793.94119/429
Memorandum by Mr. Norman H. Davis of New York82
Mr. Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador, who asked for an appointment to see me, came at ten o’clock this morning. He began by expressing regret that on account of my illness he had been unable to see me and have a talk with me in Paris on my return from the Brussels Conference last Fall.
[Page 208]What he wanted to talk with me about then, he said, was to urge us and the British to persuade his and the Chinese governments to accept our mediation in the settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict; and it seemed even more important to him now than it did then and, also, that he was satisfied that his government would be more receptive than ever to accept such mediation.
I explained to him that just now I was here on Red Cross work alone, and was not in a position to speak for our government on this subject, or to discuss any such proposed step. He said he knew I was here just on Red Cross but that he wanted to talk to me frankly, as he had always done, and he proceeded to insist that he knew now that his government would welcome mediation; that he had been talking to the British government and urging them to offer to intervene; that while the British had been willing to discuss it, they had not shown any enthusiasm and were constantly intimating that they would not take any step without the United States. He was therefore in hopes that as a result of his talk with me, he could send word to his government that the United States would be favorably inclined to make such a move.
I told him that I could give him no such word whatever and that, in fact, the last time such a matter was discussed, we had come to the conclusion that it would not be wise or practicable to inject ourselves to that extent in the situation, at least unless there were reasons to believe that Japan and China would welcome mediation and that it would be possible, as a result of mediation, to arrive at a constructive and mutually acceptable solution; that while I could only express my own personal views, it seemed tome that the issue between China and Japan was so fundamental that it was not susceptible of a compromise that would remove the issue.
I asked him if he thought the Japanese militarists had either concluded that they could not conquer China, or that they should abandon the determination to dominate China; or if the Chinese were getting in a state of mind where they would be willing, in fact, to accept Japanese control and abandon their own efforts to maintain their independence. He said the militarists were drawn into that conflict; that they had thought they could inflict enough punishment on China quickly to bring her to her senses, but that they had never contemplated getting in so deep as they had, and that while he was not sure just what their state of mind is now, he was confident that the Army was losing prestige in Japan and that through mediation by Great Britain and the United States, the people would support the government in any reasonable settlement; that while the Army had gained [Page 209] public support by conquering Manchuria, which had not been possible through diplomatic negotiations, the Army had overplayed its hand and public opinion was turning against them.
I asked him what kind of a settlement did he think possible. He thought that the recognition of Manchukoa and the creation of a buffer state in North China, as security to Manchukoa; and a cessation of anti-Japanese propaganda, and cooperation for the economic rehabilitation of China, with some kind of guarantee. I told him my personal reaction to that was doubt as to whether China would accept; a question as to whether a mediator would be willing to support such a program; and as to what he meant by “guarantee.” He said his idea of a “guarantee” was one in which Great Britain and the United States and China all recognized the special position of Japan, and would enter into an agreement for joint efforts toward economic rehabilitation. He felt that when Japan had captured Hankow would be the psychological moment for offering mediation because China would probably then be more amenable to reason and also Japan; that while China had suffered greatly in a material way, Japan was suffering, mentally, and he was confident that the time would soon come when England and America could, if they would, successfully urge China and Japan to accept mediation. I asked him if he thought England would be willing to mediate alone and he said he did not think so.
In conclusion, I told him that I could in no way speak for the American government on this question but that, personally, I could not give him any encouragement, and the situation itself did not as yet look encouraging to me.
- Memorandum transmitted to the Adviser on Political Relations, Hornbeck, by Mr. Davis in his covering letter of July 13 from Washington. Mr. Davis, who was the American delegate to the Brussels Conference of November 1937, was Chairman of the American Red Cross in 1938.↩