Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/14520: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 20, 1938—10 p.m.
[Received December 20—6:30 p.m.]

795. My 787, December 16, 3 p.m., paragraph 3, Department’s 422, December 16, 8 p.m.

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has not yet asked either my British colleague or me to call upon him.⁶⁷

2. Following is a brief résumé of the instructions received by Craigie from his Government dated December 17:

(a) In view of the unofficial nature of the Foreign Minister’s memorandum (of December 8) which was probably intended to test our reactions, no official representations should be made as coming from the British Government but an early opportunity should be taken to indicate that profound dissatisfaction has been caused in England by the Minister’s expressed views. If these views were to become known to the public they would tend to increase the already mounting distrust and misgiving resulting from recent press articles outlining Japanese intentions;

(b) British inability to agree to arbitrary and unilateral modification of existing treaties might well be stressed, thus affording Arita opportunities to suggest revision by discussion if he desires to do so. The onus to make first proposals would thus be placed on Japan;

(c) Lord Elibank, who is not a member of the Government, characterized Japanese actions in China as “economic aggression” and advocated certain measures of economic retaliation. We deplore practice of Japanese news agencies and press of divorcing from their context statements by public men in England in order to create ill-feeling in Japan. Any acts of economic retaliation which are advocated or contemplated arise from failure of Japanese to implement previous assurances. Such acts of retaliation do not furnish excuse for further Japanese acts of discrimination and exclusion. The impulse to advocate retaliatory measures would automatically disappear if causes of just complaints in China were removed and a definite forward step would have been taken in improving our mutual relations. British Government has up till now exercised great restraint in replying to questions in Parliament but will be unable indefinitely to restrain public opinion in view of growing mistrust. If any gesture is called for Japan should surely take the initiative;

(d) Your [The?] arguments already used against necessity for monopolistic control in China might well be amplified. In time of war no power except China could prevent Japan’s access to raw materials in that country. To assume the contrary would presuppose a defeated Japan whose communications with China were severed and in that event Japanese control and ownership would be of no avail. No argument therefore exists for departing from principle of equal opportunity. The only requirements are an independent, stable and well disposed China, free from domination by any power, and a powerful and undefeated Japan. Community interests of many powers in China should be welcomed as a stabilizing factor which would in no way obstruct Japanese aim to secure necessary raw materials. (End resume of Craigie’s instructions.)

3. Craigie today expressed to me the hope that I would cable to Washington the substance of his instructions and seek authority to present the situation to Arita in a similar light.

4. I told Craigie of the nature of my own instructions and added that in my opinion the views of my Government had been fully and adequately presented and recorded and that in the light of the present attitude of the Japanese Government nothing was to be gained by continual debate over the same points and issues. I said I felt that the time had come when general representations or debate were futile and that while I would continue at every opportunity to maintain the position of my Government, as already fully expressed to the Japanese Government both orally and in writing, I felt that a dignified reserve was now desirable while awaiting the development of the many factors which are constantly at work in shaping the future situation.

5. Craigie was impressed by this attitude but he nevertheless believes that the present situation is inviolable and while he is emphatically in favor of economic measures of pressure he feels that a “safety valve” would be afforded by a continuance of friendly debate with the Foreign Minister with regard to the practical application of the “new order”. Craigie says that he has reason to believe that the army is interested only in securing permanent access to raw materials and that the pressure on the Government to exclude foreign trade in general from China springs from other, non military, elements. (I myself fed it very difficult to accept this hypothesis.)

6. I may add that Craigie in this and in previous conversations has been unable to suppress a latent eagerness to find a compromise settlement with the Japanese on the basis of (a) satisfying Japanese plans for the development of sources of raw material in China and (b) non-impairment of British and other foreign trading rights in China. His opinion, as reported in the second sentence of paragraph 5, was fathered, I believe, more by this eagerness than by any conclusive indication of the Japanese Army’s exclusive interest in raw materials. In the light of Craigie’s thoughts on this point, I am apprehensive of embarking on discussions along the lines suggested in paragraph & of his instructions.

7. As a result of our talk today Craigie will, unless called for by Arita, postpone visiting the Minister until after the holidays. He expressed the hope, however, that I would inform him of any reply received from Washington to my present telegram in order that he might explain to his Government his own decisions.

Grew

67. For the Ambassador’s memoranda of conversation on December 26 with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 631 and 818.