793.94/14365: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 2:47 p.m.]
547. Reference my 546, November 16, 10 a.m. McHugh16 arrived here on November 15 in company with the British Ambassador by car from Changsha where he was present during Clark-Kerr’s conversation with Chiang Kai Shek on November 4 and 5. Clark-Kerr went to Changsha to see Chiang in response to a request made by the latter during their last meeting at Hankow late in July. He did not go, as was generally suggested in the press, to present Japanese peace proposals or to proffer Great Britain’s good offices for a settlement of the present conflict.
McHugh had two very lengthy and frank conversations with Clark-Kerr at Changsha on November 6 and 8 as well as daily contact with Donald17 during the entire period plus a family lunch with Chiang, Madame Chiang, and Donald on November 8. He is submitting a detailed written report covering these conversations which includes a verbatim copy of the aide-mémoire of the first conversation between [Page 380] Chiang Kai Shek and Clark-Kerr on November 4. This document which is quoted verbatim in my 546, November 16, 10 a.m. was made available to McHugh by Donald after the former had obtained permission from the British Ambassador to see it.
Clark-Kerr had expressed to McHugh a desire for a general talk the night he arrived. This took place at noon the day after the above meeting with Chiang but the arrival of other guests soon after the talk opened forestalled McHugh’s intention to sound out Clark-Kerr on the details of his interview. McHugh learned from Donald on the following morning of the existence of the aide-mémoire and the general tone of its contents, but Donald stated he could not reveal it without Clark-Kerr’s permission. McHugh then sought another interview with Clark-Kerr that afternoon when the latter spoke to appropriate authorities of the details of his conversation and gave permission for him to see the aide-mémoire.
McHugh gained the impression during this conversation as well as from the document itself plus his talks with Donald that Chiang Kai Shek had presented an ultimatum to London and he still believes that both Donald and Madame Chiang hold this viewpoint. During his second conversation with British Ambassador, however, which followed McHugh’s lunch with Chiang, Clark-Kerr stated emphatically that Chiang had not made his statements in the form of a threat. Instead Chiang had asserted his desire to date signifies friendly relations with the democratic powers; that he had confidently expected that they, particularly Great Britain, were bound to come to the assistance of China; but that the time had now arrived when he had to have a specific statement of Britain’s intentions as well as tangible evidence to present to the people of China at the forthcoming plenary session of the Kuomintang which is scheduled to take place in Chungking early in December. He suggested as an initial move on Britain’s part a loan to support Chinese currency. The British Ambassador informed McHugh that he had sent a subsequent telegram himself to London after despatching the aide-mémoire to make clear that Chiang’s statements had not conveyed any tone of belligerency or threat.
In his conversation on the 8th with Chiang Kai Shek, McHugh inquired specifically if he were to be permitted to infer that the statements made to the British Ambassador applied with equal force to the United States. Chiang after a moment’s hesitation replied that he thought that question should await an opportunity for him to confer directly with the American Ambassador.
In talking with Madame Chiang and Donald later after luncheon, McHugh again inquired if the statement did not apply with equal force to the United States. Chiang replied: “At least, they should [Page 381] take them as the handwriting on the wall”. McHugh then referred to the Generalissimo’s statement that he had reason to believe that Japan would afford China very easy peace terms in return for an aboutface toward the British. McHugh inquired how this could be sold to the people of China who have been so generally aroused against Japan and asked if it could be brought about by inflammatory speeches on the part of Chinese officials against the British. He interpolated the suggestion that this appeared possible in view of the remarkable change in the attitude of the people towards foreigners today as with the latter part of the last decade.
Madame Chiang evaded the suggestion that public opinion in China could be aroused and directed from the top. She stated that she and the Generalissimo had worked very hard to bring about a favorable feeling toward foreigners. She added, however, that she believed the people would accept peace with Japan if the Generalissimo told them it was the best thing for China.
Donald informed McHugh later that the Generalissimo will attend the Kuomintang Congress at Chungking in December and that foreign policy for the coming year will be decided.
Chiang expressed his present firm determination both to Clark-Kerr and McHugh to carry on with resistance. He claims to have divisions available which he intends to dispose as follows: 60 east of the Peiping–Hankow–Canton Railway; 60 west thereof; and 60 in reserve under reorganization. He asserted that he expected to carry on active guerrilla warfare in the areas east of the railways; that although frontal resistance will be offered to the Japanese as they advance, it is not his intention to attempt to hold any place in force in the future, surrendering to them any large point they choose to attack. He thereby hopes to gain the offensive by placing the Japanese under constant threat of attack on all fronts, and claims he will choose his own ground for battle.
He again asserted that he has supplies sufficient to continue the war for another year at the present rate [of] consumption. He admitted that many of his best divisions were seriously depleted and that he did not expect to assume the offensive for some weeks yet. He is apparently prepared to surrender both Changsha and Hengyang to the Japanese if they choose to advance on those points in sufficient force. He obviously is imbued with the experience he had in chasing the Communists and intends to employ on a grand scale against the Japanese the tactics he learned from those campaigns. He appeared to have recovered from signs of the strain he exhibited during the latter days in Hankow and to be physically fit and confident. He exhibited no concern over the situation in the south; claimed that a counter-attack was already under way; and stated that Samshui had been reoccupied on the previous evening (November 7).
[Page 382]In response to a question about the situation in Szechwan, Madame Chiang scoffed at the idea that any threat to national unity existed there, pointing to the fact that the Generalissimo went there practically alone 4 years ago in the face of similar rumors and moved around at will. She added that he had even taken action against the opium traffic which was Liu Hsiang’s chief source of revenue and asserted confidently that he could return again at will. Both she and Donald derided suggestions of a possible break up behind the front, insisting that Chiang controls the army through the younger officers which he educated and asserting that no leader, either civil or military, could possibly command sufficient force to question his authority.
Repeated to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.