793.94/14506: Telegram

The Counselor of Embassy in China (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State

722. 1. The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy volunteered last night the following statement to an officer of this Embassy:

(a)
He hoped that the current conversations between the Japanese Foreign Minister and our Ambassador in Tokyo would soon reach a solution; he felt that a solution would be possible if the American Government did not “hold too closely to the Stimson policy”.
(b)
The Japanese military considered that policy intolerable and progress could be achieved only by “backing away from it somewhat”.
(c)
The Japanese Government had much appreciated American attitude in North China which was an area to which the Japanese attach great importance.
(d)
When we were fairminded and patient in regard to happenings in North China the news spread very quickly and had a noticeable effect upon the Japanese military and others in Japan;
(e)
Conversely a stiffer attitude would have an unfavorable effect;
(f)
For example while he found it possible “to mitigate” the difficulties caused by incidents involving Japanese military and Americans he had failed to accomplish anything in respect to incidents involving British subjects because he had to inform the military that British diplomatic officers adopted an unbending attitude toward Anglo-Japanese problems.

2. The Counselor also offered a long dissertation on economic and trade problems the burden of which was that trade control was absolutely necessary for China, but was not necessarily discriminatory.

3. In a separate conversation the Japanese First Secretary stated to the American Secretary that (1) he was heartily sick of his work here; (2) he was no longer a diplomatic officer but an attaché of the Japanese military; (3) his Embassy had to consult the military in regard to every matter that arose between his Embassy and the American and British Embassies; (4) in addition various Japanese military officers concocted “ridiculous economic schemes” with which they burdened the Japanese Embassy; (5) for example, he himself was now wasting a great deal of time investigating, at the insistence of the Japanese military, the means and cost of softening North China’s notoriously hard water; (6) foolishness of this sort found a corollary in the political field; (7) for example Japanese plans for a new central government for China, including the plan to make Wu Fei Fu President, were now topsy turvy and hopelessly confused.

4. Repeated to Chungking. Code text being sent to Tokyo.

Lockhart