751.67/239
The Ambassador in Turkey (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 26.]
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Department that since the submission of the Embassy’s last despatch on the Hatay,45 No. 725 of June 29 last,46 the impediments to the reaching of an adjustment of the matter between France and Turkey have been overcome and the problem has, in the words of the French Foreign Minister, been “definitely liquidated” by the signing of a series of documents affirming Franco-Turkish friendship and providing for the territorial integrity and the security of the Sanjak.
As reported in the press of July 2, these documents comprise: (1) a Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and France, (2) a Military Agreement providing for joint guarantees by France and Turkey, on an equal basis, with regard to the internal and external security of the Hatay, (3) a Protocol implementing the foregoing Agreement and fixing the strength of the French and Turkish garrisons to be maintained in the Sanjak, (4) a Joint Declaration concerning the determination of boundaries between the Sanjak and Turkey and the Sanjak and the States under French Mandate, which anticipates the eventual collaboration of Syria and will ultimately (when Syria achieves independence) be replaced by a tripartite treaty, and (5) a Protocol concerning optants for Turkish or Syrian (or Lebanese) nationality.
Translations of unofficial texts of the above documents, with the exception of the Military Agreement and the Military Protocol, the texts of which have not been published, have been transmitted to the Department as enclosures to the Embassy’s despatch No. 734 of July 13, 1938.47
The first indication that a settlement of the Hatay question was imminent was contained in the Prime Minister’s closing address to the Grand National Assembly on June 29. On that date he said that although [Page 1040] the several conversations progressing simultaneously at Paris, Ankara and Antioch had not yet entered their final stages, the question was no longer critical and “a softer wind was blowing”. (A translation of Mr. Bayar’s remarks with regard to the Hatay is transmitted herewith for the Department’s information as Enclosure No.1).48
The grounds for the Prime Minister’s optimism were soon disclosed. On July 2, the Turkish press published the text of a joint declaration issued the day before by M. Bonnet and Bay Suad Davaz, Turkish Ambassador in Paris, to the effect that the “problem of Alexandretta” had been effectively solved. The communiqué, furthermore, officially admitted France’s recognition of the fact that “the arrangements of 192149 implicitly conferred a special situation upon the Turkish elements of the Sanjak” and reasserted “Turkey’s territorial disinterestedness”.
On the morning of July 3, the Military Agreement and Protocol were signed at Antioch. As already stated, the former is understood to provide for Franco-Turkish collaboration in guaranteeing the territorial integrity and the internal security of the Sanjak, and the latter to specify the number of troops to be despatched to the Hatay by both France and Turkey. In this latter respect, it is the Embassy’s understanding that the French and Turkish military missions had disagreed concerning the size of their respective garrisons, France originally wishing to set the number of its troops at 750 and Turkey insisting on 4,000, and that a compromise was finally accepted by both parties by which the number of each country’s troops was fixed at 2,500. The official communiqué issued on that date by the Turkish Government, announcing the signature of the Agreement and Protocol, likewise announced the successful termination of the treaty negotiations taking place at Ankara.
On July 4, the Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship, the Joint Declaration, and the Protocol concerning optants, to which reference has already been made, were signed at Ankara.
In view of the opinions contained in the enclosed memorandum (Enclosure No. 2)48 with regard to possible British interest in the Hatay situation, expressed by Mr. Joseph M. Levy, Staff Correspondent of the New York Times for the Near East, it is perhaps worthy of mention that on both July 3 and 4, official or semi-official British pronouncements were made calling attention to the happy termination of the Sanjak problem and emphasizing the importance of Great Britain’s friendly relations with Turkey. The first statement was contained [Page 1041] in an editorial appearing in Mr. Anthony Eden’s Yorkshire Post, and the second was made by Sir John Simon during the course of a speech in the House of Commons.
As provided for by the Military Agreement and Protocol, Turkish troops began immediately to enter the Hatay. The first detachment arrived on July 4, and the main body during the course of the following few days.
As was to be expected, the events of July 3 and 4 were the occasion of great jubilance in the Turkish press, which pointed out that Turkish statesmanship had once again triumphed over France. Considerable emphasis was also placed upon the contribution thus made to world peace in general and particularly to security in the Mediterranean.
