793.94/14586
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 9, 1939.]
Sir: Toward the end of November 1938 there was much talk in Japan, in the press and elsewhere, of the formulation of a fundamental policy toward China. Various leaders and various governmental bodies were reported to have the problem under consideration, though only the most generalized statements with regard to what was going on were obtainable. On the evening of November 28 the Cabinet gave out a statement (Embassy’s telegram 755, November 29, 5 p.m.) to the effect that “The Cabinet this afternoon decided on a fundamental policy for regulating Sino-Japanese relations in connection with the construction of a new order in eastern Asia which the five-minister conference has been considering.” On November 30, amid measures of secrecy which deceived even responsible highly placed officials; (Embassy’s telegrams 756, November 30, noon,72 and 757, November 30, 3 p.m.), a conference in the presence of the Emperor was held. These are rare occurrences and take place only for decisions of the first importance (despatch 2746, January 22, 193873).
Still no public explanation was made, although there were several announcements portending an important statement in the near future. During the “interest build-up”, which continued for several days, it was noteworthy that on December 1 the Japan Times ran a special story about Wu Pei-fu in which the statement was made that “Some [Page 430] observers predict that he may consent to become ‘President of the Federal Republic of China’ in the areas now under Japanese occupation.” Other papers carried similar articles. A few days later it was given out to the press that the Premier would make a declaration of major importance in a speech at Osaka on December 11 which would be broadcast widely. When that date arrived a press release said that the Premier would not be able to make the trip because of ill health; and on December 12 the press was officially informed that the declaration had been indefinitely postponed.
Meantime information from various sources was leading the Embassy to believe that the conference in the presence of the Emperor as well as the other discussions within the government conducted in such secrecy had had to do at least in part with efforts to establish in China a new regime, nominally led by Chinese, for the governing of the occupied areas. This belief was in considerable part borne out and conlirmed by statements made to the Counselor of the Embassy by the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on December 13 (Embassy’s telegram 783, December 14, 5 p.m.). The Vice Minister stated confidentially and off the record that the Foreign Office believes that the refusal of Wu Pei-fu to become head of the new government which had been proposed is in reality a blessing for Japan. He gave it as the opinion of the Foreign Office that a federated form of government is the most promising form of government for China, not a regime made over from the union of the Nanking and Peking groups. The Vice Minister further gave an intimation of the system of government envisaged for China by the Foreign Office when he referred to the possibility of establishment of a central committee the members of which would represent a large number of local governments additional to those already set up, a chairman being elected from among the members of the committee.
On the evening of December 22 the Premier gave out an important statement74 embodying the conditions which Japan asserts that she demands of China (despatch 3535, December 23, 1938,75 enclosure 3). The press was given to understand at the time of the release that the conditions had been approved by the November 30 conference in the presence of the Emperor.
It seems probable that when the November 30 conference made its decisions of basic policy toward China it also approved the recognition of a government of China for the occupied areas, probably to be headed by Wu Pei-fu. Obviously the recognition of an established regime at the same time as the announcement of basic policy as conditions governing the relations of Japan with the newly established [Page 431] regime would have offered to the Japanese public and to the foreign world a dramatic development, and there seems little doubt that, had Wu Pei-fu been cooperative, such would have been the result. Wu Pei-fu’s refusal then apparently caused postponement of announcement even of the basic conditions approved by the November 30 conference, in the hope that some new solution for setting up a government of China might be found. By December 22 it was nevertheless found advisable to announce the basic conditions without taking simultaneous action in recognition of a regime.
Piecing together the fragments of information which have come to the Embassy’s attention in explanation of this sequence of happenings, the Embassy inclines to the view that General Doihara was sponsor of a plan for installing Wu Pei-fu as head of a single government for the occupied areas of China; that General Kita was sponsor of a plan for installing Wang Keh-min as head of such government; that General Doihara was able to win the support of the Japanese Government to his plan; that the plan miscarried on account of Wu Pei-fu’s refusal to cooperate; that the establishing of a single regime for the governing of the occupied areas has had to be deferred and is now not being actively pressed; and that the present prospect is for a loosely federated form of government, without a dominating individual Chinese leader. A fair assumption is that, as Japanese pressure for the immediate setting up of a government has apparently relaxed, the December 22 announcement of basic conditions, separately from any act of recognizing of a regime, is further indication that the setting up of a single government is not imminently expected.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- See footnote 41, p. 24.↩
- Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 482.↩
- Vol. iv, p. 110.↩