Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94119/428: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

Hankow, July 12, 1938—5 p.m.
[Received July 13—10:43 a.m.]

352. Donald⁹⁸ informed McHugh this morning that a daughter of Tang Shao Yi arrived in Hankow at about the same time as the British Ambassador and called on Generalissimo with a message from her father congratulating him upon his stiff resistance to Japanese. She then visited Wang Ching Wei⁹⁹ and proposed to him that he, Tai Chi Tao¹ and Chu Cheng² go to Hong Kong to confer with her father with regard to possible mediation and peace. Wang is reported to have declined the invitation and to have informed Generalissimo of approach. Donald stated that some time before Wang had been approached through some other and unnamed source with the suggestion that he write directly to Prince Konoye to assure him that there would be no enmity between them after hostilities were over. This Wang is said also to have refused to do and to have informed the Generalissimo of approach and of his decision. Donald interpreted the above as efforts by the Japanese to separate some of the leaders in the present Government. Donald stated that Japanese would even be willing now to permit Generalissimo to remain as a power behind the scenes as long as hostilities are over.

In recent conversations which I have had with British Ambassador who is now in Hankow, I found him interested in the question as to whether the present Chinese Government could hold together after loss of Hankow. Today I had a conversation with Blackburn³ who arrived yesterday from Shanghai to join British Ambassador. Blackburn, who at Nanking was inclined to criticise his Ambassador for a tendency to spend too much time away from Nanking and the Central Government, seemed now to feel that it was necessary for him to keep his Ambassador from being too enthusiastic about Chinese Government’s chances of success. Blackburn appeared to believe that there was likelihood that Wang Ching Wei and possibly Tar Chi Tao might leave Government to find berths for themselves with Japanese fostered regimes in occupied areas. I inferred that he was informed of Tang Shao Yi’s overtures. I have observed no evidence here of any tendency or likelihood of break up among leaders of Government. I pointed out to Blackburn that I would attach much more significance to efforts to bring leaders like the Generalissimo, Chu Teh, Mao Tse Tung, Li Tsung Jen or Pai Chung Hsi⁴ over to the Japanese side as the Government always had been embarrassed in its relations with these leaders because of the presence in it of leaders like Wang Ching Wei. I pointed out that while I was by no means confident of the ability of the present Chinese Government to drive the Japanese out of China or even to control the activities of the growing mass of guerrillas throughout the whole occupied areas, I was convinced that resistance would continue for a long time with the Generalissimo growing as a leader and a symbol of Chinese nationalism as opposed to a Japanese controlled China. Blackburn stated that the Chinese leaders were not [now?] much worried over the danger of the collapse of Chinese currency, saying that this was evidenced by Chinese insistence that China must have financial support through a British or other foreign loan, that the Chinese were worried lest with the collapse of the currency the Government would not have the wherewithal to pay its troops. I pointed out that while it was natural for the Chinese Government to desire to obtain a loan to assist in maintaining its credit abroad and its currency in foreign exchange I saw less reason for the Chinese Government to be disturbed over the possible collapse of the currency than for the Japanese. I pointed out that a collapse of Chinese currency would be far more disastrous to the Japanese fostered Chinese regimes than it would be to the Central Government which would still be able to pay its soldiers with a currency usable within the areas under its control. I stated that I could not yet see any basis for peace between the Chinese Government and the Japanese, that I believed and feared that the struggle would go on for a long time with disastrous results to everyone’s interests. I agreed that there was no evidence of war weariness in Japan but pointed out that the change in the Japanese Government brought about by the failure of the Hsuchow campaign (loss of advantage of dry spring weather for pushing attack on Lunghai and Hankow), the putting into operation of the mobilization law now, a law obtained by deceiving the Diet, was in my opinion a measure not so much precautionary on the part of the Japanese Government as a measure of desperation, saying that if at the end of a year the Japanese Government had been forced to mobilize its entire strength for a drive on Hankow I wondered what would be left to mobilize for the long haul that must follow the capture of Hankow, the rehabilitation in the occupied areas, et cetera. I report the above as possibly indicating not only that the Japanese are very anxious to find some way of stopping the present hostilities but also as possibly indicating a feeling in the British Embassy that Chinese resistance is about to break up, to be followed by a drift of leaders toward the Japanese controlled regimes, a feeling which I do not share.

Repeated to Shanghai. Shanghai please repeat to Tokyo.

Johnson

98. W. H. Donald, Australian adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
99. Deputy leader of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).
1. President of the Chinese Examination Yuan.
2. President of the Chinese Judicial Yuan.
3. Sir A. D, Blackburn, Chinese Secretary of the British Embassy in China.
4. Two Communist and two Kwangsi leaders, all generals.