890D.01/467
The Consul at Beirut (Steger) to the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Murray)
[Received January 13, 1938.]
Dear Mr. Murray: For some time I have been thinking on the points raised in your letter of October 4th2 to Mr. Marriner, and especially the question as to the procedure by which the French will carry out the provisions of Article 3 of the Franco-Lebanese and Franco-Syrian Treaties,3 requiring the transfer to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of obligations assumed by France toward the United States on behalf of these Governments. Routine work, however, has been so pressing that I have only now found it possible to study carefully the material on file, and endeavor to evolve some orderly thoughts on the subject. I hope that the results, which I give below, may prove to be of some interest to you.
In the first place, I am rather doubtful that the French have given any especial thought to the matter, or if they intend to take any definite steps prior to the admission of the two countries to the League of Nations. More probably it is assumed that, by virtue of Article 3 of the Treaties, all international obligations which France has undertaken with respect to the mandated territory will automatically become binding on the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. This view would appear to be borne out by Article 8 of the Treaties, which reads as follows:
“Article 8.—Dès l’entrée en vigueur du présent traité, le Gouvernement français sera déchargé des responsabilités et obligations qui lui incombent, en ce qui concerne la Syrie (le Liban), du fait tant de décisions internationales que d’actes de la Société des Nations.
[Page 1004]“Ces responsabilités et obligations, dans la mesure où elles subsisteraient, seront automatiquement transférées au Gouvernement Syrien (Libanais).”
If this is to be the attitude of the Mandatory, the situation created will, as your letter implies, be somewhat confusing and none too satisfactory. Therefore I agree that it would be desirable to begin, prior to the entry into force of the Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese Treaties, at least preliminary conversations looking toward the conclusion of agreements with the two fledgling nations.
In respect to this I see two possible difficulties. The first is the legal point that the two countries, not being sovereign, may not be considered as qualified to enter into binding international agreements. However, the precedent of the Treaties with France, which enter into effect only on the date of admission to the League of Nations, should be ample to justify the signing and ratification of other agreements to come into effect at the same time. I assume, therefore, that the French would hardly interpose any objection to the conduct of negotiations prior to the termination of the Mandate.
The second difficulty is more of a practical nature, and lies in the political inexperience of the individuals who might be designated to carry on the negotiations. A case in point is that of the Lebano-Syrian conversations regarding the question of the Intérêts Communs, in which the French have been giving no especial assistance: After about six months of intermittent discussions, the only result is that no agreement has been reached. The individuals concerned cannot be hurried, and there is of course no assurance that the negotiators will not be changed at any time. This dilatory tendency is of course a point in favor of beginning negotiations at the earliest possible moment; but even then there is no assurance that treaties can be concluded before independence is achieved.
One strong bargaining point is of course Article 5 of the Mandate, which provides that the privileges formerly enjoyed by foreigners under the capitulations shall be reestablished on the conclusion of the Mandate unless the Powers shall have previously renounced these rights or agreed to their suspension. While I do not suppose that the United States, or any of the other Powers, intend to insist on these rights in the future, the legal position created by this provision should make the Lebanese and Syrians very desirous of concluding treaties whereby these privileges are renounced.
If, as is now contemplated, these two countries should become independent on January 1, 1940 (and I, like yourself, remain unconvinced that this can be accepted as an established fact), and if, as is probable in that event, satisfactory treaties have not yet been negotiated, it would undoubtedly be desirable, shortly before that date, to assure the [Page 1005] preservation of our rights by a provisional agreement. This might, presumably, take the form of an exchange of notes in which we receive assurances that, pending their confirmation or re-definition in formal treaties, all rights and privileges enjoyed by the United States and its nationals under the mandatory regime shall continue to exist unchanged and unimpaired. As indicated in the preceding paragraph, it seems to me that the Lebanese and Syrians would have every interest in coming to such an agreement.
I infer from your letter that you would not advise any discussion of this matter with the French at the present time. However, it seems to me that it might be proper to approach the question, quite informally, shortly after the exchange of ratifications. If, as I am inclined to believe, the French intend to take no steps, considering that Articles 3 and 8 of the Treaties make their position sufficiently clear, then we might, providing the French raise no objection, suggest to the Lebanese and Syrians the opening of negotiations.
I should be glad to hear further from you on this subject, especially as to whether you would like to have the matter discussed informally either with the French or with the heads of the local Governments.
Very truly yours,