793.94/14198: Telegram
The Consul General at Hong Kong (Southard) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:06 a.m.]
11. Referring to the Department’s telegram of October 24, 7 p.m., general opinion among the more conservative and best informed contacts of this office in Hong Kong is that the rapidity and ease of the Japanese invasion of South China and occupation of Canton was mainly contributed to by the following factors: [Page 338]
- 1.
- Cantonese conviction that the prestige of the British Government would deter the Japanese from undertaking any South China action likely to injure Hong Kong commercially or otherwise.
- 2.
- Cantonese conviction that the Hong Kong British were so strongly sympathetic with the Chinese cause and were so affectionately devoted to Canton and Canton trade, as illustrated by demonstrations of the general kind reported in our despatches numbers 243 and 273 of July 26th and September 1st,59 that British influence and even force could be depended upon to keep the Japanese out of South China.
- 3.
- Cantonese conceit and conviction that Chiang Kai Shek considered South China so invaluable to his own strength and prestige that he would on the first threat of invasion promptly send sufficient forces to make up for Cantonese lack of defense preparations.
- 4.
- Cantonese reliance on British and other military opinion that the Japanese could not undertake invasion of South China with less than a quarter million men which force, as the Cantonese were assured by these various experts, could not possibly be spared for the purpose;
- 5.
- The much too fulsome and exaggerated praise and dramatization of Chinese patriotism and military prowess chanted almost universally by the foreign press and observers which deluded the always vain Cantonese into an undue conceit that the Japanese would take them at that valuation and thus hesitate to venture an invasion.
- 6.
- Ignorance by the Cantonese of what really would be required in the way of modern military defense against a potential invasion, their unwillingness to accept expert foreign advice and direction in the matter, and inability to bring themselves to parting with the considerable money which appropriate defense measures would have cost.
- 7.
- Cantonese disinclination seriously to prepare for defense under the influences or beliefs outlined in paragraphs 1 to 6 above particularly when such preparations would interfere with their pursuit of financial gain from the situation developed by the hostilities.
The foregoing paragraphs represent opinions concentrated from a wide variety of reputable sources and while this office has no reason to doubt their general accuracy they can not be supported by factual evidence. Among the additional factors which might be considered as exceeding opinion and approaching fact to some degree are the following:
- 8.
- Japanese bribery of both civil and military officers in Kwangtung either with money or promise of high place in a Japanese controlled government for which plans have long been made. This has been a consistent allegation mainly by Japanese and other foreigners in Hong Kong and was specifically and positively stated to me by the contact mentioned in my despatch No. 150 of April 1st [2d]60 whose statements to me as then reported were discussed in Canton’s No. 131 of April 5th.60 I personally am convinced that bribery played probably a leading part in the case of invasion and occupation and there have been various guarded references to that influence in most of the Hong Kong newspapers which have to defer to the local government’s consideration for Chinese feelings.
- 9.
- The lack of interest of the Cantonese in supporting Chiang Kai Shek, which I have long heard, by Japanese contacts, by the presumably well informed Eugene Chen family, and by British and Americans well informed but without special bias.
- 10.
- General civic inertia, grafting, and jealousy alleged to exist among Kwangtung civil and military officials.
Of all the above suggested factors, several of which could be contributory, bribery is thought by this office to have been the decisive one and there is now strong circumstantial evidence in Hong Kong that the Cantonese have decided to encourage public emphasis and proof of the bribery factor if for no other reason than that they are deeply stung by persistent charges of military ineptitude and lack of courage whereas their previous boasting has been unceasingly to the contrary. This office concurs with most informed local sources in a conviction that the South China leaders must have known for months that a Japanese invasion was inevitable, even if for no other reason than to cut the flow of munitions from Hong Kong, and have been incredibly lax in failing to make at least reasonably effective defense preparations for which they had undoubted facilities.
Repeated to Canton, Chungking, Peiping.