Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/13729

Mr. John Garter Vincent of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs to the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)¹⁷

[Washington,] July 23, 1938.

Dear Dr. Hornbeck: Several days ago I had luncheon, at his request, with Frederick Moore, who, as you know and as he frankly admits, has been for a long period and is now employed as adviser to the Japanese Government (Foreign Office, I think).

Mr. Moore talked at considerable length and with seeming frankness about the situation in the Far East and in particular about the problems and difficulties faced by the Japanese. Although many of his observations add little to our knowledge and understanding of the situation, the following statements, I believe, will interest you, especially in view of their source:

1. The morale of Japanese civilians is at a low ebb. Mr. Moore mentioned especially the circumstance, which he said he had on very good authority, that Japanese in Tokyo are praying at temples for the withdrawal of Japanese soldiers from China.

2. The morale of Japanese troops, with the exception of those in the Kwantung Army, is bad and may be expected further to deteriorate when, as seems to be anticipated, aggressive warfare ends with the capture of Hankow and defensive operations against guerrillas ensue.

3. The Japanese are counting heavily upon a disintegration of the Chinese Government after the anticipated fall of Hankow.

4. If the Chinese can maintain resistance in a reasonable degree of effectiveness (that is, I presume, sufficient to keep an army, say, of four or five hundred thousand Japanese engaged), conditions at home will compel the Japanese military to withdraw from China within a year.

5. Even though the present venture in China should prove outwardly successful, the Japanese military are doomed to failure in their imperialistic designs upon China because of their lack of moral stability and imaginative intelligence.

6. The Chinese do not appreciate the strength of their own position in the present situation. If they, Mr. Moore professes to think, understood fully the moral and material vulnerability of the Japanese, the urgency and importance of continuing resistance would be unquestionable.

7. The best (for all concerned) outcome of the present conflict would be for the Japanese military to be discredited with the Japanese people and lose power while it is still possible to ward off complete disaster for Japan. Mr. Moore is a proponent of the Shide-hara¹⁸ school which advocates patient endeavors at peaceful cooperation with and leadership of the Chinese.

8. Public opinion in the United States would support some form of sanctions against Japan, mild initially but more drastic in time. Mr. Moore said that rationally he did not favor such a course (a) because it might, without very careful leadership, result in war with Japan, and (b) because it would cause the Japanese military to fail in their plans without being discredited at home.

9. The Japanese Embassy and other agencies of the Japanese Government in the United States have been overwhelmed with offers from American would-be advisers and propagandists to put Japan right with the American public “for a price”. Mr. Moore stated that his advice to the Japanese Embassy that it not utilize a large sum put at its disposal for propaganda purposes had not been followed. He felt that the expenditure, however, had been ineffectual.

I have been well but not intimately acquainted with Mr. Moore for about ten years. I was impressed by the earnestness and, in view of his position, critical frankness with which he spoke to me. Many of his remarks tend to strengthen and illumine conclusions I had drawn from-a conversation about two weeks ago with Dr. Takeuchi (Japanese scholar and professor—author of the book entitled “War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire”), who cautiously intimated that Japanese civilians and soldiers were far from enthusiastic about the hostilities in China and indicated a lack of sympathy with the Japanese Army’s methods of attaining objectives. He stated that the primary purpose of the Army in the present conflict was to oust foreigners and foreign influence, particularly the much-feared Soviet Russian (communist) influence, from China.

I feel, as I think you do, that the Japanese are now treading (and realize that they are) very unsafe ground. I feel that very much now depends upon the strength of the Chinese will and ability to continue effective resistance. My conversation with Mr. Moore and more recent conversations with Dr. Buck,¹⁹ Treasury official lately returned from China, confirm these views. The position of the Chinese, should Hankow fall, would undoubtedly be critical and the matter of continued effective resistance would be in the balance. It appears easy to fall into the errors of placing too much faith in the ability of the Chinese, unassisted, to carry on the fight and of placing too much confidence in predictions that the Japanese will be unable to consolidate their gains.

