760F.62/1740
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 21.]
Sir: In my telegram 626, September 27, 9 p.m. I had the honor to present our analysis of the attitude of Japan with regard to the war which was then apparently impending in Europe. I stated that there were reactionary elements among the Japanese populace which were actively agitating for the giving of military support by Japan to Germany, but I expressed the opinion that the predominant feeling in this country was one of hope that not only would Japan avoid becoming involved in any general conflagration in Europe but that the calamity itself could be prevented. When, as a result of the agreement reached at Munich by the heads of government of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy,23 the immediate likelihood of war was removed, certain of my colleagues believed that the predominant reaction of Japan to this development was one of profound disappointment. Happily, there did not eventuate that catastrophic conclusion to the prolonged efforts of the statesmen of Europe to find a peaceful settlement of the issue between Germany and Czechoslovakia which alone could have brought forth an authoritative expression of the position of the Japanese Government; and I fervently hope that there will never arise any occasion or need for clarification [Page 308] of Japan’s position in this respect. However, as the alignments among the nations of Europe and the tension between the rival camps have not yet been entirely dissolved or relaxed, a discussion of the question whether a general war in Europe would be welcomed by Japan may be of something more than academic interest.
In my telegram under reference, the first consideration on which was based our conclusion that Japan desired for Europe a peaceful issue out of all its difficulties is the policy which the Japanese Government has consistently pursued since 1931, of withdrawal from participation in the affairs of Europe. This consideration was mentioned first for the reason that it has a fairly extended historical background.
The inclusion of Japan among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers in the war against the Central European Powers, which gave Japan a voice in the settlement of a number of European problems of not even the most remote concern to Japan, gratified the aspirations of the Japanese people to be numbered among the great Powers. It was flattering to be given a permanent seat in the Council of the League of Nations and to have a voice in such matters as, for example, the final disposition of Bessarabia. However, that outburst of chauvinism and nationalism—the conflict with China in Manchuria—was also a manifestation of a policy which had long been agitated in Japan, of eliminating Occidental influences from the Far East. It was obvious that practical considerations, notably the limited economic and military resources of Japan, attached to the cry of “East Asia for the Japanese” the corollary that Japan could not undertake to oust European influence from the Far East and at the same time continue to participate in the management of the affairs of Europe, with all the risks and hazards which that involved. Judgment pronounced on Japan by the League of Nations in February 193324 gave further impetus to the retreat from Europe, and by 1936 Japan found itself in a state of complete political isolation. True, in 1936 she concluded an agreement with Germany ostensibly to combat the spread of communism and in the following year associated herself also with Italy by a similar instrument.25 It is recalled that the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated, with reference to the Convention with Germany, that one of the purposes in concluding that agreement was to open a way for Japan to escape from the isolation which encompassed her and to proceed by gradual stages toward the development of more friendly relations with the other great Powers. It might therefore be reasonable to assume that Japan had found occasion to regret her [Page 309] withdrawal from Europe. However, it is unlikely that such an assumption contains the whole truth or even a large portion of the truth. There exists today as there has existed for some years past, a section of the Japanese people which regrets, and even regrets bitterly, the chain of events which began with the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and which yearns for the “good old days” when Japan was a member in good standing of the family of nations. Nevertheless, even this element realizes that Japan will not of its own accord retrace its steps, and that the road back cannot be by way of the anti-Comintern Pact. Nor is there any warrant whatever for assuming that the Army has any intention of becoming embroiled in troubles in Europe under anything short of the most compelling reasons. The fact that the economic dislocations which would follow the outbreak of war in Europe was cited by us as one of the reasons for Japanese hope that the crisis in Europe would be successfully surmounted, may perhaps be queried by those who remember that the World War brought about a period of unprecedented prosperity in Japan. However, it must be remembered that Japan today is not in the same position that she was in 1914 and subsequent years. In 1914–18 the diversion of the industrial and economic resources of Europe to the production of munitions and the blockading of the Central European Powers resulted in a virtual vacuum in world markets for manufactured articles. Whereas a large part of the merchant marine of the combatants was either inactive or engaged in the carrying of troops and munitions, the Japanese merchant marine, which even in those days was of substantial size, was left free for the development and expansion of Japan’s commerce. The war was a god-sent hope which Japan exploited to the limits of its resources, then unencumbered by the exigencies of the conduct of military operations. Today, however, Japan is engaged in China in hostilities over a front line of more than one thousand miles, she has about 1,300,000 men under arms, her financial and economic structure is being preserved only by recourse to trade, fiscal, industrial and other control measures of the most drastic character, while a substantial portion of her merchant shipping is being used to munition her forces in China. In the unfavorable circumstances existing today only an incorrigible optimist would believe that it would be possible for Japan, were a general war to break out in Europe, even to maintain her diminished export trade to a point necessary for the purchase of the most essential commodities, to say nothing of having the industrial and financial reserves essential for replacement in world markets of goods which had thus far been supplied by Europe. How, in these circumstances, it would be possible for Japan to deprive herself completely, first of British Empire markets and next of other markets beyond the effective sphere of influence [Page 310] of the Japanese Navy, without there resulting a collapse of her economic structure, it is difficult to see.
There is a third, and perhaps the most important, consideration of all. When our telegram under reference was being prepared it was not known that, along with ultranationalistic private organizations which placarded the streets of Tokyo with demands that Japan take advantage of war in Europe to move against Soviet Russia, a substantial feeling existed in the Army that Japan should take advantage of an opportunity which might never again occur to settle once and for all its account with that country. Several responsible Japanese officials have recently informed us in confidence that, if a general war had broken out in Europe, it would have been impossible for the Japanese Government to have continued successfully to resist such demand; that with Japan allied with Germany and possibly with Italy against Great Britain, France, and Soviet Russia, the entry into the war of the United States on the side of the democratic Powers would have been a virtual certainty; and that with the United States also in arms against Japan there could have been but one conclusion—and that a disastrous one for Japan.
There no doubt exists among uneducated Japanese, and even among some of those Japanese who are in a position to have an intelligent perception of the situation, a feeling of disappointment that the final conference at Munich did not prove abortive, and thus have made it impossible for the democratic Powers of Europe, especially Great Britain, to intervene forcibly in the Far East. Although a conflagration in Europe would have given Japan a completely free hand in China, I cannot believe that the trend of events involving Japan which would have been started with inevitable certainty by a war in Europe and which might well have ultimately concluded in the collapse of the Japanese Empire, was not clearly apparent to those elements and individuals who are now formulating the policies of this country.
There are enclosed memoranda of conversations26 which I had with my British colleague when the subject of the Japanese attitude toward the situation in Europe was discussed. I think it will be clear from the various statements made to Sir Robert Craigie by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was not the desire of the Japanese Government that there should prevail the belief that Japan would necessarily give military support to Germany in the event of a war in Europe.
Respectfully yours,
- Signed September 29; Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939, 3d ser., vol. ii, doc. No. 1224, p. 627, and Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, ser. D, vol. ii, doc. No. 675, p. 1014. Cf. telegram No. 262, September 30, 1 p.m., from the Minister in Czechoslovakia, Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, p. 702.↩
- See resolution of February 24, 1933, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 113.↩
- Signed November 25, 1936, and November 6, 1937, ibid., vol. ii, pp. 153 and 159, respectively.↩
- None printed; but see the Ambassador’s telegrams No. 608, September 19, 4 p.m., p. 292; No. 609, September 20, 6 p.m., p. 296; and No. 631, September 28, 9 p.m., p. 301.↩