Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1938, The Far East, Volume III

793.94/128552/5

The Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck) to the British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Cadogan)²⁰

Washington, April 13, 1938.

My Dear Sir Alexander: It was very gratifying to me to have, through the British Embassy here, your letter of February 14 and the memorandum enclosed therewith.

I had long been intending to write you, but, in the press of many matters which have kept me more than busy since my return from Brussels, I have failed thus far to carry out that good intention— along with many other failures to perform.

Turning to the memorandum, I have noted carefully what you say in explanation of the conception which it represents and I fully understand that it does not commit your Government. I note especially your expression of the view that a settlement on the lines sketched cannot be expected unless our two Governments should be able to exercise effective pressure to bring it about. With all of that in mind, I have discussed the memorandum with some of my closest associates, and, in the light of our discussion, we have put on paper a record of discussion in the form of a memorandum which I enclose herewith. As is the case with your memorandum, this memorandum has not been seen by the highest policy-making officials of my Government and does not commit them. It should in fact be regarded as committing no one. However, it accurately reflects, its authors believe, the spirit and the manner in which, in the light of prevailing public opinion in this country, approach is made here to the difficult problems inherent in and presented by current developments in the situation under consideration. Much of what is said is tentative, and all of it is unofficial. I realize, as will you, that it does not offer much on the constructive side. More will be possible, we hope, on that side, later.

I enclose, also, for your convenience of reference, the full text of the most recent extended utterance of the Secretary of State on the subject of this country’s foreign policy.²¹

Assuring you again of my appreciation of your letter, and hoping that I may be able better in the future than during the past four months to make good on the promise which I made early in December last that I would keep in touch with you.

I am [etc.]

[Stanley K. Hornbeck]

[Enclosure]

“Memorandum on Possible Peace Terms for Communication to the United States Government”

Analysis and Comment

(Note: The memorandum gives a tentative indication of the kind of settlement between Japan and China which its Foreign Office authors believe the British Government might consider reasonable. It has not been considered by the British Government and is not to be regarded as committing the British Government. Its authors are of the opinion that a settlement on the lines sketched in its paragraphs should be expected only in case the British and American Governments should be in position to exercise effective pressure toward bringing it about.)

1. The Foreign Office authors envisage action on parallel lines by the American Government and by the British Government. They are of the opinion that action toward restoration of peace in the Far East through machinery which might be set up ad hoc under the Pact of Paris or the Nine Power Treaty would, under present world conditions, prove ineffective.

Comment: The two Governments have been pursuing in regard to many matters in the Far East courses of action which run parallel. They have been doing this without mutual or reciprocal commitments and (when and where so doing) because their views, interests and objectives have been similar. The view now expressed by the Foreign Office authors that ad hoc machinery would under present conditions prove ineffective is shared by the authors of these comments.

The Foreign Office authors feel that action along the lines thus far employed is not likely to cause Japan to abandon her present intention of destroying the Chinese Government and setting up in place thereof puppet régimes subservient to the will of Japan.

Comment: We concur.

The Foreign Office authors feel that under such an arrangement all foreign interests would suffer serious injury and might in course of time find themselves excluded from China.

Comment: We concur, but with emphasis on the word “might.”

The Foreign Office authors reason that if representations were backed by naval forces adequate to defend any vital British interest that might be affected, the attitude of the Japanese Government toward China would probably be considerably modified. They therefore approach the question of possible peace terms from this angle: assuming that the British Government should be in a position to enforce respect for vital British interests and thus dictate terms of peace, what should those terms be.

Comment: We are not in position to make an assumption that the American Government would be in a position (that the United States would be willing) to make a disposal of naval forces for the purpose of defending and enforcing respect for American interests or of dictating terms of peace. Therefore, our approach to the question what the terms of peace should be (in fact, to the whole situation and its problems) is and must be from an angle different from that from which the Foreign Office authors have in this memorandum considered that question.

