724.34119/1423: Telegram
The Ambassador in Argentina (Weddell) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 26—9 a.m.]
166. From Braden. My 164, June 24, 9 p.m. Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me terminal on river of line he suggested was same as Conference proposal and not as quoted fourth paragraph my telegram under reference.
Procedure as per fifth paragraph my telegram under reference was followed. Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs also stated that at appropriate moment Paraguayan memorandum will be answered in writing. Paraguayan delegation was visibly moved and readily accepted proposed Conference procedure placing themselves completely at our disposal in a most conciliatory speech by Paraguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Before the session Brazilian delegate and I told Zubizarreta we were convinced his opinion was the deciding factor in Paraguay and that he must weigh the responsibility since on his decision depends peace or war. He replied approximately as follows: Internal political situation in Paraguay is such that were the Government to accept a settlement unsatisfactory to the people and Army it would fall immediately; Bolivian acceptance of Conference May 27th proposal and Paraguayan counter-proposal confines the territorial difference to a relatively small area; therefore if Bolivia does not insist on littoral south of Otuquis an agreement on balance of line appears feasible; if Bolivia will not, then nothing remains but to end direct negotiations: he realizes Conference must either obtain peace treaty promptly or end negotiations; Paraguay has no desire to procrastinate but in view of gravity of issues at stake desires to have one last effort made. Concretely he proposed that a committee of delegates go to Asunción not for a few days as previously but for 20 to 30 days perhaps taking with them an unofficial Bolivian agent to maintain contact with that Government. He would accompany the committee if desired. The committee could negotiate directly with the Government and materially influence civilian and Army leaders. If a gentleman’s agreement resulted respecting the frontier the Paraguayan Government which now has all of its electoral system organized could submit it to an informal plebiscite including women. The problem could be brought home to the populace visually by map showing the Chaco and proposed division so they would understand yes means by peace and no probably war; both he and junior delegate were convinced plebiscite would be favorable. In fact the latter indicated the Conference line would probably be accepted minus littoral. If favorable the Paraguayan Government could sign peace treaty with full assurance of not failing. [Page 148] Zubizarreta agreed to my suggestion that if his idea were adopted Paraguayan Government would immediately make intensive efforts to prepare favorable public opinion. Howard and other sources confirm that considerable progress has been made in building up more reasonable and conciliatory spirit although it is not yet sufficiently widespread, and because of internal politics any agreement must have almost solid support of the Army and Zubizarreta.
Howard and others several times have urged that best way to reach an agreement was by my sojourn in Asunción for a couple of weeks. Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs and delegate of receipt of counter-proposal and our projected procedure as per fifth paragraph my telegram under reference. Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs inquired whether the Paraguayan counter-proposal was negative and if so if it were as per information confidentially conveyed to him by Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs. When the latter replied affirmatively Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs read a memorandum expressed in strong language stating:
- (1)
- Three Paraguayan rejections of Conference proposal frustrated all hope for pacific settlement;
- (2)
- Paraguayan attitude tried to place Bolivia in false position which was assisted by mystifications of the Buenos Aires press;
- (3)
- Bolivia deplored Paraguayan intransigence and declared his acceptance of Conference proposal nonexistent reserving all rights in the Chaco;
- (4)
- he called attention to grave situation for Bolivia and all America; and the destruction of American peace system since Bolivia would participate no more in pacts, conference, et cetera;
- (5)
- he demanded Conference put regulations into effect immediately.
Bolivian Minister for Foreign Affairs announced his memorandum had been given to the press. This statement naturally provoked violent protest from us during which Bolivians accused mediators of playing Paraguayan game, our extreme weakness and cited Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs’ expression of friendship for Paraguay. Finot indicated Bolivian memorandum was just a sample of what would come down on the mediatory nations in the event of failure.
During this debate Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs took attitude that nothing more could be done but end negotiations. However, I insisted that since Bolivia had not been informed officially of Paraguayan counter-proposal their memorandum was out of order. I urged on them consideration of Zubizarreta idea which they rejected. They admitted memorandum had not yet been given to the press and agreed to advise their Governments not to publish it, holding it in suspense until next Wednesday providing that in the interim [Page 149] the Conference is able to submit a Paraguayan proposal accepting Conference line minus littoral.
We meet tonight at 11:30 with the Paraguayans. [Braden.]