762.94/264
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 17.]
Sir: There has recently been a marked renewal of activities along the lines of the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis and evidence of a strengthening of the relations between Japan and the states with totalitarian or authoritarian forms of government—Soviet Russia always excepted. These activities are, of course, somewhat seasonal, as the month of November marks the anniversaries of the anti-comintern pacts with Germany and with Italy, but this fact alone would not account for Japan’s increasingly strong swing toward those and other non-democratic states.
Celebrations here began on November 6, which marked the first anniversary of the Italo-German-Japanese anti-comintern pact, and ended on November 25, the second anniversary of the conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-comintern pact, with the signature, in Tokyo, of a cultural convention with Germany. This pact, which is similar to one signed at Rome on November 23 between Germany and Italy, consists of a preamble in which the contracting parties express the intention to strengthen “bonds of friendship and mutual confidence” by “deepening their manifold cultural relations”, and of four articles which in effect provide for the promotion of relations in the fields of “science and fine arts, music and literature, youth movements, sports, [Page 404] et cetera”. The text of the convention, together with the Foreign Office’s statement accompanying its publication, as it appeared in the Japan Advertiser of November 26, is enclosed.49
This convention probably carries no secret clauses but, as remarked in the press (Nichi-Nichi of November 25, 1938), “necessarily pushes the anti-comintern pact another step forward”. As stated in the Embassy’s telegram reporting its signature,* the convention is obviously a significant indication of the trend toward a closer political association of Japan and Germany and a part of a program to move, pari passu with each other of Great Britain and France, toward a definite Japanese-German political arrangement.
Since the fall of Canton and the Wuhan cities and the advent of Mr. Arita as Foreign Minister it has become evident that Japan’s policy and attitude toward the United States, Great Britain, and France with respect to their rights and interests in China have undergone a marked change. Whereas, up to that time, at least the fiction of support of the Nine Power Treaty, the Open Door, and the principle of equality of treatment was maintained by Japan, this has since been dispelled through the adoption by Japan of a policy of creating “a new order in East Asia” which involves the establishment of a Japan–China–“Manchukuo” bloc and a demand for a modification of the principles of the Open Door and equality of opportunity in China. This reorientation in policy toward the powers with interests in China is part and parcel of Japan’s broader policy of attempting to create in East Asia a Japan-dominated self-contained economic and political entity similar to the United States, Russia, or the British Empire. It is now the intention of Japan, as revealed by the Foreign Minister in a recent strictly confidential conversation† to place itself in a position of security against the possible application of sanctions either by the League of Nations or “by nations inside and outside the League”. Adherence to such a policy would logically tend to find Japan on one side and those powers having interests in China, that is, the United States, Great Britain, and France, on the other side. Furthermore, to the extent to which these three countries, which are incidentally the leading democracies, draw closer to one another—not only in respect of East Asia but in other fields, notably Europe—to the same degree is Japan induced to draw closer to the countries opposed to the democracies, namely Italy and Germany, whose interests in China are, incidentally, negligible. Italy and Germany, too, are outside the League of Nations, along with Japan; and those two countries, with [Page 405] their strong navies and air forces, are becoming more and more potentially valuable to Japan as the risk of pressure from Great Britain and France in the East increases with Japan’s announced policy of demanding a revision of the principles which have hitherto provided a measure of protection for foreign rights and interests in China.
It is interesting to note how greatly developments in Europe have favored Japan and how recent events there have drawn Japan into what is becoming the anti-democratic camp. While it is true that the Berlin–Rome–Tokyo axis was founded upon a common anti-communist ideology, and that it outwardly retains the anti-comintern form, events of world importance, based upon a fundamental cleavage in thought between those countries whose interests lie in the direction of maintaining the post-war status quo and those in whose interests it is to alter it, have aligned the anti-comintern states against the democracies. In the Far East it is the democracies whose interests are being threatened in China by Japan. In Europe it is the democracies whose interests have been and are being threatened by Germany and Italy. The Czechoslovak crisis thus provided an ideal moment for the powers who control the destinies of Japan to launch, simultaneously with the establishment of a China Board, a new policy which is developing into a virtual protectorate over all of China with the continued existence, to say nothing of the protection, of the rights and interests of the foreign powers in that area in the hands of the Japanese military. The results of the Munich Conference were interpreted by Japan as an admission by the democratic states of their inability to match the strength of the Berlin–Rome axis, and this gave further impetus to the policy of strengthening Japan’s ties with that axis.
Still another factor in this policy is the growing sympathy on the part of Japan with the nations in Europe having authoritarian forms of Government. The China incident has hastened the establishment of the virtually unchallenged supremacy of the military in the government of Japan. Those liberal or civilian elements whose influence may have been felt, at least beneath the surface of things, prior to the outbreak of the hostilities with China, are today reduced to utter impotence, and something closely approaching an authoritarian form of government under the shogunate of the military may be said to have arrived.
Japan’s gravitation toward the circle of authoritarian states has for some time been manifest. It will be recalled that in 1936 a cultural pact was signed between Japan and Poland; this closely followed the signature of the anti-comintern pact with Germany and was Japan’s second step toward emerging from its political isolation and a bid for solidarity with a country whose policy was anti-Soviet. It is also interesting to note that Poland’s form of government then, as now, closely approached the authoritarian form.
[Page 406]It may be added parenthetically that the news that Poland had, on November 26, suddenly decided to extend her non-aggression pact of 1932 with Soviet Russia until 1945, was badly received by the press here and this action was interpreted as Poland’s withdrawal from the anti-comintern bloc. In fact, so much stir was caused in the editorial columns of the local newspapers that the Polish Ambassador, Mr. Thaddeus de Romer, called upon the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs on the following day to reassure him that Poland’s action was not to be construed as prejudicial to the friendly relations with Japan.
On November 15 a cultural pact was concluded between Japan and Hungary, another state verging on the authoritarian. This pact, incidently, is reported to take effect upon the same day as the pact with Germany, on November 25.
Japan’s association, in varying degrees of intimacy, with the authoritarian states is therefore apparent; this is due somewhat to her sympathy for that particular ideology. The fact, however, that those states, each in its own way, shares some of Japan’s own problems is of course the real reason behind this association. Germany and Italy have no axe to grind in the East; they are, moreover, opposed in Europe by the same powers, England and France, as, with the addition of the United States, are opposed by Japan in China. Thus Germany, Italy, and Japan, who were originally drawn together by the common denominator of anti-communism, are now being bound more closely by their common opposition to the so-called democratic states, and this process will probably continue until something occurs in the political field to reverse the circle now in operation. Such a move might, for instance, be a successful attempt on the part of Great Britain to wean Italy away from the Berlin–Rome axis. At this point, however, we enter the realm of pure speculation.
Respectfully yours,
- Not reprinted.↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 751, November 26, noon. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Embassy’s telegram No. 744, November 16 [19], 3 [8] p.m. [Footnote in the original; telegram printed in vol. iv, p. 93.]↩