500.A15A5 Construction/131
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 9.]
No. 2779
Sir: The recent refusal of the Japanese Government to reply affirmatively* to the inquiry addressed to it by the British, French, and American Governments44 as to whether the Japanese Government [Page 97] has undertaken or intends to undertake the construction of capital ships and cruisers of a tonnage greater than that allowed under the London Naval Treaty of 1936,45 must be regarded as a logical action, consistent with the repeated expressions of Japanese naval policy. This action on the part of the Japanese Government is, of course, apart from such questions as the reasons underlying that policy or the effect upon the Japanese Government and public opinion of the inquiry itself.
I. Beginning with the return to Japan of the delegates to the London Conference of 193046 when the Japanese nation became more and more convinced that the country had been sold out to the other naval powers, the Japanese Navy has laid down a policy which has been consistently followed and which nolens volens must be recognized by the Powers as the basis for any Japanese approach to the question of naval disarmament. This policy is one of independent naval construction of a nature designed to meet what the Japanese Navy considers to be its needs: (1) to provide impregnable defense for the Empire and (2) to implement its policy of dominating East Asia and of the “southward advance”. This is described by the Japanese as defensive and, if we exclude the “southward advance” and admit the preponderance of Japanese interests on the mainland of East Asia, it can be accepted as such. There is no evidence that their present Navy or their future building program are of such a nature as to constitute a threat to any country beyond the sphere roughly known as East Asia. This policy of independent naval construction has found expression in three phrases well-known to the Powers which have had dealings with Japan in naval matters for the past few years. These phrases, which first appeared early in 1935, some six or eight months prior to Japan’s abrogation of the Washington and London Naval Treaties, have been used on every outstanding occasion; upon their notice of abrogation,47 upon their departure from the second London Conference in January, 1936,48 in their rejection of the proposal to the limitation of the caliber of guns for capital ships to fourteen inches in June, 1937,49 and now in their refusal to give information concerning naval construction. These phrases are (1) “common upper limit” (2) “no qualitative without quantitative limitation” and (3) “non-menace and non-aggression”.
It may be observed in this connection that on no occasion has the Japanese Government closed the door to participation in any future [Page 98] disarmament conference provided only that the foregoing principles be accepted beforehand by the other Powers.
Of these three phrases the first is self-explanatory, but may be expressed in another form as an insistence upon parity in tonnage in principle; the second merely means that without quantitative limitation, i. e., acceptance by all of a common upper limit, qualitative limitation will not, in Japanese eyes, serve the purposes of realistic disarmament; the third is an expression of the defensive policy of construction which the Japanese maintain they are pursuing. And they are so convinced of their inherent right to the domination of the territory adjacent to their Empire that they are sincere in their characterization of their naval policy as defensive.
There immediately comes to mind the question as to whether it is possible to reconcile the Japanese views of defensive naval construction and of non-menace and non-aggression with the fact, if true, of their building battleships and cruisers of a tonnage in excess of those now possessed by Great Britain and the United States. This question is capable of being approached along the following lines: In the first place the construction by Japan of vessels in excess of 40,000 tons would immediately stimulate the United States and Great Britain to respond in kind which, in fact, it appears that they are about to do; therefore the possibility of aggressive action by Japan against a country as far distant as, say, the United States, would in no way be increased. In the second place it is generally believed by technical observers that the new vessels, while more heavily armed than their present ships, will probably have little increased cruising radius and that, therefore, they can be regarded as defensive in character, at least in the view of the Japanese.
As to the policy of “southward advance”, it is generally conceded that mere ship construction cannot further the pursuit of this policy—which it is admitted must be regarded as aggressive—unless and until the Japanese construct new naval bases further southward than Formosa, and there is no evidence as yet that they intend to do so.
To sum up the foregoing, therefore, it can be stated that the present Japanese naval policy is one which actually does and will continue to constitute a threat to the interests of the western Powers in East Asia, but which does not, and probably will not in the immediate future, constitute a threat to the territory of the western Powers themselves. This, we repeat, is what the Japanese believe to be the pursuit of a defensive policy.