2. The Foreign Office authors envisage vital British interests in the Far East as being: (1) peace and stable political conditions, (2) the open door and equality of opportunity, and (3) the security of Hong Kong. They consider that if the first two of these were assured the third would be thereby taken care of. Hence, if the British Government were able to secure a peace on the basis of the first two, “every vital British interest would thereby be fully safeguarded and they might hope to secure the cooperation of other powers having substantial interests in the Far East in the attempt to secure such a settlement.” They hope that the United States Government would also be of the view that all that is necessary for the protection of American interests in the Far East is the due observance by all parties of the Nine Power Treaty, and that this Government would therefore be disposed to take action parallel to that of the British Government. They suggest that such action might take the form of making representations to Japan that American (British) interests are being damaged through the failure of Japan to live up to the provisions of Article 1 of the Nine Power Treaty, and of taking such measures as will indicate clearly that the United States (United Kingdom) Government does not intend to acquiesce in further breaching of the provisions of the treaty and making it clear that in the view of the United States (United Kingdom) Government the terms of settlement should be on the one hand fair to China and on the other hand fair and even generous to Japan.

Comment: Without attempting to distinguish between interests and vital interests, it is a well-known fact that this country is deeply concerned in regard and in relation to the questions of peace, stable political condition, open door and equality of opportunity, the world over; and that it is opposed to aggression and conquest and procedures of violence in international relations—everywhere, and therefore in the Far East. Hence, its objectives in regard to points 1 and 2 are similar to the British objectives; and, it would have an indirect concern in regard to point 3. This country of course desires that there be peace, stable conditions, an open door and equality of opportunity in China (and elsewhere) and that there be no aggression against the sovereignty or the territory of any power in the Far East (or elsewhere). The Government of the United States has repeatedly given indication of the importance which it attachés to and the value which it places upon the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty. However, the action which the British authors suggest toward obtaining respect by Japan for the provisions of that treaty calls for a disposal of naval forces, and, as stated above, it cannot be assumed that the United States is or will be willing to employ that method. Moreover, there is room for doubt whether an approach—to the problem of satisfactory terms of settlement within the limits of the Nine Power Treaty alone would be sufficiently broad to cover the needs of the situation.

In the two declarations of the Brussels Conference²² the delegations present, with some exceptions, reaffirmed the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and gave notice that the settlement ultimately made between Japan and China must be acceptable to the parties to that treaty. That action should ultimately have substantial influence upon the course of events in the Far East. But, both the Japanese and the Chinese realize that the fundamental issue in the present conflict is whether China (or large parts of China) is to be ruled by Chinese or by Japanese. It apparently is, as stated by the Foreign Office authors, the present intention of the Japanese to destroy the Chinese Government and to set up in place thereof puppet régimes “that would be completely subservient to the will of Japan.” There is warrant for believing that an objective of the Japanese is to gain complete control of China. In the light of those considerations, the Japanese insistence on their contention that the issues concern Japan and China exclusively and, also, their persistent refusal to give countenance to any intrusion by other powers are intelligible.

As matters stand, would a peace settlement brought about now by pressure from foreign governments with a threat of use of force be anything other than an uneasy, not-to-be-relied-upon, and short-lived truce?

With regard to the menace to the interests of foreign powers, while it is true that Japan is, in those areas which have been occupied by the Japanese Army, steadily undermining and whittling down the rights and interests of other powers, and while there is at all times an incidental menace to the lives and property of foreign nationals, does it not appear that both the Japanese and the Chinese are, and for some time to come will be, so completely occupied with problems of their military operations against each other as to render it unlikely that either power will go out of its way to add to its troubles by an officially planned armed assault upon the territorial or physical possessions of a third power? If, however, one or more third powers were at the present time to dispose naval forces in a manner threatening to Japan, would not the likelihood of substantial assault by some Japanese armed forces upon territories or property of such power or powers be greatly increased? If such an assault were made, would not such power or powers at once—or soon—suffer injuries and incur losses greater in extent and in amount than would otherwise be those which they had sought—by making such a threat—to obviate? Suppose also that third powers were to bring to bear upon China a pressure directed toward causing China to compromise (at China’s expense) with Japan. Would not such a course be inconsistent with the treaty pledges of the powers? Leaving aside considerations of justice and of international morality, would a peace (?) agreement brought about now by such pressure in any way produce conditions of security, more than perhaps momentarily, for anything belonging to or appertaining to the powers and their interests?

Would any effort by third powers directed toward helping Japan to acquire control of any portion of Chinese territory bring any permanent advantage to any of such powers?

