761.93 Manchuria/157: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
[Received 12:20 p.m.]
229. My 288, August 4, 10 p.m. Following is translation of Tass report published in today’s press:
“Yesterday, August 4, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Shigemitsu, called on the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Litvinov, and with reference to the clash in the region of Lake Khasan, declared that the Japanese Government had the intention of resolving the ‘Incident’ by peaceful means as a local incident. Under instructions from his Government, the Ambassador therefore [Page 468] is proposing to terminate military actions by both sides and to transfer the question to negotiations through diplomatic channels.
Comrade Litvinov replied that if in reality the Japanese Government had peaceful intentions then the activities of the Japanese military authorities are not at all in conformity thereto. The armed incursion into Soviet territory and the night attack on the Soviet frontier post accompanied by the use of artillery could only ironically be called peaceful actions. The incident had arisen only as a result of these activities and had they not occurred there would have been no incident. If the Japanese will terminate the attacks on Soviet territory and the bombardment thereof and will recall those remnants of its armed forces which may still be on Soviet territory, there would then be no reason for the Soviet forces to continue its counter military activities and then the Soviet Government will be prepared to proceed to the diplomatic consideration of those proposals which the Japanese Government may wish to make to it. However, the inviolability of the Soviet frontier established by the Hunchun Agreement and the map annexed thereto must be preliminarily guaranteed.
The Ambassador said that he had intention to renounce the dispute concerning the frontier and concerning the responsibility of one side or the other, because of the [apparent omission] there was no common views on both sides on that score. He recognizes the validity of international treaties but Manchukuo, after its separation from China, has its own data. Japan has now seen for the first time the map annexed to the Hunchun Agreement. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to decide the incident on the basis of such a map. However, the Japanese Government is prepared to proceed to concrete negotiations on the spot concerning the treaty and the map. Negotiations had already taken place previously concerning the abstract delineation of the frontier between Japan and the Soviet Union and an agreement had been reached concerning the composition of mixed commissions. If the question is based only on maps, then there would have been no reason to speak of mixed commissions. In the meantime, it is necessary to speak in a practical sense concerning the termination of military activities and of the reestablishment of the situation existing prior to July 11.
To this, the People’s Commissar declared as follows:
‘Frontiers between states are defined exclusively by international agreements and maps and not by the subjective opinions or wishes of governments and military circles or by unofficial data. The official documents produced by the Soviet side have been countered on the Japanese side by nothing more than a declaration concerning its desire for a different frontier. The frontier between the Soviet Union, Manchuria and Korea can only be that which has been established by agreements and treaties concluded with the Chinese Government and by maps annexed thereto. The occupation of Manchuria by Japan does not give the latter the right to demand an alteration of the frontier. In any event, the Soviet Government has not agreed and will not agree to a reexamination of the frontier. It is not our fault if Tokyo has not in its possession the treaties and maps which were in the possession of the Commission and should be in that of Manchuria. But if, in fact, they are not available, then the Ambassador could, of course, have asked us to give him copies of these treaties and maps for examination. But the Japanese Armed Forces had preferred instead the path of direct action and had penetrated beyond the line indicated on the map. The Soviet Government does not withhold its consent to the creation of mixed commissions under the definite conditions stated by it. The question then did not [Page 469] refer to the establishment of a new frontier but to the demarcation (the establishment of frontier signs) or the redemarcation of the grades on the basis of the existing agreement and map. If the Japanese forces will declare to us clearly its [their] recognition of the Hunchun Agreement, then we will be prepared to include in the work of the Mixed Commission the grades indicated therein but only for redemarcation. There can be no question of the substitution of the Hunchun Agreement by another. In regard to the termination of military activities, if there will be reestablished the situation existing prior approximately to the 29 of July, that is prior to the attempts by Japanese to force the heights of Bezymyannaya and subsequently Zaozernaya, and if the Manchurian side will cease attacks on Soviet territory lying behind the line indicated in the Hunchun Treaty and the bombardment of that territory and the remnants of the Japanese forces which may still remain on that territory will be withdrawn, then the military activities on the Soviet side will also cease for they would become without object since we need no Manchurian territory. The Japanese could have convinced themselves after the night seizure of the height of Zaozernaya that no preparations of any kind for offensive actions had been made there and that even no fortifications of any kind had been constructed. This, best of all, bears witness to the peaceful intentions of the Soviet side. The Soviet peoples, however, will not be reconciled to the presence of foreign troops on even a small piece of territory which they consider indisputably theirs, and will not hesitate before any sacrifices in order to free it from them. Therefore, as long as the attacks on Soviet territory and the bombardment thereof continue or as long as there is to be found even one Japanese soldier thereon, the Soviet Government must reserve to itself liberty of action. The Ambassador surely has understood and will accurately convey to his Government what is required in order to terminate the military activities. Later on, the Japanese Government may receive a copy or photostatic copy of the Hunchun Agreement and map and [in order?] to convey appropriate instructions to the authorities on the spot.[’]
The Japanese Ambassador promised to inform his Government of the conversation.”
Certain foreign circles in Moscow profess to see in the above conversation between Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador evidence of the possibility of some slight lessening, for the moment, of the tension between the two countries. The sole basis for this belief would appear to be the mere fact that after many days of an apparent interruption of diplomatic contact between the Soviet and Japanese Governments, while military operations continued, conversations were held yesterday both in Moscow and Tokyo. While it is recognized that these conversations do not appear to have marked any advance toward a solution and that both sides are maintaining their original stands, there is some inclination here, however, to see evidence of a weakening in the Japanese position in that that Government made the initial move in yesterday’s conversations and apparently refrained on that occasion from further specific protests against alleged Soviet violations of Manchurian territory or from any categorical claim that the territory in dispute was without question Manchurian. In so far as the Embassy is aware there would appear to be no evidence of any modification of the Soviet position that the portion of territory in dispute is incontestably Soviet and therefore its possession is not a subject for negotiation or possible compromise.