867N.01/1279: Telegram
The Consul General at Jerusalem (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 12—3:40 p.m.]
Local reaction to Partition Commission report and British statement of policy is generally one of disappointment that positive line of action was clearly set forth and growing conviction that they offer no basis for compromise of conflicting Jewish and Arab demands or little hope that the Palestinian Arabs can be brought through persuasion and good counsel to call off the current revolt unless first assured that the pivotal question of Jewish immigration will be settled in their favor.
Jewish circles are at the same time greatly relieved that no definite announcement is made of a policy which would limit or crystallize the Jewish National Home program of the Balfour Declaration and Palestine Mandate. They hope to be able during the projected London conversations to prevent the adoption of any such policy and to [Page 985] reopen the country’s doors to large-scale immigration. New York Times and Associated Press telegrams portray accurately their categorical rejection of the Commission’s conception of statehood and economic federalism as elaborated in plan C.
Arab circles are jubilant that partition is discarded and consider the British invitation to Arab rulers a notable victory for their contention that the Palestine problem can only be solved as a larger Arab and Moslem question. They cannot, however, see how effective discussions can be held in London unless the Mufti participates either in person or by representatives. They recognize him as their one outstanding acclaimed leader and hold as axiomatic both that no Arab would venture to act as representative of the Palestine Arabs except with his approval and that such approval will not be given unless satisfactory assurances as to the immigration question are first received.
In British circles the initial reaction was generally one of intense disillusionment, bordering on disgust, a word I have heard used a score of times, that their Government has again evaded obvious fundamental issues and failed to announce a clear cut policy. They can see no hope for permanent peace unless Jewish immigration is stopped or at least drastically curtailed and the onus placed squarely on the Jews for the building up of an atmosphere of confidence without which no basis of future Arab-Jewish cooperation can exist.
Among better informed and more thoughtful British officials and neutral observers, however, the view is emerging that a majority of the British Cabinet led by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, while strongly favoring frank adoption of a strongly pro-Arab policy and convinced that no Jewish-Arab agreement can be reached through the projected London conversations, have compromised on the latter point with a minority view advocated by the Secretaries of War and the Colonies. That Jewish political pressure in England and the United States has influenced the majority to adopt this course of action is generally conceded but the ultimate result it is thought will be the same, i. e., after failure of the London conversations a declaration of policy supported by the Arab rulers under which Palestine will for a period be administered by Great Britain under a basically modified or reinterpreted mandate.
I concur in the view voiced generally by these latter that the report is an able and factually helpful exposition of the administrative problem of Palestine, one which can well, with necessary modification, serve as the basis of effective cantonal (five area) administration of the country for some years pending elaboration of a basis for final settlement and termination of the mandate.