The situation and its potentialities being what they are, is not the policy which has thus far been pursued and which is now being pursued by the United States as sound a policy as can be pursued? In the course which it has followed, the Government of the United States at the outset urged upon both the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that hostilities be not entered upon; it thereafter urged upon both Governments that resort be had to processes of conciliation, and it assured both that it would be glad to be of assistance toward resort to such processes; it has throughout preserved an attitude of impartiality (“neutrality”) as between the parties; it has refrained from any action of interference or intervention; it has in effect taken note of impairments of American rights and injuries done to American interests by processes and instrumentalities of force majeure, in some cases by Japanese and in some cases by Chinese agents; it has, however, refused to give any assent or countenance to such acts by either or both of the parties; it has made appropriate protests and entered appropriate reservations; it has notified both parties that it will hold them responsible for results of their unlawful acts; and it has taken steps toward strengthening and augmenting the armed forces of the United States, without adopting a menacing attitude or suggesting that it might use force for purposes of coercion. The Government of the United States took a definite stand in 1932 when it addressed to the Japanese and Chinese Governments its declaration²³ that it could not admit the legality of any situation de facto and it did not intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China or to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the provisions of the Pact of Paris. This Government has during the current hostilities given no assent to violations of international law or of treaty provisions by either the Japanese or the Chinese. This Government and the American people perceive today no useful purpose that could be served, no lasting advantage that might be gained by facilitating or giving countenance to any acquisition by Japan of new rights, titles or privileges on the basis of armed conquest in China.

There would seem to be little warrant for an expectation that Japan can gain a clear military victory over China in the near future. Meanwhile, armament programs are being pushed both in the United States and in Great Britain, and in course of time it should become evident to Japan that she cannot both have her way in China and keep up in an armament race—if either—and that, because of relative changes in strength and of other developments in the general situation, her self-interest will be best served by her showing reasonable regard for the rights, the interests and the opinions of Great Britain and the United States and other concerned powers.

On the basis of these various considerations, it is believed that the most feasible course for the United States—and, if we may venture to suggest, for Great Britain—would be to persevere along these lines and await the coming of a time when it may appear that the Japanese and the Chinese have reached states of mind in the presence of which assistance toward the making by them of a reasonable settlement may to advantage be offered—and be given—from without.

Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the Foreign Office memorandum contain suggestions regarding possible terms of a peace settlement. (It was stated in section 2 that the terms “besides being fair to China, should be fair and even generous to Japan.”)

3, 4 and 5. The Foreign Office authors express the view that arrangements for the future administration of Shanghai would seem to be the crux of the whole problem. They state that restoration as far as possible of the administration as it existed prior to July 1937 with possibly some improvements on the lines suggested in the Feetham Report would meet with certain difficulties because of the large number of Japanese nationals residing at Shanghai and the large amount of the Japanese share in the vested interests and foreign trade there. They speak of an inconsistency between certain provisions of the Nine Power Treaty and exclusion of Chinese authority from Shanghai. They mention a traditional aim of American and British policy, that of encouraging China to develop into a modern state. They affirm that the United States and the United Kingdom will be reluctant in future to use force for protection of vested interests or maintenance of foreign municipal institutions there, whether against Chinese nationalism or against Japanese aggression. They feel that—in view of the uneasy situation which will persist if Japanese control is not eliminated from Shanghai and if foreign control should continue to impede the normal development of Shanghai—there are strong arguments in favor of making a radical change in the existing conditions at Shanghai. They suggest that a self-denying ordinance is called for, under which both Japan and other powers would abandon certain safeguards which have hitherto been regarded as indispensable for the protection of foreign interests there. They express the view that the alternative to maintaining the International Settlement by force is to restore complete Chinese control and that this need not mean the end of foreign participation in local municipal government. They suggest that on the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from Shanghai the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom should use their influence to bring about the setting up by the Chinese Government of a single municipal authority for the whole of greater Shanghai; the municipal administration to contain a foreign element, with full representation of Japanese, British and other foreign interests; the police force to be unified, containing a foreign element; Chinese laws to be applied and the Chinese writ to run throughout; and no troops, Chinese or foreign, to be stationed, within a radius of, say, 30 miles, around Shanghai.

