Office of the Historian

793.94/13906: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 19, 1938—4 p.m.
[Received September 19—10 a.m.]

608. Our 590, September 8, 11 p.m.

1.
Carrying on their series of conversations the Minister for Foreign Affairs received my British colleague towards the end of last week and according to Craigie reiterated his previous observation that until Great Britain should “desert Chiang Kai Shek” and should cease aiding him Japanese concessions to Great Britain in China would be impossible. Craigie pointed out that while British moral sympathy lay with Chiang Kai Shek there had been little material assistance afforded him and that Germany and other nations had supplied him with arms and ammunition far exceeding British supplies. Craigie furthermore pointed out that the Japanese grievances against the British Navy, mentioned by the Minister at their last interview, chiefly concerned individual acts by officers and men which did not necessarily represent the attitude of the British Government. He received today a more detailed list of grievances which the Minister undertook to furnish him at their next interview. Craigie’s five points were again discussed without favorable result.
2.
Ugaki then asked Craigie whether he was now in a position to give assurances as to Great Britain’s intention to cooperate with Japan in China “in future”. Craigie replied that until current difficulties were settled it was obviously impossible to give future assurances.
3.
In analyzing the situation Craigie notes that a marked change in the attitude of the Japanese Government toward Great Britain took place toward the end of July at about the time of the return of the German Ambassador from Berlin, and while Craigie realizes that the adverse statements of representatives of the British Government in Parliament may have influenced the issue, he is now inclined to believe that messages from the German Government conveyed by General Ott forecasted the European crisis and tended to stiffen Japan’s back towards Great Britain.
4.
I called Craigie’s attention to a press report to the effect that the Japanese Ambassador in Rome had recently assured the Italian Government of Japan’s support of Italy and Germany in the event of war. This report, as well as a similar statement made by the spokesman of the Foreign Office in Tokyo last week, Craigie proposes to discuss with the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today and says he will inform me tomorrow of the result. It seems to me preferable to obtain an interpretation of those reported statements by this indirect method rather than by a direct approach to the Foreign Office myself.
5.
In our ensuing conversation Craigie expatiated on the great importance both to British and American interests in China of maintaining Chiang Kai Shek in the picture, more especially in case of a European war, and expressed his belief that even a comparatively nominal “subsidy” by Great Britain and the United States would exert a perhaps decisive effect. Once again I explained to Craigie the position of the American Government in these matters.
6.
These telegrams reporting my periodic talks with my British colleague appear to ring constantly the same general tune but I assume that the Department desires me to continue to report such conversations.4

No repetition made.

Grew
  1. The Department replied (telegram No. 328, September 19, 8 p.m.) that it found these telegrams to be “of substantial interest and assistance.”↩