893.0146/669
Memorandum by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)
Indications have come from China that some Japanese (apparently some Army authorities and some civilian elements) are giving consideration to the possible taking of steps toward seizing areas at important ports which have been and are under the administrative jurisdiction of occidental powers, especially Great Britain and France. From time to time certain Japanese Army officers have made threats that in certain contingencies Japanese forces might occupy the International Settlement (and the French Concession?) at Shanghai. Recently, at Tientsin, there have been controversies between Japanese elements and the authorities of the British and the French Concessions; from some Japanese quarters there have emanated demands that the Japanese authorities take drastic steps; and it is reported that the Japanese military are building an encircling roadway around the boundaries of the two concessions. Today, it is reported from Shanghai that stories are current there of a recent landing at the port of 10,000 Japanese soldiers. During the past few days of anxiety with regard to developments in Europe, there has been speculation to the effect that, if war begins in Europe, the Japanese will engage in acts of aggression against British and French interests in China which may include seizure of some or all areas where those powers now exercise administrative jurisdiction. As against this, there came yesterday from the American Embassy at Tokyo a telegram17 giving the Embassy’s estimate to the effect that Japan would probably, in the event [Page 303] of war beginning in Europe, not precipitately embark upon activities aligning her with Germany.
It is believed desirable that consideration be given to the question of policy and action by this Government and its agencies in China, in the event of war beginning in Europe, in regard to the American landed armed forces at Tientsin and at Shanghai.
Press reports yesterday and today indicate that the British Government has issued some instructions regarding and is making some redistribution of the British armed forces, both those landed at Chinese ports and their naval vessels operating in China waters. We have no evidence of the British Government’s having informed us of its intentions or consulted us in regard to these matters.
Although we have an informal understanding between the Department of State and the British Foreign Office to the effect that if and as either country is considering making alterations in the distribution of its landed armed forces in China, it shall, if circumstances permit, consult with or notify the other, it is believed that, in the light of repeated omission on the part of the British Government to consult or notify this Government, we would be warranted, if we so chose, in proceeding as we may see fit with regard to possible changes in the distribution of our landed armed forces, without consulting or notifying the British Government. However, if and as we make decisions in this matter, it will probably be possible for us without inconvenience to consult with or notify the British Government, and there might be advantage in our doing so.
It is believed that we need not concern ourselves here with the question of possible movements of American naval vessels now at Shanghai: Admiral Yarnell18 can either make his own decisions in that connection or ask the Navy Department for instructions.
What need concern us is the matter of our Marine contingents at Tientsin and at Shanghai, and possibly those at Peiping.
We have at present landed at Shanghai about 1300 Marines, officers and men; at Tientsin about 250; and at Peiping about 250.
Since the readjustment made early in the current year in the distribution of our landed armed forces in north China, at which time we withdrew the 15th Infantry from Tientsin and transferred from Peiping to Tientsin two companies of Marines, we have proceeded on the theory that the Guard, consisting of two companies of Marines at Peiping, and the two companies of Marines at Tientsin are maintained at those points for the purpose of general policing, of maintaining communications (especially through the operation of radio stations), and to be of assistance to American nationals, in the general capacity of an armed escort, in the event of there arising a [Page 304] situation calling for withdrawing of American nationals from those cities and bringing the said nationals to the coast or to some agreed-upon concentration point. It is believed that we should continue for the time being to maintain those forces at those points for those purposes. As the situation unfolds, there may develop reason for reconsidering this view. Any disturbance at this moment of the existing set-up as regards the disposal of those forces would be premature and gratuitously productive of alarm in the “foreign” communities at the points under reference. It is especially desirable that our bases of communication at Tientsin and Peiping continue in operation.
The Marine contingent which we now have landed at Shanghai is there for the purpose of policing and, in particular, of guarding one sector of the boundary of the International Settlement. It functions in cooperation with similar landed armed forces of other countries, especially Great Britain and Italy, and those of France, which guard the outer boundaries of the French Concession (the inner boundary of which is coincident with a part of the boundary of the International Settlement). It is believed that this American Marine contingent should be left where it is for the present, pending developments in regard to disposal of the British and the French forces (and possibly the Italian) at Shanghai. In the event of an impending withdrawal of the British and/or the French forces, renewed consideration should be immediately given by us to the question of the disposal of our forces at Shanghai.
The one point with regard to which it is highly desirable that we make a decision at this time is this: In the event of an authorized movement by the Japanese toward seizing control of the International Settlement at Shanghai, and if such movement were accompanied by threat of or use of Japanese armed force, should our Marines participate in any effort at armed resistance? It is believed that the answer to this question should be in the negative. It stands to reason that neither our landed force nor the landed forces of the other powers, either separately or collectively, could hold their positions against such armed forces as the Japanese could easily employ for seizure and occupation of the Settlement. Resistance to the point of combat could only result in a defeat, with its accompaniment of large loss of life and extensive destruction of property. If and when, in advance of a possible Japanese movement toward occupation, the British and/or the French withdraw their forces, we can then consider whether we will withdraw our force. In the meantime, leaving our force where it is, we may advisedly come to a decision that an attempt at seizure by the Japanese, if and when, is to be resisted by diplomatic processes only, and not by resort to force.
It is believed that the standing orders under which our landed armed forces in China are operating, together with instructions which [Page 305] have been issued, in explanation of policy, to State Department representatives in China, for communication to the officers of the armed forces, together with special instructions which have been issued by the Navy Department from time to time, cover all contingencies which are likely to arise except those referred to above, and that no special instruction or orders need be sent at this time. If we can have a meeting of the minds here to the effect that an authorized movement by Japanese armed forces with the objective of seizing control of the Settlement is not to be resisted by armed force, this Department and the Navy Department would be prepared to act instantly in the event of there arising need for instructions to be given on that point. There will be time for the issuing of such instructions after evidence reaches us of a Japanese intention so to act. To put on the cables or in the air now an instruction to the effect suggested would be to take an unnecessary chance of an interception by the Japanese the result of which, information of our intention being in their hands, would encourage them to take the step which we hope that they will refrain from taking.19