893.51/6736⅜
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
In considering the tung oil project, the American Government should, in my opinion, first of all give intensive consideration to certain political aspects of the problem presented and related problems. The political implications and possibilities of the project are far more important, both as regards our foreign relations and as regards our internal situation, than are the economic aspects of the matter. In this memorandum I shall speak, briefly, only of certain of the political aspects.
It is an important interest of the United States that Japan not gain control of China. It therefore would be to our interest that Chinese resistance to Japan’s effort to gain that control continue. The Japanese nation today is animated by concepts and is pursuing objectives which are in conflict with the concepts and the legitimate objectives of the people of the United States. The Japanese are embarked upon a program of predatory imperialism. Unless the Japanese march is halted by the Chinese or by some other nation, the time will come when Japan and the United States will be face to face and definitely opposed to each other in the international political arena. It is desirable that the development of such a situation be prevented. It therefore is desirable that the United States act toward the preventing of such a development.
The American Government should formulate and adopt a program of action (a diplomatic “war plan”) toward averting an armed conflict between the United States and Japan. In the conducting of our relations with Japan and with China we should not take haphazard and unrelated steps. Such action as we may take in the realm of use of words should be related to action which we may plan to take in the realm of material pressures (positive or negative, or both). It should be our objective to have Japan’s predatory march halted. Our course of action should, therefore, be a course in opposition to that march. That march will be halted only by the power of resistance of material obstacles and material pressures. Any nation which definitely opposes that march should be prepared in last analysis to [Page 573] use, if it prove necessary, armed force. The Chinese have already found resort to armed force necessary. China’s resistance may possibly be overcome by Japanese armed force. Resistance which may be made by other countries may in the long run have to take the form of armed force. This country, therefore, in formulating its course of action should make it its business to be prepared if necessary to use armed force.
The American Government has during recent years been opposing Japan by use of words (appeal to principles, to rules of law, to provisions of treaties, etc.). Our Department of State may be able to get the better of the Japanese Foreign Office—though even that is not certain—in the field of argumentation, but victories on our part in that field will not halt the forward march of Japan’s military machine. The fact is that unless the United States expects and intends to use weapons stronger than those of argument, continuance on our part along that line is almost certain to lead to the development of a situation in which this country will have either to accept a diplomatic defeat or find itself forced to resort to arms. The more we talk and the longer we refrain from resort to some substantial measures of positive (material) pressure toward preventing the Japanese from taking or destroying our rights, titles and interests in the Far East, the more likely will it be that resort by us to such measures at some future time—if and when—will be replied to by the Japanese with resort to armed force against us, which would, in turn, compel us to respond with armed force.
The most practicable course for us to follow would be that of giving assistance to the Chinese and withholding those things which are of assistance to the Japanese, toward prolonging and strengthening China’s resistance and curtailing Japan’s ability to continue military operations against China. If and when, however, we commit ourselves to that line of action, we should do so wholeheartedly and with determination. We should not take some one step without expecting, intending and being able to take further steps, many further steps, in the same direction. Such steps should include a combination of diplomatic, economic and potential military pressures. If this Government wishes to embark upon such a course, it should be prepared to consider seriously the taking of such steps as denunciation of the U. S.–Japan Commercial Treaty of 1911,46 repeal of the Neutrality Act, retaliatory tariff measures against Japan, placing of embargoes upon trade and shipping between Japan and the United States, disposal of our naval resources in such manner as to indicate to the Japanese Government and nation that we “mean business.”
[Page 574]The tung oil project is a project the objective of which is to give assistance to China. The amount of assistance which would be given by the consummation of this transaction alone would not be sufficient substantially to influence the situation in which resides our problem. If this Government, speaking and acting for the American people, is prepared to move forward with a comprehensive program along such lines as are indicated above, consummation of the tung oil project would be in line with and consistent with such an attitude and intention. But unless such is the case, consummation of the tung oil project would achieve so little and be accompanied by hazards and possibilities of complications so great that consummation of that project would not, it is believed, be advisable.
Decision whether to consummate or not to consummate this project should be made not on the basis of the inherent merits or demerits of the project and not on the basis of the desire of this country that China be not defeated by Japan but on the basis of and in the light of a decision by the American Government to exert itself actively and intensively toward throwing the weight of this country’s capacity into a general effort to halt Japan’s predatory advance. It is the belief of the undersigned that the American Government should consciously and definitely commit itself (the Government) to such an effort and that it should formulate a comprehensive general plan of procedure toward that end.
- Signed February 21, 1911, Foreign Relations, 1911, p. 315.↩