Comment: These views and suggestions with regard to Shanghai have a strong appeal. Our thoughts have been running along substantially those lines. It is believed that official opinion here would be favorably disposed in principle toward them. We feel, however, that the time has not yet arrived for a commitment—such as would be involved in the launching of any particular “plan”—regarding the future of Shanghai.

6. The Foreign Office authors suggest that a solution of the Shanghai problem along the lines indicated above would facilitate a settlement of other points and should connote withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and probably withdrawal of all foreign garrisons; that the Chinese would doubtless be willing to give assurances that the Maritime Customs Administration would be maintained on a basis of international cooperation fair to all powers trading in the Far East; and that China might be pressed to give satisfaction to Japan on a number of points such as anti-Japanese teaching in school textbooks, the suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda, and the tariff rates to be applied to Japanese trade.

Comment: With most of this, it is believed that official opinion here would be in accord, in principle.

The Foreign Office authors state that Japan attachés very great importance to her position in north China and suggest that the terms of peace might include the recognition of “Manchukuo” by China and the granting of special facilities for economic cooperation and for the investment of Japanese capital in north China, including perhaps mining and industrial concessions for Japanese corporations, and some measure of Japanese participation in the management of railways in north China. They indicate, also, that if opportunity should occur for dealing with the question of extraterritoriality, British officialdom would favor a solution on the lines of the draft agreement of 1931 modified by the rendition of the International Settlement at Shanghai.

Comment: With regard to the suggestion that the terms of peace might “include the recognition of Manchukuo by China—a measure which would remove one of the irritants that tend to disturb international relations generally—…,”²⁴ there is room for doubt whether recognition of “Manchukuo” by China really would “remove one of the irritants that tend to disturb international relations generally.” Such recognition (followed by recognition of “Manchukuo” by other countries) might conceivably operate as a palliative, but would it in any way go to the root of any of the causes of conflict which disturb the relations of Japan, China and the Soviet Union? Its one assured effect would be to confirm the confidence of the Japanese in the efficacy of the method which they have been following, that of using armed force, in pursuance of objectives of policy. And this development in the Far East would inevitably encourage other powers which have the inclination to employ or to persevere in employment of that method in other parts of the world. It is not believed in the United States that “Manchukuo” possesses the characteristics of a sovereign and independent state. It must be assumed that this country would not wish to take, to participate in or to be associated with any initiative toward persuading the Chinese to accord the recognition under reference.

With regard to the suggestion that the terms of peace might include the granting of “special facilities for economic cooperation and the investment of Japanese capital in North China,” it is, of course, highly desirable that there be economic cooperation between the Chinese and the Japanese. By virtue of her geographic position and of the fact that she has become highly industrialized earlier than have other Far Eastern countries, Japan enjoys in China and in other Far Eastern markets certain definite “natural” advantages. Measures should be devised whereby the Japanese may reside in, do business in, and trade with China under conditions of safety and of non-discrimination. But, is there reason why the Japanese should be accorded (by any political action) a preferred position there? Would it not seem that only when and as Chinese nationals and Japanese nationals arrive at a common conception that mutual and reciprocal advantages are to be had through amicable economic cooperation between them will there exist a basis for successful carrying out of joint or cooperative Chinese-Japanese undertakings? Can any agreements toward that end to which Chinese authorities might commit China under conditions of duress, if giving the Japanese any “special” position, have beneficial effects of any long duration? In the past, the Chinese authorities have on many occasions found it expedient under conditions of duress to enter into agreements according special rights (“privileges”) to foreign countries and their nationals. However, the circumstances antecedent and the situations prevailing when such agreements were concluded have never been, generally speaking, such as those which prevail in connection with the present Japanese-Chinese conflict. Never have the issues been such as are the issues, between Japan and China, today. The questions of Japanese penetration and of Japanese influence in and over China are questions of vital concern to the Chinese. The question whether foreign governments should bring to bear any substantial measure of influence or pressure toward bringing about the conclusion of an agreement which would accord to the Japanese special rights, privileges, or advantages in north China differing in any way from those accorded to China (and others) in Japanese territories or from those enjoyed by other powers in north China, is a question answer to which can be given to advantage only in the light of most serious and extensive consideration of the many implications and the various possible consequences of such a procedure.