I believe, as I think you do, that it is vitally important not only for China but for us and for other democratic nations that Chinese resistance not collapse. Believing as I do, I cannot but earnestly recommend that, within the limitations of our desire to avoid involvement (but within reasonable limitations which take into account the fact that the element of chance cannot be completely eliminated from any policy worthy of the name), we should overlook no opportunity now to bolster up Chinese will and ability to resist, and to embarrass the Japanese in their attempts to conquer China. To those ends I believe (a) that the doctrine of non-recognition should be unequivocally restated to apply in the present situation, (b) that as a corollary to non-recognition steps should be taken effectively to discourage loans or material credits to Japan or to Chinese regimes or agencies under Japanese control, (c) that the possibility of affording financial assistance to China should be thoroughly explored, (d) that our trade with Japan should be carefully examined with a view to withholding, either through export or import restrictions or both, assistance to Japan, and (e) that consultation and collaboration, if possible, with other interested governments in regard to the implementation of feasible measures should be undertaken.²⁰

I realize that some of these matters can only appropriately be dealt with legislatively rather than administratively, but in so far as action may be taken administratively I feel that it should be taken, and where legislative action is required I think that the influence of the Department should be brought to bear.

During recent months I have followed editorial comment throughout the country closely, and I have also discussed the Far Eastern problems with many people not especially interested in those problems. I am willing to hazard the estimate that although a very large proportion of the people in this country continue to desire (1) that we avoid involvement in the conflict in the Far East, a very substantial and influential body of public opinion desires also (2) that American rights and interests in China be protected and preserved in so far as possible, (3) that the integrity and sovereignty of China be preserved, and (4) that for the ultimate good of all, Japanese militarism be defeated. Examining these estimated desiderata, one is tempted to observe, in the light of experience, that American rights and interests may not be preserved^* unless China’s sovereignty is preserved, that China’s sovereignty may not be preserved unless Japanese militarism is defeated, and that from the long viewpoint our involvement in the Far East may not be avoided unless Japanese militarism is defeated.

I am not one to hold up the bugaboo of Japanese attack upon the United States, but I do believe that the chance we take now of involvement by rendering assistance to China is slight in comparison with the chance we take in watching Japanese militarism succeed in China. Predictions that Japan will be fully occupied in China for many years to come if she succeeds in her present military campaign are not borne out by experience. The same comforting predictions were made when Japan took Manchuria and I believe that just such a mistaken thought was back of British and European policy at that time. I was in Manchuria in 1931–32²¹ and I do not recall that any one in a position to know, including Japanese civilian officials, actually thought that Japanese military aggression would stop in Manchuria, and it is not believed that Japanese aggression, if successful in China, will stop there. It cannot be too frequently repeated that the Japanese military is psychologically an aggressive force which should not be expected to become satiated on successful aggression or deterred from aggression by normal economic and political considerations.

I believe that, although Japanese control of China would probably result in new and increased difficulties and friction between the United States and Japan, it need not be assumed that such a situation would of itself lead to an open breach between the two countries. In this connection it is well to be mindful, of course, that for many years to come the Philippine Commonwealth may constitute a delicate problem in our relations with Japan. Furthermore, I hope that, should Japanese aggression subsequently be directed against British, Dutch, or French possessions in the Far East, or against the Soviet Union, we would be able to avoid involvement. However, I restate that in my opinion the chances of our involvement, were Japanese aggression in China to prove successful, would be measurably greater than would be the chances of our becoming involved in the present conflict were we now to render reasonable assistance to China.

I believe that we have a very great and urgent obligation of responsibility, nationally and internationally, to ourselves and to posterity, to do what we can within reason and without assuming undue risk of involvement toward influencing the course of the present conflict along lines favorable to the Chinese—toward endeavoring to forestall an outcome of the conflict that would do violence to principles which we earnestly desire to have prevail—, and that now is the psychological moment for us to take practicable steps toward discharging that obligation.

17. This memorandum was read by officers of the Department and marked with approval by the Secretary and Under Secretary of State.
18. Baron Kijuro Shidehara who resigned December 11, 1931, as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.
19. Professor John Lossing Buck, of Nanking University, special agent for the Treasury Department in China.
20. See also pp. 519 ff.
21. The evidence of the past year indicates clearly that those rights and interests are not being respected by the Japanese, and that in the absence of intention to take retaliatory or coercive measures diplomatic action is of little avail. [Footnote in the original.]
21. As Consul at Mukden.