Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

740.00/724: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the Secretary of State

Warsaw, April 3, 1939—noon.
[Received 5:40 p.m.]

61. For the President and the Secretary. Judging from my observations on various aspects discernible from this angle Chamberlain’s timely declaration⁷⁷ (a) is aimed to serve as an interim commitment somewhat as if Britain had taken out a “binder” on Poland pending Beck’s London arrival to work out the details of a definite insurance policy, (b) marks a prelude to intended formation of an anti-aggression front, and (c) means that Britain and France have decided their front lines of defense east of Berlin lie not only at the Dardanelles (see my 39, March 22,⁷⁸ paragraph 1) but also definitely in Poland, possibly in Rumania if the military convention of the Polish-Rumanian alliance can be applied against a Western as well as an Eastern invasion.

2. Refer by telegram No. 51, March 26,⁷⁸ moreover signs indicate Chamberlain now pursuing a policy combining contentions of both camps, eliminating however idea that dealings with Rome should exclude efforts to enlist Moscow in anti-aggression front in capacity of a potential support for Poland’s, Turkey’s and possibly Rumania’s positions.

3. Signs indicate moreover that London and Paris envisage Yugoslavia serving tactically as axis preferably in a play to cause a potential Rome-Berlin split. This would not necessarily mean, however, Paris and London would abandon Yugoslavia to eventual aggression. Accordingly it would seem that while leaving door open to Rome’s possible change of heart, London and Paris may conceivably let Rome temporarily “stew in her own juice”.

Section Two.

1. Referring paragraph 2, section one of this telegram, French Ambassador imparts that in order to overcome Poland’s potential objections to France’s efforts to enlist Russia’s support of Poland against German aggression, France offered formula conditioning extent and character of Russia’s potential assistance upon Poland’s specified requirements. Ambassador believed this would serve to allay suspicion such as was aroused here by Barthou’s⁷⁹ Eastern Locarno proposal of April 1934⁸⁰ that France would insist upon Poland’s granting passage to Russian troops. Moreover Ambassador gained distinct impression in conversation with Marshal Smigly-Rydz that latter and his associates would consider aforementioned formula acceptable.

2. French Ambassador concurred in my profound impression of Poland’s admirable demonstration of united courage and patriotism as illustrated by costly mobilization and eagerness of masses to subscribe at great sacrifice to national defense loan. Moreover he stated Paris and London were likewise favorably impressed, a fact which together with French General Staff’s highly favorable impression gained from recent inspection both of Poland’s industrial area and military establishment would likely lead to material assistance from Paris and London.

3. According to Belgian Minister, Brussels recently received report from Belgian Legation, Moscow, indicating current signs of a Rome-Moscow flirtation apparently initiated by Moscow. This in my opinion might mean either that an Axis-imprisoned Rome was seeking friends outside or acting as Berlin’s agent towards inveigling Moscow into political conversations with Axis.

4. Accordingly yesterday’s report of Stockholm conversations of political character between Berlin and Moscow diplomats is significant. Pending further verification thereof, however, I am inclined to interpret report to mean either (a) Berlin’s earnest intention to circumvent by a Berlin-Moscow rapprochement London’s and Paris’ reported efforts to align Moscow with anti-aggression front and/or (b) that Berlin deliberately inspired report to divert the course of London–Paris diplomatic maneuvers from Rome to Moscow or (c) that Moscow deliberately inspired report in order to worry Warsaw into an agreement to line up with Moscow against Berlin and to hasten a London–Paris commitment of definite character to Moscow.

5. In my opinion the vital importance in enlisting Moscow in anti-aggression front would be to preclude a possible Berlin–Moscow rapprochement and to enlist at least Moscow’s air and material support for other Eastern and Central European participants of an anti-aggression front.

Biddle

77. House of Commons, March 31, 1939.
78. Not printed.
78. Not printed.
79. Louis Barthou, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
80. Presumably reference to plan contained in enclosure 1 to despatch No. 1067, July 24, 1934, from the Ambassador in Germany, Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, p. 498.