760F.62/1156: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan ( Grew ) to the Secretary of State
Tokyo
, September 27, 1938—9 p.m.
[Received September 27—1:10 p.m.]
[Received September 27—1:10 p.m.]
626. Our 609, September 20, 6 p.m., crisis in Europe.
- 1.
- Unlike Italy, which apparently is issuing repeated if equivocal expressions of intention to take the part of Germany in the event of a general war in Europe, Japan has made no public or other authoritative declaration of her position. Although there is some desire by extreme reactionary and other irresponsible popular elements for military alignment by Japan with Germany, the predominant feeling is one of strong hope that not only will Japan avoid becoming involved but that a general conflagration may be avoided. The evident anxiety of the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversations [Page 299] with my British colleague to discourage assumption of Japanese military alignment with Germany is, we believe, reflective of such hope.
- 2.
- It is impossible at this time to make any estimate of Japanese attitude in a situation which may have developed in Europe beyond the opening gambit. It is our opinion that in the circumstances predicated Japan will take no initiative toward, or alternatively will try to avoid, becoming involved. We base our conclusions on the following considerations: (a) As a corollary to the fundamental Japanese policy of seeking to eliminate Occidental political influence from the Far East, there has been since 1931 steady withdrawal by Japan from participation in the affairs of Europe; (b) with a declining export trade, Japan has thus far been able to finance purchase of munitions for the conflict with China and of other necessary primary commodities only by resort to drastic trade control. Even if Japan were to remain neutral, the worldwide economic dislocations which must inevitably follow an outbreak of a general European war would add immeasurably to her difficulties, first, in maintaining her overseas markets and second, in procuring munitions and raw materials. There is very grave doubt whether in such circumstances she could afford to lose, by joining Germany, her British, French and possibly other markets and sources of supply. There is some optimistic speculation over the possibility of Japan benefitting by decrease of European goods in world markets, but the question arises whether Japan has the resources necessary to exploit such opportunity.
- 3.
- It is reasonable to believe that Japan in her present position would prefer to a general war in Europe a continuation of the conditions of unrest which have prevailed there for some years—conditions which have prevented Great Britain especially from active intervention in the Far East.
- 4.
- In the event of war actually breaking out, I propose as on my own initiative to inquire of the Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to the attitude and [policy?] of the Japanese Government, provided the Department does not cable disapproval of such a step.
Grew