The suggestion that there should be mining and industrial concessions for Japanese corporations seems on its face reasonable and meritorious. However, there at once arise the questions: Circumstances being what they are, would Japan enter into any such agreements on a reciprocal basis; would China derive any real benefit therefrom; and what would be the results in terms of harmony or of friction?

The suggestion that there should be some measure of Japanese participation in and management of the northern railways raises the questions: What, in the event of such a development, would become of the already established interests of other countries, conspicuously those of Great Britain, France, and Belgium, in the northern railways; and would such a measure be consistent with certain provisions of existing treaties and contracts, and with certain features of China’s national policy?

With regard to the broad general subject of Chinese-Japanese cooperation, the question arises: Does the evidence afforded by observation of what has taken place in the areas in which conditions have been theoretically favorable to Chinese-Japanese cooperation (the Kwan-tung Leased Territory, south Manchuria, and since 1931 all of Manchuria) give warrant for an expectation that such cooperation would be attainable in fact in north China? Over the period of the past thirty-three years the Kwantung Leased Territory might with warrant be viewed as having afforded a laboratory for testing the practicability of Chinese-Japanese cooperation, and, viewed in this light, the results of the test would seem to afford little basis for an answer in the affirmative. With the factors of a Japanese administration, an industrious Chinese population, abundant natural resources, and an adequacy of available capital, there has not been produced any real economic cooperation or any substantial collaboration of any kind. Much the same may be said also regarding south Manchuria, where Japanese influence has been predominant for twenty-three years, and regarding “Manchukuo,” where the Japanese have been in control since 1931. In “Manchukuo” not only has there been little or no genuine Chinese-Japanese economic cooperation but economic developments have been kept subservient to political and military objectives, and there has been afforded little or no opportunity for private Chinese participation (as distinguished from “Manchukuo” government participation) or for foreign participation. In the light of these facts, can it be assumed that Chinese-Japanese economic cooperation in north China would be realizable—or would eventuate? Might it not more warrantably be expected that facilities extended for economic cooperation and Japanese investment in north China, if and when, would contribute toward creating in north China a situation in all essential respects similar to the situation in Manchuria? The difficulty which the Chinese find in cooperating, even among themselves, is well known. Also well known are the rigidity of form, of national consciousness, and of political influences which characterize and accompany Japanese official and economic activities. To these factors, there has been added during recent years the factor of intense reciprocal distrust and antipathy. These observations and queries need not imply criticism either of the Japanese or of the Chinese. They do, however, give rise to a further question: Is effective Chinese-Japanese cooperation possible?

In general, does not observation of Japanese penetration into areas populated by Chinese lead to the conclusions: (1) that, where there is close contact between Japanese and Chinese, conflict rather than cooperation develops; (2) that Japanese economic effort in China relies heavily upon Japanese official support; (3) that such effort when and where engaged in tends toward subordination or exclusion of the Chinese interests; and (4) that in areas in which such effort is successful, American and European interests also are gradually and effectively excluded?

Are not these outstanding among the actualities and the possible consequences to which serious consideration must be given in connection with the question whether third powers should or should not urge that special facilities be accorded to Japan for economic cooperation and Japanese investment in north China?

The suggestion that if in the course of a settlement an opportunity should occur for dealing with the question of extraterritoriality a solution might be sought on the lines of the draft agreement of 1931, with modification in the direction desired by China in regard especially to the rendition of the International Settlement as discussed in an earlier section of these authors’ memorandum, is altogether in line with views which have for some time past been those in principle of the American Government.

Additional Comment: The contention is often made that the United States maintains an attitude and follows courses in regard to Far Eastern problems which are unduly “idealistic” and not closely enough responsive to “realities.” Without going into a discussion of the question: What constitutes realism in relation to the situation in and the problems of the Far East?—it is our belief that the approach which the Government of the United States makes to the problems involved is in fact definitely and conspicuously realistic.

