793.94/12271: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, February 1, 1938—1 p.m.
[Received February 1—9:10 a.m.]
[Received February 1—9:10 a.m.]
63. My unnumbered telegram January 31, 5 p.m., via Shanghai.87
- 1.
- The period of military and political quiet in China which has existed since the Japanese Government’s announcement of policy on January 14 [16]88 has begun to raise in the Japanese popular mind some perplexity and doubt as to future developments. The official announcements had been preceded by several weeks of mysterious discussions within the Government and had a somewhat theatrical setting. For a short time it was believed that the ground was being prepared for some powerful blow which was to be dealt to China either in a political sense or in a military sense or both. Continued inactivity is therefore tending to become anticlimatic and is having adverse effect on public morale.
- 2.
- It is therefore in an atmosphere tinctured with some degree of pessimism and perplexity that reports were received of discussions between Great Britain, France and Soviet Russia with regard to some form of systematic aid to China. If such an arrangement were reached it is obvious that it could not be ignored by Japan without risking a collapse of public confidence in Japan’s ability to meet any challenge from European quarters. The logical step for Japan to take to support that confidence would be to declare war. It is realized by the Japanese that such measure would not facilitate the prevention of the entry of arms from Indochina and Soviet Russia and that the closing of the Hong Kong route would merely divert the traffic to the [Page 63] other routes. The practical results would be small but the belief prevails amongst many Japanese that if Japan were not to take formal cognizance of any such arrangement if made the moral consequences in Japan itself would be extremely serious.
- 3.
- We have no information with regard to the degree to which the building up of a consensus of opinion within the Government has developed and we would be inclined to advise the Department to discount reports from correspondents affecting to know that a decision to declare war has been reached if a specified condition of affairs should occur. Certainly the statement of the Prime Minister89 reported to the Department might warrant such a conclusion but we do not believe that “inside” information will be permitted to leak out.
Repeated to Shanghai for Hankow.
Grew
- See telegram No. 177, February 1, 11 a.m., Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 446.↩
- ibid., p. 437.↩
- For Prince Fumimaro Konoye’s address of January 22, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 438.↩