Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/14239: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 28, 1938—9 a.m.
[Received 10:40 p.m.]

688. Telegrams of this general nature should always be made available to the Commander-in-Chief.⁶⁶ Department’s 360, October 25, noon.

1. As having direct applicability to the question of the bearing of the Munich Agreement and its aftermath on recent developments in the Far East, please review our 655, October 10, midnight. Subsequent developments in Europe have not borne out the hope, which was current when our telegram was sent, that stabilization of Europe was within close reach, yet it was precisely that possibility which aroused apprehension in this country lest the Munich Agreement Powers eventually intervene in the Far East. In fact it was suggested by the Japanese press that the Hankow offensive was being prosecuted with increased vigor in anticipation of such possible intervention. This connection between the Munich Agreement and events in the Far East was the only one which was given any notice whatever in Japan. The suggestion that the Munich Agreement had repercussions on Japanese policy the reverse of that above mentioned would be purely speculative.

2. We believe that the Munich Agreement had no direct bearing on the attack on Canton. By reference to our 643, October 4, 4 p.m., paragraph 4, it will be observed that my British colleague had already obtained knowledge of the preparations then being made for this attack, and, considering the elaborate precautions taken to preserve Japanese military secrets, it is highly probable that these preparations had been in hand for a substantial period of time (certainly not less than 2 weeks) before Craigie got wind of them—and therefore before the Munich Conference was talked of. That the attack on Canton was a sound strategic move was so obvious that it had been expected for the past 12 months. An appraisal of the reasons for making the attack at the time actually chosen will be found in our 665, October 13, 5 p.m. However, we do not at all exclude as an additional reason for making the attack at this time the lack of British resoluteness disclosed during the protracted discussions prior to the Munich Conference.

3. We are not in a position to appraise, in relation to the Munich Agreement, recent expressions of Japanese intention to preempt prior position for their shipping on Chinese rivers. Such expressions are of course completely contradictory of previous declarations that the Yangtze River would be thrown open to international commercial navigation upon the capture of Hankow. Although we have not as yet done so, we intend shortly to invite the Foreign Office to comment in the light of its previous declarations on the statement recently made in this connection by Minister Tani to Gauss.

4. The advertisement of the Shiunso is only the most recent in a series directed against Great Britain during the past year by this organization. Two years ago the organization was preoccupied with Soviet Russia, and previously with American policy during the Manchurian conflict. The fact that its former threats have not been fulfilled should serve to place the fulminations of this organization in accurate perspective. Nevertheless, the extent and depth of the anger and resentment of the Japanese public against Great Britain should not be minimized. This feeling is no new development but has been vigorously manifested during the past year or more, as reported in several of our telegrams and despatches. Its existence has been frankly admitted to my British colleague on several occasions by the Minister for Foreign Affairs (please see, among other reports, our 543, August 18, 2 p.m., paragraphs 2 and 3⁶⁷).

5. As the Department is aware, my British colleague is convinced that the Germans are inciting the Japanese to take an increasingly uncompromising attitude vis-à-vis the British. Information which Japan derives from Germany with regard to British difficulties and involvements in Europe might, and probably does, affect the timing and extent of Japanese actions in China, but we do not believe that potential objectives of Japanese policy in China are capable of change one way or another by whatever advice or information Germany might give.

6. Our 670, October 15, 11 a.m.⁶⁸ may be found to throw considerable light on this general subject.

7. Finally, in our analysis of the attitude of Japan towards foreign interests and foreign commercial activities in China, we should constantly bear in mind the fact that there exist marked discrepancies between the views of the home Government and of the military authorities in the field. We can hardly reject as diplomatic persiflage the assurances given us by such substantial statesmen as Prince Konoye (see our 640, October 3, 4 p.m.,⁶⁹ paragraph 3) who himself is a thorough Nationalist, even though these assurances are being daily belied in practice. The increasingly truculent attitude of the Japanese, mentioned by the Department, is of the Japanese military in the field, not of the home Government. In dealing with Japan we are, in effect, dealing with two distinct authorities who are sometimes very far apart in their respective conceptions of foreign policy. To us who live in Japan, this is a trite statement. Ironically, the military and naval authorities are having their day. Their obvious aim is to drive all commercial interests out of China and to make of China an exclusively Japanese mart. Into such vacuum as they are able to create, Japanese commercial and industrial interests will inevitably and progressively crowd. The home Government, which alone is able to appraise the international aspects of this situation, is for the moment very nearly powerless to compel the military authorities in the field to implement its assurances.

8. The foregoing observations are presented merely as facts. It would be futile to attempt to predict the eventual outcome.

Grew

66. A common means of transmission between the Embassy in Japan and the Department of State was via the Consulate General at Shanghai and the U. S. Navy radio there. This telegram was intended to be made available to the Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, at Shanghai.
67. Ante, p. 265.
68. Vol. iv, p. 67.
69. Ibid., p. 53.