793.94/14216: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 1:20 p.m.]
515. Department’s 360, October 25, noon, to Tokyo. It is my opinion that the Munich Agreement came as a surprise to the Japanese who had long planned an invasion of South China for the purpose of putting an end to the stream of munitions that was flowing into China through Hong Kong and Canton. I do not believe that it precipitated that decision although Chinese reliance upon an assumed Japanese unwillingness to affront British at Hong Kong contributed doubtless to their failure to prepare for such an invasion and contributed to ease which attended Japanese military advance. Nor do I feel that Munich Agreement has necessarily contributed to increasing truculency on the part of Japanese since this has existed from the first. A review of Japanese military activities since beginning of hostilities [Page 345] will I think justify one in believing that invasion of mainland is outward manifestation of a revolt in Japan which has almost succeeded in placing the Japanese military in control of the Government or at least that part of Government which functions in regard to China and the mainland. Resignation of Ugaki over proposed creation of China Bureau independent of Foreign Office and therefore presaging the establishment of Government for China independent of Japanese relations with other nations and whole set of treaties regulating those relations is measure of success of this revolt. Army’s attitude from the beginning has been consistently opposed to existence of national government in China and continuance of third power rights, interest and influence in China. Japanese military have successfully prevented shipment of American owned goods caught by hostilities on the Yangtze between Nanking and Kiukiang (wood oil belonging to Werner G. Smith), Japanese prevented Monocacy proceeding [from] Kiukiang to Shanghai, arguing that this barrier was prize of war (see message 0019–0004 Oahu to Commander-in-Chief of August 1964). Recent communication regarding Yangtze and Pearl Rivers was consistent with this earlier pronouncement which was addressed to the American Government concerning the movements of one of its national ships. Japanese Army in China and its leaders in Japan have not, from the first, had any regard for treaties between Japan and other powers or between China and third powers and by setting up in Japan an independent bureau to deal with China affairs and governments in China subordinate to Japanese Army control have consigned such questions to that other Government of Japan with which we have ordinary contact only through such recognized channels as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Munich agreement was I have no doubt greeted by Japanese military party with relief as an indication that at least from Great Britain and France it would meet with little or no opposition, but it did not give rise to this policy.
Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo. Repeated to Shanghai.