During the century of increasingly close contact between the occidental powers and China which preceded the Washington Conference, the occidental powers made trial of and had experience of a great variety of methods of approach. Against the background of experience, and in the light of serious and careful consideration of existing situations and existing trends of thought in various parts of the world, the powers concluded, at Washington, under the leadership of the American and the British Governments, a collection of agreements which were intended to diminish frictions, regulate contacts, and eliminate some at least of the factors which were making for international conflict—especially in the Far East and the Pacific. Whatever may have been the inadequacies and the deficiencies of those agreements, the provisions of one of them, the Nine Power Treaty, constitute, in our opinion, a sound basis for the regulation of the activities of the powers, including Japan, in China and in relations with China. Although there has been during recent years much criticism of that treaty and much contention from some quarters that the treaty either is defunct or is obsolete, from no source has there come any proffer of a better set of principles and provisions which might be agreed upon by the powers for the furthering of the objectives which were sought to be attained by commitment of the powers to (and respect—were it given—by the powers for) the provisions of that treaty. The treaty was based on the assumption that the Chinese people would be capable, if not subjected to unwarranted molestation, of working out by their own methods and their own efforts a new political organization and an economic reorganization which would contribute toward conditions of stability and peace within their country and in the Far East. The American people still feel that the assumption under reference was (and is) sound. The Government of the United States believes that, generally speaking, the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty are fair and susceptible of practical application. It therefore seems to us that the fundamental problem in connection with China and Japan (and the relations of the powers with and in China) is that of bringing about a realization by Japan that relations between Japan and China must conform to the general principles which have been evolved in world experience for the regulation of relations between sovereign and independent states; realization by Japan that neither the Chinese people nor the peoples of other countries which have interests in the Far East are capable of becoming reconciled to a domination by Japan of China; realization by the Japanese that other powers not only have rights in and with regard to China but are incapable of relinquishing some of those rights; realization by Japan that conquest of China by force of arms is expressly forbidden by international legislation, in the form of multilateral treaties, enacted during recent decades; realization by Japan that, whatever may be her immediate success in use of armed force, several other nations, including the Chinese, have greater resources and power of endurance than has Japan; realization, in short, by the Japanese that principles, interests, law, treaty provisions, and the public opinion of many countries too powerful to be disregarded in the long run are opposed to Japan’s present policies and methods in regard to China, and that it therefore is advisable that the Japanese themselves revise both of these.

Such evidence as we have gives no indication that there is imminent a breakdown either of China or of Japan. Nor have we any indication that the Chinese are at this time eager to enter upon any negotiation the objective of which would be a settlement favorable to Japan at the expense of China. Attempts at mediation have already been made by an official representative of at least one power. Suggestions which that representative made to the Chinese apparently with the approval of the Japanese, have been rejected by the Chinese. The efforts of the Brussels Conference to bring about a negotiation were rejected by the Japanese. The Conference is on record in reaffirmation of the principles of the Nine Power Treaty and in affirmation that the settlement between Japan and China when made must be acceptable to the powers party to the Nine Power Treaty which they represented. At the present moment no settlement acceptable to the Chinese would be likely to be acceptable to the Japanese—and vice versa.

In the light of the above, we feel that the time has not yet come when it would be opportune for the American Government or for the British Government or for these two Governments or for any group of governments to put forward a suggested plan of settlement. It seems to us advisable to withhold such a step until both the Japanese and the Chinese shall have reached a state of mind more favorable to a disposition on their part to take into consideration what we believe to be the realities which underlie the whole situation and which sooner or later must be faced. Is there not warrant for an expectation that, as the situation in China further develops, the Japanese will come to a realization that the cost of a perseverance by them in their effort to conquer China will be greater than such a conquest, if achievable at all, could possibly be worth to them; and that in the interval they will, as a result of representations made by other governments and in the light of developments in the fields of public opinion and of military preparedness in other countries, tend to show increasingly greater respect for the rights and interests of third powers?

(Note: Certain officers here are examining, with a view to possible future action at some opportune moment, the question of the practicability (possible methods and calculable effects) of taking action in the nature of “reprisals” in the commercial field against Japan or China or both in connection with disregard, growing out of the present hostilities, for the rights, the interests and the diplomatic representations of the United States and other countries. We would be interested to know whether officers of the British Government have made or are making studies of this question and, if so, to what conclusions.)

[Washington,] April 13, 1938.

20. Transmitted to the Counselor of the British Embassy by the Adviser on Political Relations in letter dated April 13.
21. Address of March 17, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 452.
22. November 15 and 24, 1937, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, pp. 410 and 421.
23. The nonrecognition doctrine of January 7, 1932; see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 76; also see Foreign Relations, 1932, vol. iii, p. 7.
24. Omission indicated in the original.