741.94/232
The Ambassador in Poland (Biddle) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 27.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 778 of November 4, 1938,56 and to report the following information which has just come to light.
[Page 411]In conversation with Minister Beck57 last night he significantly remarked that he had learned from authoritative Japanese quarters that the Japanese Government felt the hour was approaching when it might be possible to bring about an Anglo-Japanese agreement in connection with their respective interests in China. The Japanese were very hopeful of bringing this about but were concerned lest the United States place obstacles in the way. In fact, the Japanese felt that if the United States did not oppose such an agreement, the British and Japs might come to terms within a reasonable period of time.
(The foregoing remarks rendered even more interesting a report which Polish officialdom had received a few days ago to the effect that the Japanese Government had told British Ambassador Craigie that they regretted relations between their two countries were drifting; apart, and that the Japanese Government was anxious to amend this condition, due to pressure from Germany to seal the Anti-Comintern Pact with a military alliance.)
The Minister then remarked that in his opinion Britain’s ability to concentrate effectively on a Western European appeasement and pacification was hampered mainly by her difficulties in the Far East. Britain could not be expected to handle both problems effectively at the same time until she had attained the desired standard of rearmament—and that was still some time off. In fact, times had changed since those days when Britain used to be able to treat with problems one by one as they arose within her Empire. London then sat back calmly while her diplomats and troops localized difficulties and effected a settlement. Nowadays, however, the high pressure politics of Germany, Italy, and Japan were pinpricking Britain at points all over the political chessboard whereat British interests crossed those of the other three countries. The Minister reiterated with emphasis his opinion that under present circumstances Britain was not in a position to handle effectively the situations in the West and the East at the same time. Therefore an Anglo-Japanese agreement in the Far East might give Britain a freer hand to concentrate her efforts in the West. The Minister then significantly mentioned that he would be greatly interested to ascertain what American official attitude might be towards a possible Anglo-Jap agreement.
The Minister’s manifested interest on this score discloses, to my mind, his present efforts to appraise at long range the potential turn of events in the Far East, in the light of their bearing upon affairs in Western Europe, and upon Poland’s position in particular. Accordingly, I interpret his aforementioned interest to mean that he is [Page 412] now undoubtedly planning Poland’s course for the next few months. He must therefore take into consideration the possible outcome of events in the Far East. Accordingly, I perceive Beck feels that if the United States were not actively to oppose an Anglo-Japanese accord, such an accord might augur an eventual free hand for Japan vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, which in turn might hamper the Soviet’s ability to cooperate effectively with Poland in protecting the Soviet’s and Poland’s respective Ukrainian minorities against German pressure. In such case, as well as in the event of British and French continued disinterest in Eastern Europe, Poland might be afforded no “out” from what might appear to be its only alternative, namely, collaboration with Germany in the setting up of an independent Ukrainian state at the expense of Polish, the Soviet’s and Rumania’s Ukrainian minorities.
On the other hand, I perceive Beck feels that if the United States were to oppose actively an Anglo-Japanese agreement, Japan’s hand would not be free to act against the Soviet—at least for some time to come. Hence, in turn, Moscow might be freer to attend (a) to a much needed reconsolidation of the Soviet’s internal structure, and (b) to the protection of the Soviet’s Ukrainian minority against German machinations. In this case Poland might conceivably be afforded effective Soviet collaboration in protecting their respective Ukrainian minorities, and in such light a possible “out” from aforementioned forced collaboration with Germany.
Of pertinent bearing on the substance of Minister Beck’s aforecited remarks, his Chief of Cabinet, Count Lubienski, who joined our conversation, stated that his recent talk with an American journalist disclosed the latter’s opinion that American public opinion would be resentful of an exclusively Anglo-Jap agreement with regard to their respective interests in China. In response, Minister Beck significantly said that this opinion recalled to his mind the expressed opinion of former Japanese Minister to Poland, Hito, to effect that Japan was making a great mistake in attacking China first—she should have gone after Soviet Russia in the first instance—China later. Japan would undoubtedly encounter a longer campaign in China than expected; in such case, a consequent drain on the Japanese Army’s strength and Tokyo’s treasury, potential provocation of anti-Jap feeling among the democracies, and other world events of direct or indirect unfavorable bearing on Japan’s position during a protracted campaign might conceivably play in Moscow’s ultimate favor.
Respectfully yours,