711.94/1234½
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Sayre)
Mr. Sayre: Referring to your memorandum of December 15,69 and making of record certain statements which I made in conference this morning, I may say:
I concur in the lines of reasoning on which this memorandum moves, and I have no criticism of or comment to offer upon what appears in the first twenty pages. With regard to the statement in conclusion (pages 21–25), I concur in the views there expressed except as indicated hereunder:
I share the view that “a comprehensive and thoroughgoing program of retaliation is not desirable at this time”; but I would underscore the words “at this time”, and I would add that I consider it highly desirable that a plan be made at this time for a comprehensive and thoroughgoing program of measures of material pressure which might be applied, beginning with some one step and proceeding as the situation may unfold to other steps, by way of preparation for action which might soon need to be begun.
[Page 426]I dissent from the view that “Such a program of retaliation would [underscoring mine] involve serious risk of armed conflict.” My view is that adoption of such a program, and letting it be known that the program is in existence and may be carried out, might contribute substantially toward obviating the development of a situation in which danger of armed conflict would become an actuality. I grant that the formulation of such a program might create a risk. But I think that continuance of this Government’s part of acquiescence in Japan’s impairment of our rights and destruction of our interests in China is more sure to contribute to the creation of a risk than would be the adoption by this Government of a program of resistance to Japan by means qf material pressures. In my opinion, unlawful and aggressive acts cannot anywhere be opposed—even by words alone—without some degree of risk arising. It is my conviction, however, that resolute opposition is less dangerous than timorous opposition or acquiescence; and I believe that a bold stand by the American Government would on the one hand have very prompt support from the American public and on the other hand have a definite though not conclusively determining effect toward deterring the Japanese from going to extremes.
I dissent from the view that “wholehearted international cooperation, especially on the part of the British Empire, would be necessary, to accomplish the objectives in mind …”70 To begin with, the immediate objective is to prevent the Japanese from taking extreme action against our rights and interests (along with those of other powers) in China. The more remote, as contrasted with the immediate, objective is to prevent a collapse of Chinese resistance to Japan and the concomitant of an early military victory by the Japanese which would place them for the time being in unopposed military occupation of the whole of China. Sharing the view that “close and thoroughgoing European cooperation” cannot be secured, I nevertheless do not believe that such cooperation is necessary—provided the United States would take and would make clear that it had taken and would continue in a determined position of refusal either to assent to or to acquiesce in disregard of its rights and destruction of its interests in China. This country has the capacity and it could be brought to have the will to bring to bear upon Japan material pressures of such weight that the Japanese, contemplating the prospect of those pressures being applied, would very substantially modify the program to which they have recently and openly declared themselves committed.
I find the suggestion, but absence of a recommendation, that endeavor might be made now to obtain revision of Section 338 of the [Page 427] Tariff Act of 1930 on lines indicated; also, that possible denunciation of the commercial treaty of 1911 might be considered. I would go further. I would urge that the first of these suggestions be acted upon forthwith. I would urge that a decision be made that denunciation of the treaty of 1911 be authorized, now, notification to be given if, when and as developments in the situation may be such as to lead to the conclusion that the moment is opportune and the act desirable.