724.34119/1425: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 27—6:23 a.m.]
168. From Braden. My 167, June 26, 3 p.m. Brazilian delegate’s and my conversation this afternoon with Zubizarreta may be summarized approximately as follows.
Developments at yesterday afternoon session with Paraguayan delegation had made him more optimistic than ever before; but he had completely changed to extreme pessimism at last night’s meeting because, (1) he had finally become firmly convinced that the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs and Government including President are uninterested in a solution and only desire to be rid of the question and the Conference; (2) the question asked by the Conference in note handed to the Paraguayans requires a categorical answer which he anticipates will be negative in which event the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs declared to him the Conference will end direct negotiations and he realizes arbitral compromise will never be concerted. In fact for the first time he admits war will be the outcome.
[Page 151]When I indicated that long duration of Conference, comprehensive nature of negotiations and necessity for me to get to my post in Colombia52 made it essential before embarking on trip that we at least have some assurance that the Paraguayan Government and people by plebiscite would accept a frontier which would come within the limits which, based on my list to La Paz and conversations with the Bolivian delegation, we believed would make possible an agreement, he replied that he was insufficiently acquainted with views of civilian and Army leaders to hazard an opinion in this particular and furthermore such a surprising change in favor of an agreement had taken place last January as to induce him to believe Brazilian delegate and I could bring it about by a visit to Asunción followed by plebiscite as outlined in my telegram 166, June 25, 10 p.m. Brazilian delegate and I were impressed with sincerity of his statement in this respect and that it is not merely another stall for time.
He said additional reason for suggested visit was attitude of the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Government making it desirable to transfer actual negotiation to Asunción where a more favorable atmosphere would prevail. Moreover negotiations would be easier since the delegation here is greatly restricted by limited instructions. He admitted in effect President of Paraguay had particularly taken care to tie Baez by instructions …
He criticized delegates who visited Asunción in April for their handling of negotiations, their failure to attempt making things concrete particularly as they subsequently gave an erroneous interpretation of their conversations to the Conference.
At the close of our interview I told him negotiations must rest on the basis of the note given Paraguayans last night since “we had no idea whether we could get Bolivia to renounce littoral and much less alterations in the interior line also but I was somewhat encouraged by our conversation today which after thinking over we should pursue”.
Informing him in a general way of the Bolivian memorandum and understandable reasons Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs has for wanting to publish it Wednesday I urged that he do everything possible to offset unfavorable Paraguayan reaction thereto. He agreed to do so but pointed out that Bolivian publication would require public Paraguayan reply and he feared that under the best of circumstances it would have bad effects on Paraguayan opinion. Brazilian delegate and I feel he is probably right in this connection and that if it is possible it would be well to stop the publication. Since Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs categorically refuses to desist Brazilian delegate says he is requesting Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs to exert influence in this direction and I suggest the [Page 152] Department might well point out the inappropriateness of publication to the Bolivian Minister at Washington for the urgent consideration of his Government. We may be closer than we realize to a meeting of the minds; therefore no provocative move should be permitted to disturb negotiations. [Braden.]
- Mr. Braden was the appointed Minister to Colombia.↩