793.94/12412: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:20 p.m.]
100. 1. My British colleague,25 who talks to me freely and so far as I can judge frankly, has told me of the following conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on February 9 which would appear to be significant owing to the marked change in the Minister’s usually placid, courteous and friendly bearing. The fact that for the first time in our respective dealings with him Hirota twice lost his temper with Craigie might be due to nervousness engendered by the strain of the current sessions of the Diet or the mounting irritation at the tone, insistence and volume of Craigie’s continual representations both oral and written in connection with British interests in China or perhaps to both. The Minister’s demeanor tends to confirm reports which have come to both Craigie and myself that Hirota is steadily becoming harder and more intransigent as regards foreign interests in the Far East and that it is Hirota rather than Suetsugu26 who leads the ultra-chauvinistic element in the Government. I myself have as yet seen no outward demonstration of any change of attitude on Hirota’s part as regards American interests.
2. The conversation referred to arose when Craigie informed the Minister that he is in possession of evidence indicating that Japanese forces have occupied several of the smaller Chinese islands in the general vicinity of Hong Kong and again asked for specific assurances that the statements of the Japanese Government that it has no territorial designs in China apply as well to the islands as to the mainland. According to Craigie, the Minister in some instances in their intercourse became very angry, inveighed against the continual British demands for renewed assurances, said that under present war conditions Japan had given all the assurances that can reasonably be expected, and asserted that if the warfare is prolonged Japan may be forced to occupy more territory whether insular or on the mainland. If the warfare becomes permanent, said Hirota, the occupation will also be permanent. Referring specifically to Hainan, Hirota said that the Japanese could not possibly give a permanent pledge not to occupy. Craigie pointed out that whereas Hong Kong cannot be regarded as a threat to Japan, the occupation of these islands by Japanese forces does constitute a very real threat to Hong Kong. The general tone of this conversation appears to have been acrimonious.
[Page 83]3. Craigie is aware that there are large concentration[s] of Japanese troops in Formosa (see our 61, January 31 [30], 6 p.m.27) and of Japanese ships in the port of Takao and he believes that an attack on Canton or some other point in South China is impending.
4. Craigie’s general reaction to this conversation with Hirota is that the longer the warfare is prolonged the greater will be the likelihood of permanent occupation by Japan not only of the islands but of territory on the mainland. He believes that Japanese assurances of “no territorial designs” are likely to be withdrawn at short notice. These prospects so seriously concern British interests that he contemplates recommending or has already recommended to his Government (a) that continued support of Chiang Kai Shek, whether by furnishing war supplies and funds or otherwise, is detrimental to British interests and (b) that the British Government should be alert to foster any outlook for peace negotiations which might leave to China any hope of eventual resurrection.
5. Craigie is informed and believes that it was the Japanese industrialists and politicians and not the military who favored and brought about the withdrawal of recognition from the Central Government.
6. I think that the nature of the conversation reported above indicates that our own practice of concentrating our representations to the Minister on important issues and with discreet timing is likely to prove more effective than the British practice of constant hammering by almost daily notes, letters, and other communications with continual personal visits to the Minister or the Vice Minister both on important and routine issues. The British procedure appears to be based on the theory that constant hammering will wear away a stone but in the present temper of the Japanese Government and military this practice is liable to defeat its own object through the irritation which it inevitably engenders, clearly demonstrated in Craigie’s last interview with the Minister. The representations of the American Government are at least listened to with respect and an evident inclination on the part of the Foreign Office to meet our wishes so far as the military can be influenced in that direction.
7. About 2 weeks ago Craigie told me that he had heard from a trustworthy source that there was to be a change for the better in the Japanese attitude toward Great Britain and that press and other agitation against the British was to be discontinued. I did not put much stock in Craigie’s information. Since then General Matsui28 in the interview which he gave to Woodhead29 sharply criticised the British for trying to create political issues out of the problem of preserving [Page 84] British economic and commercial interests in China while the Japanese press has expressed the conviction that it was Great Britain which initiated the three-power démarche with regard to naval construction. The feeling in Japan against the British is not in our opinion altogether artificially created as Craigie believes it to be but flows from the conviction that the British are constantly endeavoring to establish a common front against Japan in order to preserve British political and economic interests in the Far East.
Repeated to Hankow.