793.94/13495
The Consul General at Shanghai (Lockhart) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 19.]
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith, as of probable interest to the Department, copies of an exchange of correspondence53 between the Commanding Officer of the United States Fourth Marines54 and the Japanese military and naval authorities concerning the entry of armed Japanese units into the American defense sector and the passage of Japanese military and naval trucks through that sector.
It will be noted that definite understandings were reached both with the Japanese naval and military authorities on these matters. The agreement with the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party is set forth in the memorandum dated March 17 attached to Admiral Yarnell’s letter to Mr. Gauss dated March 18. It indicates clearly that when the American naval authorities decided to permit the billeting of a small number of naval units in Japanese mills located within the American sector, it was agreed by the Headquarters of the Japanese Naval Landing Party that no patrols should operate outside of these mills and that Japanese liaison and ration trucks were to move to and from these mills to Chapei only via the Ichang Road Bridge over Soochow Creek. By reference to the memorandum mentioned it will be noted that this understanding was not scrupulously observed, inasmuch as on several occasions armed Japanese naval units in considerable numbers passed through the American sector without previous notification and other than by the route agreed upon. However, the situation with respect to Japanese naval traffic has greatly improved.
The American Marine authorities experienced greater difficulties with the Japanese military. Japanese military traffic through the American sector became so heavy that Colonel Price protested repeatedly to Japanese Military Headquarters and eventually an understanding was reached regarding these matters and is set forth in Colonel Price’s letters of March 22 and 24. The agreement of the Japanese Military Headquarters to Colonel Price’s stipulations regarding the passage of Japanese army traffic through the American defense sector appears in Colonel Takahashi’s letter of March 26. It will be noted that this agreement specifies the type of Japanese military vehicles permitted passage and refers to the arms which may be carried by the personnel riding in such vehicles. With reference [Page 189] to the number of supply trucks permitted each day it will be seen by reference to the letter from Japanese Military Headquarters dated March 26 and Colonel Price’s letter of March 28, that the latter acceded to the request of the Japanese military and agreed that a total of twenty supply trucks, ten east bound and ten west bound, might daily pass through the American sector. Both parties, it will be noted, reserved the right to modify, amend or suspend this understanding.
The Japanese military authorities in agreeing to Colonel Price’s stipulations had requested that American Marine sentries be removed as a gesture of friendliness and goodwill. Colonel Price intimated, however, that until the volume of traffic had been definitely restricted he could not comply with the request. A gradual improvement did take place between March 26 and April 2 and on the latter date Marine sentries were removed. Almost immediately armed and unarmed Japanese soldiers in considerable numbers appeared in the American sector, while the volume of traffic increased to two hundred and sixty trucks per day carrying all types of “supplies” and running over routes not included in the original understanding. Protests made by Colonel Price to Japanese Military Headquarters brought about some improvement but from the subsequent correspondence on these matters it will be seen that many violations occurred. Such violations still continue although there has been some improvement.
It is believed this correspondence is of interest inasmuch as it upholds the principle that the armed forces of one country may not move through the defense sector at Shanghai assigned to another country without prior notice and agreement and indicates, furthermore, that this principle is recognized by the Japanese military and naval authorities. In this connection it may be noted that the British military authorities were disinclined to cooperate with the American defense forces in these matters and made no effort to prevent Japanese military traffic through their sector. It is believed that this laissez faire policy was followed because of the strained relations existing between the British and Japanese here and because the British did not wish to aggravate an already delicate situation.
The other point of interest brought out in this correspondence is the fact that although a definite understanding was reached between the American Marine authorities and the Headquarters of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces at Shanghai regarding these matters, and repeated written and oral assurances were received to the effect that orders implementing this understanding had been issued and that [Page 190] every effort was being made to carry them out, violations varying in degree and number continuously occurred. It can only be inferred either that the responsible officers attached to Japanese Military Headquarters did not sincerely attempt to carry out the terms of the understanding or that the Japanese military are extraordinarily inefficient in the matter of disseminating and executing orders.
Respectfully yours,