On July 7, negotiations were begun between Dr. Aras and a French delegation, under the Chairmanship of the French Ambassador, which included several experts to represent the Mandatory Power, and the Emir Adil Arslan as representative of the Syrian Government, with a view to concluding the tripartite treaty envisaged in the Joint Declaration of July 4th. These negotiations continued until July 11, when the press announced their postponement because of the need of further research and deliberation. It will be observed from the remarks of Dr. Aras to Mr. Levy (Enclosure No. 2), however, that the real reason for postponing the negotiations was that Turkey was unprepared at the present time to accept the Syrian proposal that an area including Alexandretta and Antioch be ceded outright to Turkey. Later, on July 12, in a conversation with Mr. Kelley, First Secretary of Embassy, Dr. Aras repeated this statement in somewhat elaborated form. A copy of a memorandum of Mr. Kelley’s conversation with the Foreign Minister is enclosed for the Department’s information (Enclosure No. 3).50 It is understood that the postponed negotiations will be resumed in September, at which time the French Foreign Minister is expected to make an official visit to Turkey.
Now that the Hatay question has been “definitely liquidated” (at least in so far as it is a direct issue between France and Turkey) it is perhaps opportune to inquire into its significance, into the reasons which originally created it, and into the probable effects of the solution reached. Throughout the last two years, approximately, during which time the matter has sporadically flared and waned—one moment as a question involving the national honor of Turkey and hence capable of precipitating the most serious consequences, and the next as a dispute about to be settled along lines dictated by Turkey—the Turkish press has never once given a clear statement of the Turkish case, or developed any logical argument as to the basis of Turkey’s [Page 1042] claims. The welter of press comment concerning France which has appeared during this time has been overbearing, threatening, vitriolic and even insulting in tone, but it has contained only vague allusions to the causes of the dispute, in which, apparently, no great interest was generally felt. There has therefore been considerable speculation as to why Turkey should insist upon the inauguration of a special régime for the Sanjak, at the same time definitely denying any territorial aspirations in that quarter, and also as to why France should so often recede before Turkish demands and remain apparently unruffled by the turgid attacks of the Turkish press.
To explain these facts, several theories have been advanced. Of these the most popular are that Turkey desires, for military reasons, control of the approaches to the Cilician Gates, or that Turkey was merely insisting upon the fulfillment of a moral right, or that the matter has been a personal obsession of Atatürk’s and has been so understood by all concerned.
The theory advanced by Mr. Levy (Enclosure No. 2), that granting Turkey control of the Hatay is a necessary quid pro quo in return for assurances concerning control of the Straits and the furnishing of military assistance, and that it is only one part of a much larger whole having to do with British measures of defense against possible European aggression, is a view that has not been previously encountered in Turkey. It would appear, however, to be consonant with the facts at hand and, moreover, to offer an explanation of certain aspects of the case—notably Turkey’s assured insistence, France’s willingness to recede before Turkish demands, and the apparently intimate connection of the British Ambassador with the progress of the matter—for which it is otherwise difficult to find a satisfactory explanation. This view, therefore, appears not only possible but worthy of serious consideration.
As to the effects of the solution of the question, it seems probable that, for some time at least, Turkey will content itself with developing the Port of Alexandretta and the resources of the district. It is the Embassy’s understanding that every effort will be made to keep what might be considered as purely Turkish institutions, administrative practices, et cetera, from appearing as a part of the government machinery of the Hatay, and to develop as great an amount of autonomy as circumstances permit. It is further understood that a free port will be created at Alexandretta, the benefits of which will be shared by Turkey, Syria and Iran [Iraq?], The questions of the fixing of boundaries and of Syrian collaboration in assuring security, and other problems involving Syria, will be disposed of provisionally by agreement and ultimately by a tripartite treaty. [Page 1043] Negotiations in this regard, as has been stated, are to be resumed in September. When they have been satisfactorily concluded, a basic adjustment of the matter will, therefore, have been arrived at by the three countries most immediately concerned. As the Department will observe from Enclosure No. 4 (Memorandum of a Conversation between the French Ambassador and Mr. S. Walter Washington),52 however, the possibility that a fourth country (Russia) may manifest an active interest in the Port of Alexandretta is, somewhat surprisingly, seriously considered in certain quarters.
Respectfully yours,
- Turkish name for Sanjak of Alexandretta.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed. For French texts of the Treaty of Friendship and the Joint Declaration, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1937, pp. 515–517.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, signed at Angora, October 20, 1921, League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. liv, p. 177.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