slovakia to a position of complete dependency on the Reich, can best be explained on the ground that these areas must be controlled in a military, in addition to a diplomatic, sense prior to initiation of pressure to the east by German power, civil or, if need be, military. The sudden descent on Memelland, by similar means, points to the same objective. At the same time, it should not be overlooked that the spectacular display of might gratifies German delight in a feeling of power, so that dramatic measures may be employed, as in Austria a year ago, when a similar result might be gained by indirect means and without giving unnecessary offense to public sentiment abroad. The importance of consideration of foreign opinion, though, appears not sufficiently to impress itself on the mind of those in power in this country. Hence, use of the army in a startling manner may at times be for the very sake of exhibiting authority and not for any definitely purposeful objective.
Nevertheless, the recent moves to the north and south of Poland make it seem reasonably certain that Germany, at the present time, looks to the east of Europe as its first field of expansion into non-Germanic areas, unless interference on the part of the Western Powers should so exacerbate those in control of German policy as to induce them to try conclusions with the West as a condition precedent to oriental expansion. However, such a development seems improbable since, at least for the time being, Germany does not wish to risk a [Page 109] “show-down” with the Great Powers of the West. (It is conceivable that opposition from the West might induce Germany to attempt a joint adventure in the company of Poland at the expense of their common neighbors.)
It is hardly to be believed, though, that the German expansive urge is motivated solely by economic considerations, powerful though such may be, and indeed undoubtedly are. The German possesses so much of mysticism as to cause a search for satisfaction of his material requirements to be supplemented by a powerful sense of mission and a desire to play a conspicuous part in the world. This missionary, or even messianic, impulse, joined to his love of displays of might for their own sake, renders it difficult to give full faith and credit to assurances by persons conspicuous in the official life of present day Germany to the effect that this country merely and understandably seeks a “Lebensraum” or area capable of providing its population with the bases for a good life in a material sense.
It is widely believed by foreign observers in Berlin that concessions to Germany merely serve to whet its appetite and that some pretext will be found to explain, if not to justify, seizures of neighboring real estate. The bland and unapologetic imperturbability with which the principle of self determination has been cast aside on ceasing to serve German interests, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, is an instance of this. A principle is merely a convenient tool so that when one tool is no longer serviceable, as that of self-determination, the “principles” of historical association or of geographical propinquity or of bald self interest lie comfortably at hand.
Accordingly, it is not easy to hold that Germany, which has readmitted Austria into the fold, and is apparently now engaged in reconstituting the former Austro-Hungarian empire under new management, will remain content even with very considerable territorial gains in neighboring areas, however adequate these may be from the economic standpoint.
It may be of interest in this connection to record a remark recently made to an officer of the Embassy by a diplomatic colleague concerning a conversation which the latter had had with a Party member occupying an important position. The Nazi official had explained Germany’s eastward moves as being occasioned by the need of raw materials and finally observed that what Germany could not find elsewhere it might take in Italy. That this remark showed a disbelief in the fixity of the “axis” was indicated by the German’s subsequent confusion.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that, if German forces are given scope to expand toward the East, where at least they will affect no civilization superior to their own, and where they can find [Page 110] economic satiety, they will gradually dissipate themselves, or will be neutralized by the emergence of the internal problems of a hastily organized empire of alien peoples.
At the moment of writing, the possible effect on the immediate future of Germany’s external policy of Prime Minister Chamberlain’s pronouncement of March 30 [31], by which British power was related to the independence of Poland, is obscure. The essentially landlocked situation of Poland, coupled with Italy’s position athwart the Mediterranean may cause British and French proffers of assistance to be regarded with scant respect so long as the “axis” holds and thus prevents an approach to Germany through the Black Sea. It is such an attitude toward German aspirations on the part of the Western Powers, however, which might induce Germany suddenly to face west instead of east.
Respectfully yours,