Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

893.51/6730: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State⁴⁶

Tokyo, December 1, 1938—8 p.m.
[Received December 1—5:25 p.m.]

760–762. 1. As a result of the recent modification in policy announced by the Japanese Government and also as a result of the recent conversations between Chiang Kai Shek and the British Ambassador in China, my British colleague and I have had several informal talks by way of endeavoring to appraise the new situation. We are agreed on the following points:

(a) If any assistance is to be given by our respective Governments to Chiang Kai Shek there is little time to be lost if the assistance is to be effective.

(b) There is every indication that the discrimination against foreign interests in China will be continuous and progressive.

(c) Japan is under the governance of the military elements and the trend toward some authoritarian government is becoming progressively more pronounced. The restraining influence of the civilian and liberal elements has become so feeble that it may be entirely eliminated from our calculations.

(d) There is in process a strengthening of the anti-Comintern feeling. (Craigie is convinced that the further agreement which is in view between Germany, Italy and Japan can only be designed to strengthen political and possibly military ties and will be directed more against the democratic powers than against Soviet Russia. My feeling is that Germany and Japan and Italy if they can bring her along intend to keep step with any further strengthening of the ties between Great Britain and France.)

(e) Although there are indications that the hostilities are exerting a progressive strain on Japan’s economic structure, reliance on this factor alone to bring about moderation of Japanese policies would be illusory.

2. Craigie further feels that, although the impact of a strengthened totalitarian combination would first fall on British interests in the Far East, it would only be a question of time before the “vital interests” of the United States also became affected. He is convinced further that the hardening of the Japanese attitude is due not only to recent military victories but to the conviction in military and naval circles that the democracies are not prepared to risk war under any circumstance. My position on these two points is that they are matters of opinion or of impressions and do not fall within the realm of demonstrable fact.

3. Craigie proposed that we jointly recommend to our respective Governments that there is little to be lost—and much may be gained—from resolute action taken jointly by the United States and the British Empire (preferably with French cooperation) to maintain our position, rights and interests in the Far East. The measures which he proposed for recommendation to our Governments were: (a) joint currency loan to China; (b) denunciation of respective treaties of commerce with Japan with a clear indication of the reasons for this step; (c) raising of the French embargo on the passage of munitions through Indochina.

4. I have told Craigie that after very carefully and thoroughly considering the problem for several days I am not able to conform to his suggested recommendations.

5. I said first that my Government is in possession, from many sources, of all available facts upon which to formulate and carry out its policies and actions and furthermore that it is in a far better position than I am to estimate the desires and restraints of American public opinion. These factors alone would deter me from making such a recommendation as he proposed even if I believed in the wisdom and efficacy of retaliatory measures.

6. As a matter of fact, however, I expressed to Craigie my belief that in the present temper of the Japanese Government, of the Japanese military and of a preponderant element of the Japanese public, such sanctions as he lists would defeat their own object and would simply result in making the Japanese more intransigent than ever against the interests of the participating nations. I could not estimate the practical effect of loans to the Chinese nationalists but any practical effects accruing from the denunciation of our respective commercial treaties with Japan would take a long time to register. I expressed doubts over the soundness of Craigie’s belief that concerted action by the three powers along the lines he had suggested would lead to a satisfactory reorientation of Japanese policies. I admitted that he might be right but on the other hand I could not bring myself to believe that our Governments can afford to discount completely the statements which Arita has made to both of us that the primary objective of Japan in bringing about “the new situation” in the Far East⁴⁷ is to place herself in a position successfully to resist external pressure exerted through economic measures. It would seem to me extremely hazardous to assume that the program which Japan is carrying out at such enormous costs would be allowed to collapse upon there being brought about precisely that situation which the program was intended to meet.

7. I told Craigie that ever since the hostilities in China began I had endeavored to render maximum protection to American interests but at the same time to avoid recommendations or action which in my opinion would steer the United States into dangerous channels which American public opinion would not countenance. In all conscience therefore I found myself unable to go along with him in the recommendations which he proposed.

8. I then talked frankly of the marked difference in the respective positions of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East. I pointed out that the United States and Great Britain have common interests and concern in the broad field of influencing of policy such as the Open Door and that in the specific field of Far Eastern politics they oppose violation of the territorial and administrative integrity of China. They furthermore have a common interest in specific issues which have been created in China in violation of the above mentioned principles. There are, however, other political and economic considerations which do not affect the two countries in equal degree, and it seemed to me that such defensive measures as Great Britain might consider necessary to protect British interests might not necessarily commend themselves to the United States.

9. Craigie replied that he fully recognized the justice of my position and that he did not wish to press me unduly. He said that it is only his deep sense of the gravity of impending events and his feeling that there is now no time to be lost that led him to put forward his suggestions.

10. The Department will undoubtedly recognize the fact that Craigie’s complete frankness with me called for equal frankness on my part and that in my personal observations to him I was in no manner committing my own Government.

No repetition.

Grew

46. The three sections of this message, transmitted as telegrams Nos. 760–762, are printed as one document.
47. Cf. memorandum of November 19, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 801, 804.