II. The reasons underlying this policy have been frequently touched upon in despatches from this Embassy. They can be summed up as follows: (1) It has been abundantly clear to the Japanese that with the relatively meagre resources at their command they could [Page 99] never hope to compete successfully in a ship-for-ship construction race with greater and richer Powers; this is both obvious and axiomatic but nevertheless it should not be left unstated. (2) Japan feels that she can neither feed her population nor continue to exist in the industrial world without gaining access to such raw materials as may be within her grasp or without stabilizing and increasing her markets in China; consequently the control of China and the approaches to it render domination of East Asia, in the minds of the Japanese, an absolute necessity. (3) The existence of the League of Nations with its constant threat of the use of economic sanctions brings unceasing pressure to bear upon Japan to take such steps as she deems necessary to defend herself against the possible consequences of the application of such sanctions. (4) Her geographical location makes it possible for her to make her defense, from a naval point of view, nearly impregnable provided that she be free to build unrestrictedly the types of ships which suit her needs. (5) Her passionate desire for equality in the eyes of the world and for the preservation of her amour propre, as well as her necessity for maintaining “face” in the eyes of the Chinese, has led her to hold out for parity in principle even at the cost of stimulating further construction on the part of the other naval Powers. For example, if Japan’s policy results in the building by the United States of a navy so large that the ratio between it and that of Japan is increased to an extent even beyond the present ratio, Japan’s defensive position, i. e., not only as regards the Empire itself but as regards its domination of East Asia, will be scarcely affected—a fact which concerns Japan greatly—whereas Japan’s offensive position, i. e., her ability to attack the United States will be, of course, greatly reduced—a fact which concerns Japan virtually not at all.
Without intending to make an exhaustive study of the motives behind Japanese naval policy, the foregoing are among the outstanding factors which must be taken into consideration in evaluating that policy. It may well be argued from the above that the Japanese have much to gain and little to lose by pursuing a policy of independent naval construction and permitting the other nations to do what they like. Japan has no present intention of carrying the battle to the western Powers; but if the western Powers wish to carry the battle to Japan, the Japanese navy is and can be prepared.
III. The effect upon the Japanese Government and public opinion of the recent inquiry addressed to Japan by the three Powers, in which information was requested as to whether Japan were building ships in excess of the treaty tonnage, has been, to judge by the tone of the Government’s reply, and the press comment, to arouse a feeling of resentment that the treaty Powers should call upon Japan to furnish information not required by any obligation incumbent upon her. At [Page 100] the same time, however, the Japanese Government placed itself on record once more as being willing to enter upon discussions on the matter of disarmament “which give primary importance to a fair quantitative limitation”.
From the point of view of the press here the action of the three Powers was designed to throw the burden of naval armament expansion upon Japan in the eyes of the world and for no other reason. The press argues that as common sense will show that Japan’s budget will not permit the building of a fleet large enough to menace the United States, why, then, does the American press maintain that the Japanese reply will make Japan responsible for beginning a naval armament race? “The real intention of Great Britain, France and the United States,” says the Nichi Nichi Shimbun, “is to shift to Japan the burden of responsibility for their respective armament expansion. The primary intention of Great Britain is to protect its rights and interests in China by indirect means.” And so on; there is no need to quote further from the press. The fact remains that the action of the three Powers was resented and that the Japanese are apparently indifferent to the prospect that a naval race may be started by their refusal to furnish information concerning their naval construction.
IV. It may at this point be desirable to speculate upon the reasons underlying the refusal of Japan to furnish information regarding her naval building in order to prevent the Powers from exercising their rights under the “escalator” clause of the 1936 Treaty and so stimulating a naval armament race. The reasons which come to mind are three:
- (1)
- The Japanese are convinced that, due to world conditions elsewhere than in the Far East, Great Britain (followed by the United States) would in any case greatly increase her strength in categories of vessels which, even though they might remain within treaty limits, as to tonnage, would make it necessary for Japan to build further for defense; hence Japan would rather be left free to construct as she pleases; and not to tie herself down to ships of a specified tonnage.
- (2)
- Japan is fully aware of her “nuisance value” and she is hopeful that, with her ability to maintain secrecy regarding her naval construction to a far greater degree than any other nation, she is in a position—by creating fear that she is building new types of vessels which would render obsolete existing types—to be such a constant menace to the Powers that she may force them eventually to accept the principle of parity in exchange for information regarding her naval construction.
- (3)
- And lastly, the Japanese feel that they can afford to be more or less indifferent to the expansion of naval armaments by the Powers for the reasons given under II above; namely, that Japan is confident of her ability to take care of her security in East Asia irrespective of what the Powers may do.
There are enclosed herewith copies of the American, British and French notes of February 5, 1938, and of the Japanese replies thereto as supplied by the Japanese Foreign Office in English and French translation. It may be added in this connection that while we are transmitting to the Department our reply in English translation exactly as it was received from the Foreign Office, the British Embassy chose to “polish up” the translation which they received before transmitting it to London. A comparison of the two texts will reveal that the British Embassy version of the translation conveys a rather more brusque tone than does the original as received by this Embassy.
Respectfully yours,
- Embassy’s telegram No. 101, February 12, 7 p.m. [Footnote in the original telegram not printed; for text of Japanese note of February 12, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 304.]↩
- For note dated February 5 from the Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, see ibid., p. 303. For further correspondence on naval construction, see Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, pp. 891 ff.↩
- Signed March 25, 1936; 50 Stat. 1363.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.↩
- Note dated December 29, 1934, Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. i, p. 274.↩
- Note dated January 15, 1936, ibid., p. 297.↩
- See telegram No. 161, June 18, 1937, 4 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, ibid., p. 301.↩